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.. ". 
Scholarship needs to pass from the making of ~hs to 
the stu~ of the making of ~hs and, even, to the 
study of the people who make those ~hs. 
(J. Pocock, 1975: 614; cited in Harries, 1988) 
Hey, White Boy! 
You know, when you were born, you were purple, 
then you went pink 
when you are angry, you go red 
when you are cold, you go blue 
when you are scared, you go white 
you lie in the sun and you go brown. 
I am always brown, 
whether I'm angry, cold, scared, or sunburnt! 
And you, "Mlite BOY", have the cheek to call me 
-' ' . ' ,J 
, ••• a "coloured"? 
(anonylliOUs graffiti, Cape Town subway) 
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Abstract 
This study examines South African racial discourse within 
what may be described as a 'critical social science' 
framework. Despite South Africa's long racist history, 
research which provides a thorough understanding of racism 
is limited. Consequently, this study aimed to explore the 
ideological nature of young 'white' South Africans' 
commonsense understandings of 'race' and racism through a 
discursive and rhetorical analysis. Twenty-five young, 
.... 
'white' South Africans were interviewed on a wide range of 
topics relating to the category of 'race' and the 
phenomenon of racism. Interviews were loosely structured 
and lasted between two and four and a half hours. The 
analysis was oriented to identifying the key discourses 
participants used in the construction of their accounts, as 
well as the linguistic devices and rhetorical strategies 
employed in negotiating the "dialectic of prejudice" 
(Billig et aI, 1988: 100). Three principal discourses were 
identified: the discourse of biologism, the discourse of 
cognitivism, and the discourse of constructivism. However, 
not all participants drew equally upon all three of these 
discourses. The declared political affiliation of the 
speaker (Nationalist, Liberal or Left-wing) was related to 
the selection of discourses and the nature of the 
linguistic resources and rhetorical devices used in the 
production of accounts. For example, Nationalist speakers 
tended to construct accounts in terms of the discourses of 
biologism and cognitivism, but not in terms of the 
discourse of constructivism. These findings are discussed 
in the light of contemporary research on the "the language 
of racism" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992), a~d their 
theoretical and pragmatic implications are considered. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
It was a Friday night. Charles and I were celebrating 
his triumph with a drink at the local pub. The 
celebrations were well-deserved! Charles'~ parents 
were impover.ished, illiterate, rural folk; his family 
just survived, subsistence farming in one of the 
infamous 'homelands'. Charles, who had always hoped 
to study law, had worked extraordinarily hard to be 
accepted by a top South African university. Once 
admitted, he was confronted with new unanticipated 
difficulties stemming from the overwhelming 'white' 
middle class culture of the institution. Yet five 
years later, he had won a prestigious scholarship to 
the United States. I felt enormously proud and happy: 
Charles had been one of 'my' ASP (Academic Support 
programme) students, and I had shared in the long hard 
journey of his intellectual development. We raised our 
glasses. Suddenly the warmth of the moment was 
shattered. "Haai! Wat doen jy met daaie fokken 
kaffir? En jou,jou vuilgat, luigat '" jy stink man!!" 
(translation: "Hey you! What are you doing with that 
f . .. ing kaffir? And you, you dirty pig, you lazy son 
of a bitch ... you smell man"). A huge man lurched 
forward, smelling of beer and sweat. His buddies 
pressed behind him leering. I leapt angrily to my 
feet. Charles, fine-boned, debonair and immaculately 
dressed, put his hand gently on my arm. "Let's go" he 
said quietly. "But ... " I began. "There's no point", 
Charles replied, with a faint smile. "Come." 
This thesis is about racism, a vicious and brutal 
oppression which has destroyed the lives of millions and 
violated their most fundamental human rights. In South 
Africa, racism has permeated every facet of peoples' lives. 
In the all too recent past the virulence of its form 
governed where you may live, where you may go to school, 
where you may work, how you may travel, whom you may marry, 
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even with whom you may share a bed. Centuries of colonial 
rule coupled with the odious ingenuity of the apartheid j 
regime, saw to it that racism infiltrated every detail of 
daily living to the benefit of those deemed 'white' and to 
the serious detriment of those deemed 'black'. 
In this first chapter I hope to sketch the context within 
which this study was conducted. I therefore begin with a 
section on history, politics and psychology. This includes 
a very brief overview of the general history of South 
Africa as well as of the development of the discipline of 
psychology in that country. The latter is important since 
historically psychology has been infused with racist 
practice, a feature which partly accounts for my desire to 
-< • 
undertake this piece of work. In the second section of 
this chapter, I provide my rationale for the study, and 
explain the general aims of the research. The third 
section tackles the issue of terminology with the objective 
of clarifying my use of certain terms and not others in 
this thesis. In the final section I provide a brief 
outline of the remaining chapters. 
1.1 History. Politics and Psychology: The Context 
1.1.1 History and politics 
It is important before proffering even a briAf introduction 
to the history of South Africa that this be preceded by a 
caveat which notes that both the content and the process of 
that history-making is infused with racial bias (Bundy, 
1979; Harries, 1988; Meli, 1988; Saunders, 1988; as indeed, 
is a great deal of South African literature; February, 
1981; Gunner, 1988). This is revealed in the fact that the 
majority of historians are 'white' men, and that most texts 
display an obvious ethnocentric or Eurocentric bent: 
generally, the country's history is constructed in terms of 
'white' (Dutch/British/Boer) conquest and advancement, and 
'black' savagery and backwardness (eg. refer the 11 volumes 
of Theal, 1887 - 1919). This is illustrated by the fact 
that many texts pinpoint 1652 as the year when South Africa 
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'began' (when Jan van Riebeeck arrived at the Cape of Good 
Hope to establish a refreshment station on the sea-route to 
India) although, as Thompson and Prior (1982) have argued, 
much was happening in southern Africa from about AD 300, 
when the ancestors of the 'African' population first began 
to settle in South Africa. 
It may be argued that 1652 did mark the beginning of South 
Africa's racial history, with 
settlement by 'white' people (cf. 
the first permanent 
van den Berghe, 1967). 
However, as noted the manner in which this history is 
described is problematic. The story is told almost 
exclusively from a 'white' perspective. 'Black' people, 
when mentioned, are portrayed in a variety of minor roles -
.., . 
as objects of interesting anthropological study (the 
'tribes' of Southern Africa), as presenting obstacles to 
'white' advancement (the various clashes/wars between Boer 
and Zulu for example), or as a useful resource in the 
extraction of South Africa's mineral wealth (cheap labour 
on the mines) . 
The domination of 'black' people by 'white' people began 
with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape, an event 
which heralded two and a half centuries of colonial rule. 
The Dutch and the British each occupied South Africa at 
various times until Britain returned South Africa to the 
'afrikaners' in 1910 after lengthy negotiations which were 
an "all-white affair" (van den Berghe, 1967) and "designed 
in the interests of imperialism" (Meli, 1988: 221). This 
period was also marked by continued resistance on the part 
of the indigenous population, which culminated in the 
founding of the African National Congress in 1912. 
The period from 1910 to 1948 was characterised by increased 
Afrikaner Nationalism, racial segregation and oppression on 
the one hand, and continued resistance on the other. In 
1948 the National Party came to power. The apartheid era 
followed, driven by lunatic policies designed to entrench 
racial ideology and facilitate more vicious and brutal 
forms of oppression. 'Black' resistance continued. On the 
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16th of December 1961, Umkhonto we Sizwe, the 'peoples' 
army' was formed: a policy of passive resistance had 
brought only violent assault by the State and had not 
secured South Africa's liberation. Even so, it was to take 
a further 33 years before freedom was achieved. 
On the 27th of April last year the first ever democratic 
elections in South Africa were held, resulting in the 
transfer of power from the 'white' minority to the 'black' 
majority. Nelson Mandela, having spent nearly three 
decades in jail, was sworn in as President on 10th May. A 
new era was born. 
1.1.2 psychology and politics; the early histo~ 
-< • 
It is within this historical context, characterised by 
domination and oppression, that the discipline of South 
African psychology arose. It is not surprising to 
discover, therefore, that the discipline itself has a long 
racist history (Foster, 1991a: 17). Unfortunately, social 
science is not an autonomous social practice but is a 
product of the society of which it is part (Jubber, 1986), 
or as Johan Mouton (1986: 139) has observed: 
social research is, in the final analysis, a 
social practice which implies that it cannot avoid be 
coming entangled in the web of power struggles 
inherent in all societies. 
psychology and racism were enmeshed in South Africa even 
from the earliest moments. For example, in 1861, the 361 
mental patients in the lunatic asylum on Robben Island were 
segregated broadly on the basis of 'race' (Foster, 1990). 
Although racist practice infused mental health care in the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, it was not until the 1920s that 
psychology began as an 
South Africa (Foster, 
department of psychology 
institutionalised discipline in 
1991b) . In 1917, a separate 
was established at the University 
of Stellenbosch and shortly thereafter other universities 
followed suit. A sub-department of mental hygiene was 
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founded in the state sector following the Mental Disorders 
Act of 1916 (Foster, 1991b). 
From its inception south African psychology tended to focus 
upon social problems (as defined predominantly by 
conservative 'white' men). The "poor 'white' problem", for 
example, provided psychologists with an opportunity to 
demonstrate the usefulness of their fledgling discipline in 
respect of offering 'solutions' to societal ills. Indeed, 
an educational psychologist, E.G. Malherbe, was one of the 
first people to draw attention to this problem (Louw, 
1986). After he encountered poverty-stricken woodcutters 
in the Knysna forest, Malherbe wrote an article in T.he Cape 
Times newspaper calling for a scientific investi~~tion into 
the problem. 
During the 1920s a number of psychologists became involved 
with the plight of the poor 'whites', one of whom was the 
infamous Dr Hendrik F. Verwoerd. Verwoerd was born near 
Amsterdam in 1901, and moved to South Africa as a child. 
He studied psychology at Stellenbosch University whereafter 
he was offered a scholarship to Oxford. Verwoerd declined 
this opportunity, "preferring to study in Germany. He later 
returned to South Africa and in 1927 became the first 
professor of applied psychology at the University of 
Stellenbosch in the Cape. 
In 1934 Verwoerd delivered a paper at the Volkskongress in 
which he argued that the problem of poor 'whites' stemmed 
from the fact that 'black' people had taken the jobs of 
'white' people in the cities (Louw & Foster, 1991). He 
advocated that 'black' people be returned to their 
'homelands', a grim foreshadowing of 
as principle architect of apartheid. 
his later masterplans 
Apart from organising 
the national conference on the poor 'white' problem, 
Verwoerd's early political activity involved leading a 
deputation to Prime Minister Hertzog to request that South 
Africa refuse admission to Jewish refugees from Nazi 
Germany (Thompson & prior, 1982). 
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In 1937 Verwoerd left psychology to become the founder-
editor of the newspaper, Die Transvaler, through which he 
championed Afrikaner Nationalism and the Nazi cause in the 
Second World War. In 1948 Verwoerd entered the Senate, 
later acquiring the portfolio of Native Affairs - from 
whence he designed his policy of apartheid. He became 
leader of the party and Prime Minister in 1958, a position 
he retained until he was assassinated in Parliament in 
1966. Verwoerd, one of the first psychologists trained in 
South Africa and one of the first chairs in the fledgling 
discipline" was one of the most virulent racists South 
Africa has ever seen: to the discipline's shame, it was a 
psychologist who fulfilled Afrikaner Nationalism's desire 
for a republic and explicated the ideological justification 
for 'separate development' and its implementation in the 
'homeland' policy (Thompson & Prior, 1982). 
Early South African psychology's focus upon social problems 
continued to spawn a considerable amount of racist research 
and practice. For example, the "poor 'white' problem" 
stimulated a wealth of research on mental testing during 
the 1920s and 1930s. Much of this w9rk adhered to an 
hereditarian explanation for the consistent under-
achievement of 'black' people on intelligence tests (eg. 
Fick, 1929; 1939), although in parallel with international 
debates, these arguments were countered by those advocating 
an environmentalist line (eg. MacCrone, 1936; Biesheuve1, 
1943) . 
The 'social problems' orientation of much of South African 
psychology was also evident in the 1940s and 1950s which 
saw the establishment of services concerned with the 
attitudes and aptitudes of the armed forces in the 
aftermath of the Second World War (Louw & Foster, 1991). 
Aptitude testing remains a strong research tradition in 
South Africa to this day, although more recently it has 
been plagued by the difficulties associated with issues of 
'culture bias' in tests. 
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While mental testing played a large part in early South 
African psychology, so too did a body of research which 
falls broadly under the term 'intergroup relations'. 
Studies were conducted which examined the nature of 
prejudice, which sought to measure racial attitudes and 
which explored various aspects of intergroup contact and 
conflict (refer chapter 3, refer sections 3.3 and 3.4 for a 
more comprehensive review). Again, much of this research 
was premised upon the notion that 'black' people 
constituted 'the problem', although as we shall see later 
there were a few notable exceptions (cf. MacCrone, 1930, 
1949) . 
Overall, although the early history of psychology ,in South 
Africa was oriented to:the resolution of social problems it 
did not succeed in doing so for the majority of the 
country's inhabitants, In recent years the elitist nature 
of much of South African psychology has been seriously 
challenged, resulting in considerable changes to both 
theory and practice. 
1.1.3 Psychology and politics; the recent past 
Although the history of South African psychology is 
characterised by racism, a minority of voices has always 
spoken out against racial prejudice and oppression. Thus, 
a divided psychology has mirrored the divided nature of 
South African society: while some psychologists were 
advocates of or apologists for the policies of racial 
segregation/apartheid, others were opposed to these 
policies (Louw & Foster, 1991). 
One of the areas in which this division has been reflected 
most clearly is the formal organisation of psychologists in 
South Africa. The first psychological association of 
psychologists was formed in 1948 (coincidentally, the same 
year as the National Party assumed political .power). 
However, by 1961 the South African Psychological 
Association was divided over whether 'black' psychologists 
could become members. When a motion which sought to 
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exclude 'black' people from the Association was defeated, a 
portion of the membership broke away to form the 
Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa, 
exclusively for 'white' psychologists (Louw, 1987). The 
explicit exclusion of 'black' people by a sector of the 
discipline remained in force until as late as 1983 when the 
two organisations amalgamated once more to form the 
Psychological Association of South Africa (PASA) - with no 
'race' restriction clause. The 1980s represented a 
transitional period in the history of South African 
psychology. A growing awareness was developing of the 
constraints and restrictions which shaped the nature of 
South African social research (cf. Savage, 1983) and the 
"uses and abuses to which 'psychology' ... (had been) ... 
put in the maintenance of apartheid and other forms of 
social oppression" (Editorial, PINS, 1983). An increasing 
sense of discontent with mainstream psychology prompted 
progressive psychologists to re-evaluate their practice. 
One of the main sources of disillusionment was the newly 
established organisation, PASA. Many psychologists were 
concerned about PASA' s implicit support of the racial 
status quo, and the Association's refusal to speak out 
against human rights abuses in South Africa (such as 
detention without trial, and torture) . 
Other problems were identified too. Most psychologists 
were 'white' male and middle-class, and working mostly with 
'white' middle-class people (Swartz, Dowdall & Swartz, 
1986). Mental health services in South Africa reflected 
broader class, 'race' and gender inequali ties. The 
training of psychologists was decontextualised, Eurocentric 
and uncritical. Within industry, psychologists served the 
interests of management. Within education, psychologists 
traditionally supported a meritocratic system and ignored 
the vast discrepancies in quality of education provided to 
children of different 'races'. It was clear that something 
needed to be done about the status of psychology in South 
Africa. 
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One way in which some psychologists sought to address the 
problems was to refuse to join PASA. These psychologists, 
and others, joined the Organisation of Appropriate Social 
Services in South Africa (OASSSA). OASSSA was formed by 
progressive psychologists and social workers in 1983 in 
response to the inappropriate and insensitive choice of a 
venue for their conference by members of the Institute for 
Family and Marital Therapy: Sol.Kerzner's 'flashy' Sun City 
situated in the 'homeland' of Boputhatswana. The 
organisation aimed to represent progressive psychologists, 
social workers, psychiatrists and others interested in 
relevant social and health services (although in practice 
it was dominated by psychologists) and explicitly 
highlighted the relationship between apartheid ~nd mental 
health. OASSSA's statement of principles reflected this 
commitment to: "the mental health and social welfare of 
South Africa's people, and to the development of 
appropriate social services" (Vogelman, 1987:29). 
OASSSA was not set up as a formal alternative to PASA, and 
for most of the 1980s the two organisations continued to 
co-exist while addressing very different issues. Within 
OASSSA, one of the most pressing issues concerned the role 
of psychology within the South African context. 
Progressive psychologists were preoccupied with defining 
and developing what was variously termed a 'relevant/ 
appropriate/ community' psychology (eg. Berger & Lazarus, 
1987; Dawes, 1985, 1986; Foster, 1986a; Nicholas & Cooper, 
1990; Seedat, Cloete & Shochet, 1988; Vogelrnan, 1987); that 
is, a psychology working to serve the interests of the 
majority of South Africans, rather than the interests of a 
privileged few. 
Part of the agenda of developing an 'alternative' 
psychology was to produce 'relevant' research. Studies 
began to emerge on issues such as conscripti,;m (eg. 
Feinstein, Teeling-Smith, Moyle & Savage, 1986; Flisher, 
1987; Korber, 1992), clinical psychology within the context 
of political 'unrest' (eg. Swartz, Dowdall & Swartz, 1986; 
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Perkel, 1988), the psychological sequelae of police action 
(eg. She fer & Hofmeyer, 1988) and detention and torture 
(eg. So1omons, 1988; Spitz, Eastwood & Verryn, 1990; 
Perke1, 1990; Foster, Davis & Sandler, 1987), although the 
topic of racism per se was largely avoided. 
The work of people within OASSSA, both theoretical and 
applied, soon became known within the broader South African 
and international community. OASSSA members gained an 
increasing legitimacy and credibility in both these sectors 
and came to be seen by some as an alternative to PASA, 
although as noted this was not the intention. As a 
consequence of these developments, the late 1980s and early 
1990s saw PASA experiencing what Louw (1992) h~s.termed a 
crisis of 'cultural legitimacy'. PASA members became aware 
of the fact that their organisation was too closely aligned 
to the powerful groups in South Africa and was seen by the 
majority of South Africans as comprising psychologists who 
were 'servants of apartheid' (Webster, 1981). 
This crisis resulted in PASA, OASSSA, and 'black' 
psychologists in South Africa entering into a period of 
intense negotiation about the way forward. These talks 
culminated in the founding of a new organisation, PsySSA 
(Psychological Society of South Africa), on the 28th of 
January last year. PsySSA replaced PASA and OASSSA, both 
of which were formally disbanded. The formation of PsySSA 
represents an entirely new spirit in South African 
psychology as described in the society's principles and 
objectives: 
We acknowledge psychology's historical complicity in 
supporting and perpetuating colonialism and the 
apartheid system. 
THEREFORE 
We commit ourselves to transforming and redressing the 
silences in South African psychology to serve the 
needs and the interests of all South Africa's people 
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It is within the spirit of this new era in South African 
psychology that this research has been carried out: given 
the racial history of the country and psychology's 
complicity in that history, the study of racism should 
occupy a central place within the discipline. 
1.2 Why Racism?: The Rationale 
To those of us growing up within the South African context, 
the question of 'why racism?' seems almost superfluous: 
when life is racism and all else flows from that, what can 
be more important than addressing the root of the problem? 
As Foster (1991a: 2) has asserted "merely being in South 
Africa constitutes sufficient justification for the topic". 
~ . 
Surprisingly, despite the salience of 'race' in South 
Africa, the topic of racism does not dominate South African 
psychological work. Furthermore research on racism, to 
date, has tended to be conducted within a positivist 
paradigm and is essentially (although not exclusively) 
descriptive, providing little in the way of furthering an 
understanding of racism (cf. Foster, 1991a, 1991c; and 
refer chapter 3, section 3.4 for a detailed ~eview). Apart 
from the lack of critical work in this area, there has also 
been "surprisingly little research into how laypersons ... 
understand race" (Boonzaier, 1988: 65): an area which would 
seem so vital given the social, political and economic 
history of the country. 
Two South African scholars whose work represents an 
Don Foster and N. Chabani exception 
Manganyi. 
to this trend are 
Both have written fairly extensively in the area 
of 'race'. Foster has produced some excellent theoretical 
reviews of the development of racial attitudes in children 
(cf. Foster, 1986b, 1994) and the consequences of 
colonisation and racial oppression (cf. Foster, 1992), 
while Manganyi has written widely on the experj.ence of 
'being-black-in-the-world' (cf. 1973, 1977, 1981). Perhaps 
one of the reasons that the issue of racism has not been 
more widely addressed is that critical psychologists 
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represent a minority in South Africa. It is also possible 
that racism has been neglected because of the difficulty of 
tackling a sensitive issue in an era in which political 
correctness is high priority. Hopefully, the winds of 
change which have recently blown through South African 
politics and psychology will have repercussions for the 
nature of psychological research in the future. 
Indications are that such changes may already be under way. 
A new-found spirit of reconciliation has encouraged people 
to address the issue of racism more openly than was 
possible before. In November 1993, for example, the 
University of Cape Town held a workshop which sought to 
examine the manner in which representatives fr2~ all the 
university's constituencies defined 'race' and racism with 
the aim of formulating a clearer position on racist 
practice. The workshop steering committee had various 
misgivings about what may transpire given this fairly 
testing context; however, the workshop proved extremely 
successful and proceeded without incident. It is these 
sorts of changes which have begun to facilitate the 
execution of studies such as this one. 
This study, then, stands as an example of the 'new order' 
of social psychological research in South Africa. As such 
it aims at a theoretical level to challenge the hegemony of 
a positivist epistemology and at a practical level to 
provide research which is sensitive to the relations 
between power and knowledge, and which has an action 
orientation. It is hoped that this research will not 
remain behind the hallowed portals of academia, but will be 
used to the benefit of South Africa's people. 
Thus far, this chapter has focused exclusively upon the 
South African context and while later chapters will deal in 
more depth with international theory and research, it is 
important to note by way of introduction that 
internationally the discipline of psychology has also 
failed to engage critically with the notion of 'race'. 
Indeed, some international scholars are guilty of racism 
12 
(eg. refer to Billig's 1985a paper on the psychologist John 
Ray) and others have used psychology to further racist 
causes (Evans & Waites book on IQ and mental testing 
provides a good review, 1981). In addition, although a good 
deal of research has been conducted on racism or prejudice, 
the fruits of this research appear extremely limited in 
terms of actually eradicating this phenomenon. For 
example, in the last decade or so, psychological evidence 
has suggested that racism is assuming a 'gentler', more 
subtle form (cf. Kinder and Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986; 
Barker, 1981). However, these findings appear to pertain to 
a limited sector (middle-class 'white') of a particular 
population (American); across the rest of the globe, racism 
and genocide remain rife. In short, it would seem that 
psychology has not contributed very much in the way of 
resolving racism - it may be hoped that in time it will do 
so. 
Finally, in the spirit of critical research practice, it is 
appropriate to comment briefly upon my personal motivation 
for engaging in research on racism. Increasingly the 
researcher's subjectivity has been recognised as not simply 
influencing his/her choice of topic, but as a valuable 
resource to be reflexively harnessed to the entire research 
process. This stance represents the very antithesis of 
positivism with its emphasis upon objectivity and value-
neutrality, recognising instead that 'science' is "one 
among many truth games" (Lather, 1992~ 89) and that 
knowledge is socially constructed and discursively 
produced. Feminist writers , in particular (eg. Bhavnani, 
1988, 1990, 1991; Burman, 1991a, 1994 ; Ho 1 lway, 1989; 
Lather, 1988, 1992), have been at the forefront of 
developing this approach, succinctly articulated by Sue 
Wilkinson (1988: 494) as follows: 
Within a positivist epistemology, with its emphasis 
on objectivity, such values are considered sources of 
bias and obstacles to determining the 'facts', but 
within an alternative epistemology, which emphasises 
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the social construction of mul tiple reali ties and 
takes reflexivity seriously, they may be seen as both 
central to and as a resource which informs one's 
research. 
Informed by these developments in critical theory and 
research, I began this chapter with a narrative. It 
describes just one of many similar personal incidents. My 
reason for its inclusion is two-fold. First, I hope that 
for those unfamiliar with South African society, it reveals 
something of the nature of everyday life in that country, 
and thereby accounts for my desire to engage with racism as 
a research topic. Second, this particular incident stands 
out from all the others in the following way: it provided 
me with a glimpse of how to connect psychology and 
politics. 
Until then I had been active in 'the struggle' but had felt 
frustrated at my inability to bridge the gap between 
psychology and society. After Charles and I had left the 
pub, we returned to my house and talked deep into the night 
about racism - about the injustice of it on the one hand, 
and about the incomprehensibility of it on the other. We 
came to the conclusion that racism was a social and 
political act, we despaired at psych?logy's inability to 
produce an account of racism which escaped individual-
social dualism (Charles, it will be recalled had been a 
student of psychology), and then we began to ponder about 
whether this should necessarily be the case. We generated 
all sorts of ideas about how psychology could offer an 
alternative account of phenomena such as racism, and by the 
end of evening we were brimming with enthusiasm and 
idealistic notions of the way forward. 
It was some time before I developed the 'fruits' of that 
evening further and began to formulate this piece of 
research (refer chapter 4, section 4.1), but that evening 
marked my decision to remain within the discipline and not 
to abandon it for a life of politics. As such it marked a 
theoretical shift in my thinking, from a resigned 
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frustration with the status quo to a perhaps idealistic 
commitment to a 'new' and 'better' kind of psychology. 
1.3 Aims of the Study 
This study investigated 'white' racism. Like Wetherell and 
Potter's (1992: 1) work in Ne~ Zealand, the research is 
premised upon the assumption that social psychology should 
enable us to "cut a slice through the communities to which 
we belong" and thereby "develop a critical analysis of the 
codes and practices which sustain racism in those places". 
Specifically, I wanted to explore the ideological nature of 
young 'white' South Africans' common-sense understandings 
of 'race' and racism. My inquiry was guided by ~ range of 
questions: given that social conditions give rise to the 
forms of talk available, within the context of South 
Africa's racist history, how do 'white' people construct 
accounts of what 'race' is? How do they construct 
narratives of their own past? What linguistic resources 
and rhetorical devices do they draw upon in producing 
accounts? What constitute the main discourses which 
structure their accounts? How do they articUlate their 
political position in the face of imminent political 
transformation? 
South Africa's political system of apartheid was unique in 
the modern world (Thompson & Prior, 1982). I was 
interested in the way in which these particular social 
conditions were translated into a language of racism. From 
my personal experience of living and talking in South 
Africa, a confusing language of racism seemed to exist. It 
embodied statements which could be construed both as 
racist, and non-racist even anti-racist. It 
simu1 taneously expressed hopes for a non-racial and 
democratic society, and fears of a future in the hands of a 
'black majority' with little obligation to look a~ter the 
interests of 'white' people in the face of what had gone 
before. I wanted to explore this "dialectic of prejudice" 
(Billig et aI, 1988: 100) in the talk of young 'white' 
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South Africans. I wanted to trace it in detail, with a 
view to providing a 'picture' of 'white' racism which would 
inform anti-racist training in the future. 
1.4 A Note on Terminology 
Any book about race and racism runs the risk of using 
categories with objectionable connotations. It is, 
for example, very difficult to talk in any meaningful 
way about issues of race in South Africa without using 
- not just mentioning - the categories in virtue of 
which apartheid expresses itself. 
(Goldberg, 1993: viii) 
The issue of terminology is a complex one. A~ 90ldberg 
(1993) has observed, those of us committed to opposing 
racism are confronted with what Billig et al (1988) may 
term an 'ideological dilemma'. We are concerned to 
deconstruct 'race' and fight racism, and yet in order to 
accomplish our objectives we have little option but to use 
the very concepts which service oppression. 
The category of 'race' represents a defining feature of the 
lives of the majority of the world's people (Afshar & 
Maynard, 1994). Unfortunately, many people continue to act 
as if 'race' were an objective reality - both at the level 
of political discourse and popular ideas - although it has 
long been recognised that 'races' do not exist in any 
biological sense (Solomos, 1993). 'Race' is a social 
construction, the meaning of which varies with historical 
context and geographical location (cf. Afshar & Maynard, 
1994) or, in ami and Winant's (1986: 68) terms, 'race' is 
"an unstable and 'decentred' complex of social meanings 
constantly being transformed by political struggle". 
The acknowledgement of these ideas in recent years has 
resulted in progressive academics raising concerns about 
their colleagues' uncritical use of the term 'race'. 'Race 
relations' theorists (cf. Banton, 1977; Rex, 1970), in 
particular, have come under attack for reifying 'racial' 
concepts and affording them scientific status (Miles, 1989; 
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Maynard, 1994). However, the terminological way forward is 
unclear. For example, the strategy of reiterating that 
'there is no such thing as 'race" is unhelpful in the face 
of world-wide racism (Dona1d & Rattansi, 1992). While 
'race' may not have any scientific validity, it does have 
'real' effects, in material and representational terms 
(Anthias, 1990). Indeed, as Donald & Rattansi (1992) 
argue, the issue is not whether 'race' exists, but how the 
category operates: 
The issue is not how natural differences determine 
and justify group definitions and interactions, but 
how racial logics and racial frames of reference are 
articulated and deployed, and with what conseqvences. 
(1992: 1; original emphasis) 
It is for this reason, that researchers' have been urged to 
appreciate the consequences of their own use of categories. 
For example, Swartz (1985) has argued that deciding on 
categories is an inevitable and important part of any 
research project; although in South Africa, psychological 
research typically describes its subjects in terms of the 
four 'race' groups proclaimed by the government ('white', 
'coloured', 'indian' and 'black'). Unfortunately, most 
research tends to utilise existing population categories 
(Boonzaier, 1988) in an unreflexive manner - examining, for 
example, the 'different' experiences of 'black' and 'white' 
people while failing to challenge the categories which 
underpin the 'difference' (Maynard, 1994: 17). 
The recognition in recent years of the socially constructed 
nature of 'race' and the functional orientation of talk has 
led to considerable debate in progressive circles about 
what terms to use to describe people of minority group 
status. Should one use the generic term 'black' to 
describe all minority groups, or should one use terms which 
specifically designate each minority group? 
At present the debate remains unresolved, both 
internationally and in South Africa. On the one hand, the 
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use of the term 'black' as a political category has been 
welcomed. It signifies a common experience of racism, 
expresses the rift between oppressed and oppressors 
(Maynard, 1994), and provides the foundation for a politics 
of resistance against the manner in which historically 
'black' people have been positioned as the 'other' 
irrespective of their differences (Hall, 1992). On the 
other hand, the term 'black' has attracted criticism on the 
grounds that it tends to refer to people of sub-Saharan 
African descent, it denies the needs of different cultural 
groups and is applied to people who may not wish to be 
defined in that way (Brah, 1992). 
Arguably, the dominant trend in South Africa se~ ,to be to 
opt for a dichotomous system of classification - 'black' 
and 'white' (Ormond, 1986). Many people have elected to 
identify themselves in this way, rather than adopt the 
imposed form of categorisation previously enshrined in 
South African law. However, there are still others who 
prefer to identify with a 'coloured' or 'indian' group, 
rather than become amalgamated into the generic category 
'black' (Wallerstein, 1991). 
Ultimately, whatever the system of classification selected, 
all racial categories represent rhetorical devices which 
serve political ends, as even a fleeting glance at South 
African history will reveal. Recognition of the 
politically and cultura+ly constructed (Boonzaier & Sharp, 
1988a; Hall, 1992) nature of racial terms has resulted in 
the deployment of a number of practices aimed at 
highlighting this feature of minority groups. These 
practices include referring to minority groups as 'so-· 
called' (as in 'so-called coloured'), writing the first 
letter of the term in lower case and placing the term 
within inverted commas. Again, while well-intentioned 
these practices have not met with unequivocal suppo~t. For 
example, Immanuel Wallerstein (1991) in his article on the 
construction of peoplehood, cites a letter written by Alex 
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La Guma, an ANC member, to the editor of Sechaba (the 
official journal of the ANC). La Guma writes: 
I have noticed now in speeches, articles, interviews 
etc. in 'Sechaba', that I am called a 'so-called 
Coloured' (sometimes with a small 'c'). When did the 
Congress decide to call me this? ... When we worked for 
Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter we 
sang, 
'We the Coloured people, we must struggle to exist 
I am confused. I need clarification. It makes me 
feel like a 'so-called' human, like a humanoid· ... 
In the editor's reply to La Guma, it was stated that 
although no formal decision had been taken to change from 
'Coloured' to 'so-called coloured', people in South Africa 
had been increasingly using the latter term (cf. also 
February, 1981). It is for this reason that where it is 
necessary to refer to specific minority groups within this 
thesis, I too have prefaced them with the word 'so-called'. 
However, as a sign of my opposition to the classification 
system borne of apartheid, I prefer the dichotomous system 
of 'black' and 'white' where 'black' refers to all those 
people historically at the sharp end of apartheid and 
'white' refers to all those people who benefitted from that 
system. 
In keeping with the notion that categories such as 'race' 
are representations informed by the assumptions and 
intentions of the people who use them (Sharp, 1988a; 
1988b), I have followed the convention of placing the words 
'race', 'race-group', 'black' and 'white' between single 
quotation marks with the first letter in the lower case. 
1.5 A Brief outline Qf the Chapters 
This thesis comprises nine chapters including this first 
introductory one. The next two chapters present the 
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theoretical framework within which the study was conducted. 
The first of these concerns the discursive and rhetorical 
approach taken in the thesis, while the second reviews 
psychological research on racism and prejudice. 
Chapter four provides a detailed description of the method 
used in this study, as well as discussing 
development of the research process. 
followed by four chapters which present 
something of the 
The method is 
the analysis of 
'white' South African discourse. The first of these 
briefly describes some of the preliminary findings by way 
of introduction to the main analysis. The next three 
chapters each focus upon a particular form of talk used in 
presenting accounts of 'race' and racism; that is, 
-< 
Nationalist, Liberal and Left-wing discourse. 
The final chapter synthesises the findings of this 
research, and compares them to those of other contemporary 
studies. possible explanations for certain observed 
differences between these findings and those of other 
pieces of research are discussed. In conclusion, the 
implications of discourse analytic research are considered. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
2.1 introduction 
... . 
The field of social psychology reportedly 'began' in the 
late 180 Os: the oft-cited work of Triplett into the 
processes of social facilitation ostensibly mark the 
'moment' of the first social psychology experiment. since 
Wundt deliberately kept his interest in social psychology 
out of the laboratory. However, it was not until the 1930s 
that social psychology began to emerge as 'a substantive 
grouping'; in fact. most published work of a social 
psychological nature has only been produced in the second 
half of this century (Howitt et al., 1989). 
One of the central characteristics of social psychology has 
been. and remains. its fragmentary nature. As early as 
1908, differences between those within the field were 
apparent. In that year two volumes were published. both 
enti tIed 'Social Psychology'. In England. William 
McDougall's book was written from a psychological approach. 
while in America, E.A. Ross' text assumed a sociological 
perspective. Although the influence of these two authors 
upon modern social psychology has not been great (Howitt et 
aI, 1989), social psychology has remained divided along the 
lines of these ori~inal texts. Certain. social 
psychologists have pursued a distinctly psychological 
social psychology. while others have developed a more 
sociological social psychology. In consequence, modern 
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social psychology has not evolved a unitary status but 
continues to be characterised by difference, conflict and 
change (Foster, 1991c). 
perhaps in part it is because of this fragmentation that 
the field of social psychology has encompassed a broad 
range of topics. Social psychology has involved, and 
continues to involve, the study of attitudes, interpersonal 
attraction, social influence, communication, and intergroup 
relations amongst other topics. However the last twenty 
years or so have been dominated by the rise of an area 
known as 'social cognition'. Indeed, there has been a 
veritable explosT';~- of- research and theory in this area 
which is concerned with "how people make sense of other 
..., . 
people and themselves" (Fiske & Taylor, 1991: 1), and is 
founded upon Fritz Heider's work on attribution theory and 
Sir Frederick Bartlett's work on schema theory. 
Proponents of the social cognition approach claim that it 
will revolutionise the entire field of social psychology, 
as is ambitiously reflected in the title of one of Ostrom's 
(1984) essays on the topic: The sovereignty of social 
cognition. Although advocates oof the social cognition 
approach have some way to go before their objective is 
fulfillied, one of the areas which has been profoundly 
influenced by this theory is that of stereotypes (cf. 
Leyens, Yzerbyt & Schadron, 1994). Consequently, we will 
be returning to this topic and examining it in a little 
more detail in the following chapter. 
The social cognition framework is representative of a 
number of theoretical initiatives which began to develop in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s in response to the 'crisis 
in social psychology' (Elms, 1975). 'The crisis' was 
precipitated by the inability of social psychology to 
bridge the individual-social divide and to contribute 
socially relevant knowledge to pressing social problems, 
and it stimulated considerable debate within the field as 
how best to conceptualise relations between individual and 
society. Indeed, it contributed some significant rebuttals 
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against laboratory-experimental psychology, embedded within 
a positivist-empiricist framework. However, these debates 
failed to move beyond the terms of reference of traditional 
psychology and consequently were unable to progress beyond 
individual-social dualism (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn 
& Walkerdine, 1984). 
Before the 1960s, North America had dominated the field of 
social psychology and very little social psychological work 
was being pursued in Western Europe (Louw & Foster, 1991). 
However, in response to the inadequacies of North American 
social psychology, Europeans began to develop theories and 
methods which located human subjects within an historical, 
social, political and economic context. Both H~n~i Tajfel 
and Serge Moscovici, for example, developed new theoretical 
ideas (on intergroup conflict and minority influence 
respectively) although they employed traditional research 
methods to test them (Rijsman & Stroebe, 1989). 
At the centre of critical arguments espoused during the 
course of the crisis were the 'new paradigm' social 
psychologists, concerned with ethogenics. Proponents of 
ethogenics, led by Rom Harre, assumed an anti-
experimentalist stance, advocating instead the gathering of 
accounts informed by the 'open souls' doctrine : if you 
want to know why people behave as they do 'why not ask 
them?' (Harre & Secord, 1972: 101 - 123). The focus of 
attention was upon language, and the meaning of social 
behaviour. Two brands of ethogenics emerged. Harre and 
Secord's (1972) 'explanation of social behaviour' was 
informed by a realist approach similar to structuralism, 
while Shotter's (1984) more radical ethogenics interpreted 
social action in a hermeneutic manner (Parker, 1989). 
There is no doubt that ethogenics made a significant 
contribution to psychological debate at the time; in 
particular, with respect to developing a critiqUe of the 
dominance of positivist methods of research. However, 
ethogenics failed to end the crisis in social psychology 
because it neglected central issues of ideology and power 
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(parker, 1989) and left the fundamental terms of the 
social-individual couple intact by remaining committed to a 
unitary pregiven subject (Henriques et aI, 1984). 
Moreover. while this approach favoured an analysis of 
language, language was viewed as a route to understanding 
something located inside the person' s head (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987); that is, Harre and his colleagues were 
concerned with an actor' s 'social competence' a 
reservoir of social knowledge akin to a set of rules which 
informed social action and accounts thereof. 
Despite the failings of ethogenics, the focus upon meaning 
and personal accounts of behaviour spawned a range of 
theories, and a large body of research, variously ~eferred 
to as 'ordinary/everyday explanations' (Antaki, 1985, 1988) 
'everyday understanding' (Gergen & Semin, 1990), 'lay 
theories' (Furnham, 1988) and 'social representations 
(Moscovici, 1984; Farr & Moscovici, 1984). These 
theoretical developments were characterised not only by 
their move to 
also by their 
arriving at 
privileging peoples' own 
change in analytic focus: 
explanations to the 
understandings, but 
from the process of 
content of those 
explanations, including their structure and function (cf. 
Furnham, 1988; Moscovici, 1988). 
These theoretical models do present significant 
alternatives to earlier conceptions of social behaviour 
(such as the immense literature on social cognition); they 
eschew traditional positivist research methods and offer 
more socialised accounts of human understanding. However, 
at root, they too remain wedded to individual-social 
dualism: to notions of "a real world on the one side and a 
mental world on the other" (Gergen & Semin, 1990: 12). 
The transcendence of the dominance of individual-social 
dualism required a radical reformulation of psychology's 
subject matter: no easy task given the manner in which this 
notion has entirely saturated the discipline for almost a 
century. However, the past decade has seen just such a 
development. Informed by the postmodern turn in other 
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social science disciplines, a minority of social 
psychologists 
text/ language' . 
have engaged with the 'turn to 
This chapter takes as its focus the 'turn to language' in 
social psychology. It seeks to chart the development of 
discursive approaches, to provide a clear overview and 
critical appraisal of the basic tenets of the approaches to 
discourse analysis which have dominated social psychology, 
to consider the contribution of rhetorical theorists, and 
finally to consider the theoretical advantages a discursive 
approach offers to the study of racism. 
2.2 The turn to language 
~ . 
The 'turn to text' signifies certain psychologists' ongoing 
dissatisfaction with the state of the discipline. Despite 
what has become known as 'the crisis' of the 1960s and 
1970s, psychology continues to be "racked by a number of 
intersecting crises" (Parker, 1989: 9; original emphasis) 
which are located within the very structure of the 
discipline itself. Psychology remains constricted 
theoretically by the terms of individual-social dualism: by 
an inability to move beyond pre-given categories of 
'individual' and 'society' and a model of a unitary 
cognitive subject in interaction with a social environment. 
The 'turn to language' in psychology has found expression 
in the approach of discourse analysis. Of course, 
discourse analysis is by no means confined to psychology -
quite the opposite: psychology has been remarkably slow to 
recognise the value of this perspective (Robinson, 1985). 
By contrast, within other disciplines, the past few decades 
have witnessed discourse analysis burgeon into an extremely 
diverse research area with a mUltiplicity of approaches, 
some of which bear little or no relation to the other 
(Burman, 1991b; Potter, Wethere11, Gill, & Edwards., 1990). 
For example, socio-structura1 approaches informed by a 
foucauldian tradition are very different to sociolinguistic 
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approaches which confine themselves to the grammatical 
construction of talk (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984: 16 - 17). 
The origins of the study of discourse may be traced back 
some 2000 years to the ancient study of language and 
rhetoric (van Dijk, 1985; Billig, 1987), although the roots 
of modern discourse analysis have been situated as the mid 
to late 1960s. Research around this time was scattered and 
tended to apply semiotic or linguistic methods to the study 
of texts. It did not embrace discourse analysis as an 
alternative approach to research, across disciplinary 
boundaries (van Dijk, 1985). 
One of the early influences upon the development of the 
analysis of discourse was J. L. Austin's deliv~ry of the 
William James Lectures at Harvard University in 1955. It 
was Austin (1962: 6 & 12) who highlighted the 
'performative' nature of language. As he put it: "the 
issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action" or 
"to say something is do something" (original emphasis). 
Aus tin's speech ac t theory was s igni f ican t in that it 
highlighted the social context within which language was 
used. However, this work remained at the level of abstract 
theory and was not applied to the practicalities of 
everyday conversation in natural settings (Potter & 
Wetherel1, 1987). 
A second line of influence arose from the ideas of 
microsociology, specifically ethnomethodology (cf. 
Garfinkel, 1967) and conversation analysis (cf. Sacks, 
1972; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). These 
approaches involve the study of ordinary peoples' language 
use in their everyday lives. They embrace the notion that. 
language is constitutive of social action and events, and 
is not simply a conduit for describing or talking about 
such actions and events. Consequently, the meaning of an 
utterance will change with the context within which it is 
produced: a feature known as indexicality. 
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Although both of these research traditions are widely 
acknowledged as being influential in the evolution of 
discourse analysis, Potter and Wetherell (1987) identify a 
third theoretical tradition which has informed the 
discourse analytic perspective: semiology. 'The science of 
signs' was propounded by de Saussure at the beginning of 
the century, and was developed by Roland Barthes (1972) in 
particular. Perhaps the most central point emerging from 
semiology for the study of discourse is that there is no 
natural relationship between the signifier (the speech 
sound) and the signified (the concept). Rather, the 
relation between signifier and signified is imbued with 
meaning via the process of signification. 
-< • 
The influence of these three research areas upon the advent 
of a discourse analysis pertaining to psychology in the 
last decade is indisputable. However, it is the existence 
of what Kvale (1992a: 1) terms 'a postmodern cultural 
landscape' that enabled the emergence of a radical 
al ternative to traditional psychology. A pos tmodern 
climate has undermined (for some) psychology's search for 
universal 'truths', emanating from a blind belief in the 
steady and progressive accumulation of scientific 
knowledge. Consequently, postmodernism has been said to be 
"slowly dribbling into psychology" (Parker, 1992: 74), 
giving rise to an approach which is characterised by its 
"noncognitive, nonsystematic, rhetorical, critical social 
constructionist" stance (Shotter, 1992a: 58). 
The shift away from modern to postmodern sciences involves 
a considerable reorientation on the part of researchers 
(the volumes by Kvale, 1992b and Simons & Billig, 1994, and 
the chapter in Parker, 1989 are useful references in this 
regard); however, for psychologists perhaps the most 
significant aspect of the postmodern movement is its focus 
upon discourse (Parker, 1992). Within the literature of 
relevance to social psychology, the term 'discourse' tends 
to be used in two ways. On the one hand, it is employed to 
refer to any product - formal or informal, spoken or 
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written (cf. Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 
1987). Used in this manner 'discourse' becomes synonymous 
with what other authors refer to as 'text' (cf. Fairc1ough, 
1992; Parker, 1992). On the other hand, some writers use 
the term prefaced by an article (a discourse). Employed 
thus, the term denotes "a system of 
constructs an object" (Parker, 1990a: 
statements which 
191) . From this 
perspective, a discourse or a number of discourses are 
realised within texts - where texts are "delimited tissues 
of meaning reproduced in any form that can be given an 
interpretative gloss" (Parker, 1992: 6; original emphasis). 
For those who use the term 'discourse' to refer to 'text', 
interpretative repertoires (Potter & Wetherel1, 1987) 
ideological dilemmas (Billig et el, 1988) or~practical 
ideologies (Gill, 1991) find their expression in discourse. 
This terminological conflation adds 
diverse field. Gunther Kress 
confusion to an already 
(1985: 27) offers a 
parsimonious solution to the disorder: 
Discourse is a category that belongs to and derives 
from the social domain, and text is a category that 
belongs to and derives from the linguistic domain. The 
relation between the two is one of realization: 
Discourse finds its expression in text. 
In this thesis, the term 'text' is used to refer to any 
spoken or written, informal or formal product since 
informal spoken text may be tranformed into formal 
transcribed text in the process of achieving an analysab1e 
product. This definition is used by Fairclough (1992) and 
is synonymous with the definition of what Potter and 
Wetherel1 refer to as discourse. The term 'discourse' is 
used in this thesis in two ways. First, it constitutes a 
synonym for text, and second it refers to "recurrently used 
systems of terms used for characterizing and evaluating 
actions, events and other phenomena" (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987: 149). I prefer the word 'discourse' (like Parker; 
ego 1992) to Potter and Wetherell's 'interpretative 
repertoire' which seems to be an unnecessarily clumsy term. 
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In order to distinguish between discourse as text, and 
discourse as a particular system of terms, I tend to refer 
the the latter in specific terms; for example, the 
discourse of biologism. 
Although issues of nomenclature are significant, 
particularly for reasons of clarity, it is really the 
assumptions that each author brings to the terms of his/her 
choice that are central. The field of discourse analysis 
in social psychology is characterised by the co-existence 
of two 'strands' of research, each informed by slightly 
different assumptions, and assuming a different level of 
analysis. The approach of Potter and Wetherell (1987) is 
most clearly espoused in their 1987. book Disco,-\rse and 
social psychology, although they have published extensively 
in this area. Parker and Burman's perspective is outlined 
in various articles (eg. Parker, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c; 
Burman, 1991b), in Parker's (1992) book Discourse dynamics 
and most recently in their jointly edited book (1993) 
Discourse analytic research. Before critically appraising 
these two approaches, and evaluating their relative merits, 
let us briefly examine what a discourse analytic approach 
advocates. 
2.3 Discourse analysis: an overview 
What is discourse analysis? As we have noted, discourse 
analysis as "a single unitary entity" (Burman & Parker, 
1993: 3) really does not exist. A plethora of discursive 
practices abounds, derived from various disciplinary 
sources and oriented toward different analytic foci. 
Traditional psychological research views central constructs 
such as personality, identity, and attitudes as entities 
lying dormant inside the heads of individuals until laid 
bare by the discerning psychologist (Burman & Parker, 
1993). Language, regarded as a transparent medi~ which 
reflects unprob1ematically existing underlying realities, 
is viewed as the tool by means of which people may describe 
both external (the world out there) and internal (what goes 
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on in their heads) reality. Hence, language is seen as the 
pathway to unravelling the complexities of the human mind. 
By contrast, discourse analysts regard language as actively 
constituting or constructing reality. Experiences, selves, 
even psychological constructs are constituted in and 
through language; and their meaning is inseparable from the 
ways they are described in the interactional context 
(Garfinkel, 1967; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Language, it 
is argued, "embodies the 'sediment' of social practices 
which undermines its use as a neutral descriptive medium" 
(Wetherell, Stiven & Potter, 1987: 60). Furthermore, it 
is a "reality-creating social practice" (Fowler, 1985: 62), 
both in respect of objects which have an onto1og~c~1 status 
(such as a rock) and those objects which are prodl,lCed 
within what Parker (1990c: 229) terms the 'moral/political 
sphere'. Objects derived from the latter are advanced for 
strategic or ideological reasons and constitute phenomena 
such as 'race', and 'nation' - and indeed, most of the 
concepts upon which the discipline of psychology rests. 
Either way discourse "constructs 'representations' of the 
world which have a reality almost as coercive as gravity, 
and, like gravity, we know of the objects only through 
their effects" (Parker, 1990a: 196). 
This notion of language as constitutive does not mean, as 
some critics suggest, that "objects exist only in a trivial 
way outside of their construction in discourse" (Abrams &, 
Hogg, 1990: 220). Rather, "the object that a discourse 
refers to may have an independent reality outside 
discourse, but is given another reality by discourse" 
(Parker, 1990a: 197). 
The potential for criticism of this nature to be levelled 
at discourse analysis, however, has been recognised even 
among the ranks of its proponents (cf. Burrnan, 1991b), and 
is founded upon misunderstandings related to the idea that 
"all of the world ... can be described as textual" (Parker, 
1992:7) and "there is nothing outside of the text" 
(Derrida, 1976: 158). The articulation of discourses 
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within texts operates within a context; but, it is not at 
all clear where text ends and context begins. In a recent 
review of discourse analytic research, Figueroa and Lopez 
(1991) identified this tension between text and context as 
one of a number of tensions fundamental to contemporary 
discourse analysis. 
The tension arises from the very nature of discourse 
analysis itself: that the world out there is created in and 
through text. Therefore, despite the fact that things may 
have an independent reality, we can never know that reality 
directly. In other words, since the world is given meaning 
by us, the whole world becomes a text. 
How then does language 'create' reality? As we~have seen, 
people.do things with language. Language is performative, 
and talk has an essential action-orientation (cf. Austin, 
1962). Moreover, language plays a vital role in the daily 
life of any human being. As people construct accounts, 
which of course they can do in various ways, they actively 
select pre-existing linguistic resources from an available 
pool. The 'contents' of this pool are constrained by the 
sociopolitical context within which the speakers live. For 
example, social institutions produce particular ways of 
talking about different areas of social life, "which are 
related to the place and nature of that institution" 
(Kress, 1985: 28). The set of statements produced about a 
particular area, both sets the limits upon or constrains as 
well as enables or facilitates the manner in which that 
area mayor may not be talked about. 
The culturally available resources which form the basis of 
everyday talk represent shared sets of meaning which may 
contain contradictory ideas. Consequently, meaning is not 
located merely inside the head of the individual subject, 
but is informed by the social conditions which 'govern' the 
forms of talk available (Burman & Parker, 1993)'. Hence, 
discourse analysis offers: "a social account of 
subjectivity by attending to the linguistic resources by 
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which the sociopolitical realm is produced and reproduced." 
(Burman & Parker, 1993: 3). 
This focus upon language and meaning within the discourse 
framework results in discourse itself becoming the analytic 
topic, or as Potter and Wetherell (1987: 160) observe 
"social texts 
a secondary 
are approached in their own 
route to things 'beyond' 
right 
the 
and not as 
text like 
attitudes, events or cognitive processes" (original 
emphasis). Thus, instead of attempting to access the mind 
via language, discourse analysts study the texts in which 
the images of the mind are reproduced and recast; the focus 
of the psychologist's gaze is not private individual 
cognitive processes, but shared social knowledg~ 5Valach, 
1993) . 
'Changing the subject' (Henriques et aI, 1984) of 
psychology in this way implies considerable theoretical 
reorientation, since it challenges that which stands at the 
very centre of the discipline: 'modern individuality' 
(Henriques et a1, 1984: 1). It necessitates "the 
suspension of belief in what one normally takes for 
granted" (Potter & Wetherel1, 1987: 104) as the focus 
shifts from seeing a practice as a reflection of 'reality' 
to considering the social construction and function of that 
practice. For psychology, described by some as a "sub-plot 
within the history of modernism" (Po1kinghorne, 1992: 146), 
the shift to a post-modernist approach represents far more 
than a crisis. It represents something akin to a 
revolution. 
What then, is the status of the individual within the· 
domain of research termed 'discourse analysis'? In 
contrast to the rationai, non-contradictory and unitary 
self, traditionally viewed as psychology's subject (Venn, 
1984) - a self also traditionally European and male - the 
'turn to language' prob1ematises and retheorises 
subjectivity. The assumptions of modern Western psychology 
are deconstructed, such as the notion of 'self as centre of 
experience' which informs psychology's preoccupation with 
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the individual as the unit of analysis. The individual 
subject is no longer viewed as a unified whole, but as a 
complex of disparate images and events (Gergen, 1992). 
For the psychologist, the attempt to describe the timeless 
and universal features of individual human subjects is 
abandoned (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), and replaced with 
descriptions of the discursive practices which produce 
social and psychological realities. Hence, the individual 
is seen, not as a pregiven entity, but in the words of 
Henriques et al (1984: 95) as a "constituted 'always-
alr~ady social' being, as being locked in ideological 
practices". For instance, Margaret Wetherell (1986) has 
demonstrated how the notions of masculinity and femininity 
-< • 
represent examples of just such ideological practices 
rather than being a set of traits, psychological states or 
stereotypes based upon roles '( and particularly effective 
ones at that, since they appear to be the natural and 
immutable consequences of biology and socialisabion) . 
The force of 'discursive or ideological practices' is said 
to lie in the way in which they 'position' people, and 
their use generates the individual's subjectivity 
(Henriques et aI, 1984; Davies & Harre, 1990). This notion, 
raises questions regarding the degree to which human 
subjects are constituted (discourse determinism) as opposed 
to being constitutive (human agency). The work of 
Althusser, for example, has been criticised for being over-, 
deterministic: people are seen as fixed in a subj ect 
position through the range of discursive practices' 
available to them to make sense of the world (Potter & 
Wethere11, 1987) A1thusser's theoretical framework presents 
an over1y passive depiction of human subjectivity - and 
therefore a limited view of social change (Foster, 1991d). 
However, "a theoretical framework which recognizes the 
social construction of subjectivity in social relations and 
through discourses does not result in an inevitable lack of 
agency" as Henriques et al (1984: 57) have noted. It is 
possible to present the subject as being both socially 
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determined and capable of individual creativity: "obliged 
to act discoursally in preconstituted subject positions, 
yet capable of creatively transforming discourse 
conventions" (Fairclough, 1989: 169). Indeed, the past 
decade has witnessed an increasing awareness of human 
subjects as active agents, and not as being mechanically 
determined (Harre, 1979; Bi1lig et aI, 1988). From a 
rhetorical perspective, the speaker is capable of producing 
inventive arguments or in Billig's terms (1987: 100) 
engaging in the 'open-palmed playfulness of witcraft' . 
The idea that selves are produced discursively, and 
therefore that an individual may hold any number of 
discursive and sometimes contradictory position~ ~ddresses 
the impasse which has plagued psychology almost since its 
inception: that the presence of contradiction or 
variability needs to reconciled. Recently, European 
social psychologists have argued for a social psychology 
which takes account of contradiction (cf. Billig, 1987) and 
dilemma (cf. Billig et aI, 1988). 
In contrast to traditional approaches within the social 
sciences, discourse analysis directly confronts the issue 
of variability. Indeed, it turns what has been regarded 
previously as an "intractable methodological liability" 
into a "productive analytical resource" (Gilbert and 
Mulkay, 1984: 13). It is precisely the focus of attention 
upon the manner in which accounts of social events and 
actions are socially generated which makes discourse itself 
the analytic focus (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). One of the central advantages of this 
approach is that the researcher stays closer to the data 
since s/he is no longer concerned with inference, with 
viewing language as an indicator of something else (Gilbert 
& Mulkay, 1984). 
Discourse analysis, in the light of the postmodern turn, 
has managed to deconstruct the commonsense image of people 
as unitary subjects, to retheorise the image of autonomous 
and undivided human beings which prevails both within the 
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discipline of psychology and in Western European culture. 
This represents an extremely significant step for, as 
Parker (1989: 96) has argued, it is imperative that 
psychology adopt such a position if it is to "deconstruct 
its ideology and its power" - a position advocated by 
Moscovici in his early call to social psychologists to 
study "everything that pertains to ideology and to 
communication" (1972: 55). 
But in what way can discourse be characterised as 
ideological? First, let us consider briefly the concept of 
ideology. David McLellan (1986: 1) in his book on the 
topic has observed that: "Ideology is the most elusive 
concept in the whole of social science". DesQit;e this, 
ma~y recent writings on ideology are in agreement that 
ideology is not simply a system of beliefs, values and 
ideas, nor is it merely a form of 'false consciousness' of 
the real (Foster, 1991d). Since the literature on ideology 
is diverse, we shall limit discussion to notions that are 
of relevance to the development of a critical social 
psychology. 
One of the central notions informing recent psychological 
approaches to discourse analysis (although perhaps not 
discourse analysis more generally; Parker, 1992) is that 
language is a principal medium for the operation of 
ideology (cf. Therborn, 1980; Thompson, 1984). In other 
words: "the processes of everyday thinking can be processes 
of 'ideology'" (Billig, 1991), therefore it is through an 
examination of language that ideological structures may be 
exposed (Kress, 1985). 
Sceptics may still question the relevance of ideology 
(traditionally associated with the discipline of sociology) 
for the discipline of psychology. Parker (1992: 32) 
provides a pithy motivation: "the nature ... of individuals 
at any time flow(s) not so much from their 'attitudes' or 
'motivations' ... , but from the overall ideological 
context." Discourse analysis functions to deconstruct that 
ideological context in pursuit of the 'ground rules for 
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action' (Parker, 1992: 32) since psychological phenomena 
"have a public and collective reality, and we are mistaken 
if we think that they have their origin in the private 
space of the individual" (Burman & Parker, 1993: 1). In 
short, although individuals' construct discourse, they do 
so within an ideological context which sets the parameters 
upon their discursive practice. 
From this perspective, ideology is realised within the 
fabric of everyday conversation via the social 
constructions of reality which give meaning to the 
discursive or linguistic practices people use to account 
for their everyday reality. It is in this sense that 
Wetherell and her colleagues (Wetherell, Stiven, & Potter, 
- . 
1987) used the term 'practical ideologies' in an 
investigation of discourse pertaining to employment 
opportunities for women. They note that ideology "is not 
simply a set of propositions but is primarily a method of 
accounting or managing a representation. It is an active 
way of making sense. Language use can be varied from 
moment to moment depending on the participants' 
interactional goals" (original emphasis). 
Similar themes are echoed within the writings of those 
adopting a rhetorical approach. This theoretical framework 
has highlighted the failures of both psychological and 
social theory: the former neglecting the social and the 
latter neglecting the individual. While this criticism in 
itself is not new, the theoretical alternative posed by 
rhetorical psychology certainly is. Like specific strands 
of discourse analysis, and social constructionist theory, 
rhetorical psychology focuses upon language since 
"rhetorical acts are above all acts of language" (Billig, 
1991: 14), and ideology is articulated through language. 
The notion of 'practical' or 'lived ideology' does not 
refer to a unified, internally consistent, set of beliefs 
which informs the individual's everyday life. Rather, it 
is seen fundamentally to comprise dilemmatic or contrary 
themes (Billig et aI, 1988) upon which human subjects draw 
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to account for their everyday practice. Contradiction is 
recognised as a feature of talk (instead of being glossed 
over or suppressed by means of quantitative techniques) and 
is expressed in the variable construction thereof to 
accomplish different objectives or to serve different 
functions (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
The idea that ideology embraces contrary themes may be said 
to encourage the view that both argument/' logos' and 
counter-argument/'anti-logos' (Billig, 1987) are equally 
balanced in the equation. However, rhetorical theorists 
mindfully explain that one theme may be more dominant than 
another (cf. Billig, 1987; Billig et aI, 1988). For 
example, ideology is most effective when it a§s~es the 
status of common-sense, or what Billig (1987) terms 
'common-places'. Once linguistic resources have become 
'naturalised' in this way (Fairclough, 1992), they are so 
familiar, so obvious that they assume the status of 'fact' 
or 'truth' and it is difficult to recognise them as simply 
constituting one version of reality. Factual descriptions 
represent particularly powerful discursive constructions 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987). It is for this reason that 
ideology becomes a "key mechanism of rule by consent" 
(Fairclough, 1989: 34). 
It is the widespread and shared belief in particular social 
representation (Moscovici, 1982; 1984) which lend a fact-
like status to certain discourses or interpretative 
repertoires. This results, for example, in members of the 
Flat Earth Society being viewed as somewhat eccentric by 
the average Western European person. Similarly, particular 
ideas dominate in many other spheres of public life -
'race' (cf. Potter & Wetherell, 1988; Wetherell & Potter, 
1992), health (cf. Herzlich, 1973) and 'gender' (cf. 
Wetherell, 1986; Wetherell et aI, 1987) to suggest but a 
few. The inequalities in terms of the discursive resources 
available for accounting for social life brings us to the 
issue of power. 
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What role does power serve in relation to language and 
ideology? One aspect of a critical view of ideology is that 
it serves to maintain power relations of domination 
(Foster; 1991d), and we have seen how ideology "operates as 
discourse" (Therborn, 1980: 15). To examine ideology in 
text is to examine the manner in which meaning serves to 
sustain relations of domination (Thompson, 1984). Discourse 
reproduces relations of power, it is the location in which 
these relations are played out and enacted (Fairclough, 
1989; Fowler, 1985). It is through discourse that certain 
practices are legitimated and others are prevented from 
occurring. 
The links between discourse, ideology and pow~r. suggest 
that power should be of significant concern to discourse 
analysts. Indeed, Ian Parker attests that: "We should 
speak about discourse and power in the same breath" (1990a: 
199). In other words, discourse analysis should not limit 
its focus to the mere description of specific texts, but 
should explore the ideological functions of discourse and 
expose relations of domination and oppression. 
From a foucauldian perspective (cf. Foucault, 1977), 
discourses are implicated in the structure of institutions; 
that is, certain discourses tend to be affiliated with 
certain institutions. Discourse analysis needs to address 
the way in which discourse reproduces institutions. For 
example, Fairclough (1989) has observed within a range of 
medical contexts the manner in which power operates both 
'in' and 'behind' discourse to reproduce particular 
relations of power and subject positions, and the hegemony 
of the medical institution. 
Although Foucault's (1980) work represents the most 
thorough analysis of power, his framework tends to regard 
power as all-pervasive, as everywhere (Parker, 1989, Burman 
& Parker, 1993). This is problematic in that it denies the 
rhetorical nature of 'lived ideology': the notion that both 
argument and counter-argument are united in dialogue, that 
where there is logos, there is anti-logos (Billig, 1987). 
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The upshot of a foucauldian position on power is that the 
potential for resistance and social change is negated. 
However, as Billig (1987: 48) has noted: 
The power of speech is not the power to command 
obedience by replacing argument with silence. It is 
the power to challenge silent obedience by opening 
argumen ts . The former resul t can be attained by 
physical force as well as logos, but the latter can 
only be achieved by logos, or rather by anti-logos. 
The importance of a discourse analytic framework which 
includes an analysis of ideology and power should be 
apparent at this point. However, many strands of discourse 
analysis completely omit, or pay very scant att~ntion to, 
these issues. This is especially true of those analyses 
informed by conversation analytic theory and methodology. 
Within the psychological discourse literature, the recent 
text by Edwards and Potter (1992) is exemplary. The text 
outlines a model for discursive action (DAM) but in so 
doing demands a micro level of analysis; that is, "close 
attention to the fine detail of talk and texts" (Edwards & 
Pott~r, 1992: 2). The level of analysis in and of itself 
is not the problem, it is the fact that Edwards and Potter 
neglect to link the minutia of what is accomplished in 
social action with notions of ideology and power. 
Potter's work assumes a more ideological flavour when he 
collaborates with Wetherell. Their excellent book Mapping 
the language of racism explicitly locates racism within the 
context of "the study of ideology more generally" (1992: 
3). and 
power. 
draws out the relations between subjectivity and 
Here too the textual analysis highlights the role 
of rhetorical constructions and discursive features. 
However, rather than getting bogged down in heavy (and 
arguably unnecessary) detail, the analysis clearly 
demonstrates the manner in which the discursive patterns 
identified in the text reflect dominant racist ideologies. 
Furthermore, these ideologies, and their attendant. power 
relations, are grounded within the historical context of 
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the colonial history of 'white' New Zealand. This is 
important for: "Ideological power, the power to project 
one's own practices as universal and 'common-sense', is a 
significant complement to economic and political power, and 
of particular significance ... because it is exercised in 
discourse" (Fairclough, 1989: 33). In short, we need to 
take account of "the relations of language to the material 
conditions of its uses and of its users" (Kress, 1985: 29). 
On the face of it an approach which departs so radically 
from mainstream psychology with respect to subjectivity, 
and which claims to offer both a theory of ideology and 
power and a method of exploring these notions, would seem 
to be inherently political. The term discourse a~a~ysis is 
almost synonymous with 'critical' and sometimes 'feminist' 
research and has been used in progressive ways (Burman, 
1991b). Wetherell and Potter's (1992) work on the language 
of racism in New Zealand constitutes one such example. 
However, "Is the progressive political practice associated 
with discourse analysis a necessary or intrinsic feature of 
discourse analysis itself?" (Burman, 1991b: 329-330). The 
need for this question stems from the post-structural 
foundation of the discourse analytic perspective. In 
particular, the emphasis upon meaning as multiple and 
shifting rather than unitary and fixed, and the focus upon 
knowledge as socially constructed, uncoupled from notions 
of 'truth'. The consequence of this view is relativism: 
that "there is nothing outside of the text" (Derrida, 1976: 
158). That which is 'real' is that which is constructed in 
and through text and the manner in which truth or 
acceptability is gauged is internal to particular 
discourses (Henriques et al, 1984). Thus al though 
discourse analysis has been used to inform political 
struggle in a number of areas, Burman (1990, 1991b) 
maintains that the relativism of the 'turn to langu?ge' has 
left a 'moral-political vacuum' - for once there is no 
truth, how does one argue right from wrong? 
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The notion of a non-unitary self inhabiting a plurality of 
discursive positions, while theoretically useful in terms 
of deconstructing individual-social dualism, contributes 
further to the problem. Specifically, it has been 
criticised for leaving people as politically impotent, both 
individually and collectively (Shusterman, 1988, in Skeggs, 
1991). In consequence, a discourse analytic framework does 
not necessarily imply a progressive political position. As 
Burman bravely argues, given the smug complacency of the 
'new' order, " a motivated, partisan political 
orientation is proscribed. By this account, theory floats 
disconnected from any political position - a return to a 
disturbingly familiar liberal pluralist position" (1991b: 
331) . "" . 
In short, despite the fact that this type of research has 
been hailed as a "critical, political and potentially 
emancipatory activity" (Potter & Wetherel1, 1987: 104), it 
would seem that discourse analysis "does not offer a 
political position in its own right: rather, the political 
rests in the strategic appropriation of its framework" 
(Burman, 1991b: 333). This is an issue to which we shall 
return later (refer chap 9, section 9.2). 
Thus far our discussion has been oriented to delineating 
the principal features of discourse analysis generally. We 
have touched upon issues of language, self, ideology, power 
and politics. Much of our discussion has drawn upon the 
writings of Ian Parker and Erica Burman, 
Potter and Margaret Wetherell. These 
and Jonathan 
four people 
constitute perhaps the major thrust of discourse analytic 
work in European social psychology; however, the stance 
which each pair adopt in relation to their subject is 
slightly different. The following section examines these 
differences, with a view to teasing out the strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach. 
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2.4 Potter vs. Parker: a critical appraisal 
It must be expressed at the outset that the differences in 
approach between Parker and Burman on the one hand, and 
Potter and Wethere11 on the other, should not be 
overstated. They have in common the key features of 
discourse analysis described above, and their differences 
are perhaps best characterised as being of nuance. This 
discussion aims to highlight what appear to be the main 
areas of distinction, and will avoid becoming a nitpicking 
exercise (cf. Bowers, 1988 for a detailed review of Potter 
and Wethere11's approach). 
Both Parker (cf. Parker, 1988a, 1988b, 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 
1990c, 1991, 1992, 1994, Parker & Shotter, 1990a, 1990b) 
and Burman (cf. 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1992, 1994; 
Burman & Parker, 1993) and Potter (cf. 1988a, 1988b; Potter 
& Edwards, 1990; Potter & Mu1kay, 1985; Potter & Reicher, 
1987; Fotter, Stringer & Wethere11, 1984; Potter & 
Wethere11, 1987, 1988, 1989; Potter, Wethere11 & Chitty, 
1991; Potter, Wethere11 , Gill & Edwards, 1990; Edwards & 
Potter, 1992; Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1992) and 
Wethere11 (cf. 1986; Wethere11 & Potter, 1986, 1988, 1992; 
Wetherel1, Stiven & Potter, 1987), have published 
extensively in the area of discourse analysis. A review of 
this writing reveals two major areas of difference: the 
first relates to the level of analysis employed, and the 
second relates to the amount of applied work generated by 
each approach. We shall examine these in turn. 
As we have seen above (refer section 2.3), discourse 
analysis eschews the approach of traditional psychology 
which takes the individual human subject as the unit of 
analysis. 
multiple 
A view of subjectivity as non-unitary and 
necessitates that selves be located within 
discourse, and that discourse itself becomes the analytic 
topic. Both Parker and Burman, and Potter and Wethere11, 
share this perspective and approach texts with a view to 
identifying 'discourses' (Parker and Burman) or 
'interpretative repertoires' (Potter and Wethere11): the 
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difference between these constructs being essentially one 
of nomenclature. 
However, while these two approaches converge with respect 
to the unit of analytic focus, they diverge with respect to 
the level of analysis each assumes. In a nutshell, Parker 
and Burman do less of the detailed conversation analytic-
type work to warrant their claims regarding the 
identification of certain discourses, and provide more 
commentary upon issues of power and ideology. Potter and 
Wetherell, on the other hand, do more of the detailed 
conversation analytic-type work, and provide less 
commentary upon issues of ideology and power. 
At this juncture let me stress that this observation is 
about degrees (more or less) and is not in any way 
suggestive of a total neglect of one or other component in 
the work of either approach - as mentioned earlier, we are 
concerned with nuance here. Furthermore, to digress for a 
moment, there are differences between members of each 
'pair' of researchers. For example, much of what is 
regarded as 'Parker and Burman's approach' comes from the 
work of Parker alone (eg. the key text Discourse dynamics, 
1992). While there is no doubt that Burman has contributed 
significantly to the development of this form of discourse 
analysis, she expresses reservations about its political 
use (cf. Burman, 1990, 1991d); consequently, much of her 
work is conducted within a feminist framework. Potter and 
Wetherell's approach, on the other hand, does represent a 
joint accomplishment (cf. their major texts of 1987 and 
1992). However, the authors differ from each other in 
terms of politics. Wetherell's stance (again informed by 
feminist ideas) is more concerned with issues of ideology 
and power while Potter's proclivity is for more 
conversation analytic type work (refer also section 2.3). 
The differences between the two approaches to discourse 
analysis relate in part to the sources of historical 
influence which have shaped the evolution of each 
perspective. Again, the difference is one of emphasis. 
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While Potter and Wethere11 (eg. 1987; McKin1ay & Potter, 
1987) ascribe the foundations of their _~~:t'!lI_~t: ___ ~~~_~~urs.e~ __ ._ 
analysis to linguistic philosophy, ethnomethodo1ogy, and 
- -- - --- -" --_ .. ,,'-
post-str~ctura1ism, Parker and Burman (eg. Parker, 1990a, 
1992; Burman & Parker, 1993) situate their approach firmly 
within the post-structuralist tradition. As Parker (1990a: 
190) has commented "my only understanding of discourse is 
informed by post-structuralist work" (my emphasis), and he 
has been critical of Potter and Wethere11's later writing 
in particular for merely 'acknowledging' this significant 
line of influence (cf. parker, 1990a). Interestingly, the 
year after Parker's charge, which took place within the 
context of a key debate about discourse analysis between 
the two 'groupings' in the journal Philosophical 
psychology, Wethere11 and Potter (1992: 88) claimed to 
"have been strongly influenced by developments in 
'continental' discourse analysis such as that of Foucau1t 
and other post-structuralists" (my emphasis) . 
Such argument is interesting, even amusing, but it is 
indicative of deeper differences which underlie the 
perspectives of Parker and Potter respectively. These 
differences relate to theoretical objectives and the 
methodological means of realising those objectives. While 
both approaches are concerned with the explication of· 
ideology and power through an analysis of discourse, the 
relations between social institutions, power and ideology 
appear to be more explicitly formulated within the 
discourse analytic framework propounded by Ian Parker and 
Erica Burman. Unlike Potter and Wethere11 (1987), and in 
line with their avowed closer links with the foucau1dian 
tradition (cf. Parker, 1990a), Parker and Burman overtly 
incorporate these aspects of discourse into their theory 
and method (cf. Parker, 1990a, 1992). In contrast, the 
approach advocated by Potter and Wethere11 is oriented 
toward discursive function, construction and variation. 
Issues of ideology and power flow from these notions but 
are not explicitly formulated within their theory or 
method. 
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The advantage of Parker and Burman's approach is that it 
has immediate and obvious appeal to those of us committed 
to a psychology of social transformation: it has political 
face validity. Indeed, it is probably for this reason that 
their approach to discourse analysis seems to have found 
greater favour among critical psychologists in South Africa 
(although very little has transpired in the way of 
published articles) - Parker and Burman formally visited 
the University of Cape Town in January 1994. However, 
while superficially appealing, the method of performing an 
analysis of discourse put forward by Parker is less than 
satisfactory in achieving its objective of 'ideology 
critique' (Parker, 1990c: 227) in my opinion. Furthermore, 
I would go so far as to suggest that this accounts for the 
fact that Parker and Burman' s approach to discourse 
analysis has stimulated less applied research. 
Parker's approach to discourse analysis fails to live up to 
expectation on three grounds, the first two of which relate 
to the point of difference regarding 'level of analysis' 
described above while the third corresponds to the point of 
difference regarding practical application. First, the 
manner in which Parker conceptualises 'discourses' is 
problematic, second, the method employed for the 
identification of discourses is flimsy, and third, the way 
in which this approach has been used does not always seem 
to be consonant with its overtly political objectives. 
Parker's view of discourse has been criticised for its 
tendency toward abstraction and reification (cf, Abrams & 
Hogg, 1990; Potter wetherell, Gill & Edwards, 1990). In 
essence, Parker's account 
independently existing 
affords discourses the status of 
'realities' which in and of 
themselves have agentic properties. In line with the post-
structuralist thinking which dominates this approach, 
"there is nothing outside of the text" (Derrida, 1976: 158) 
- the unfortunate corollary of such a position being its 
inattention to context, and local discursive context in 
particular (a point to which we shall return shortly) . 
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In seeking to identify discourse in text, the aspirant 
analyst is informed that "the statements in a discourse can 
be grouped, and given a certain coherence, 
they refer to the same topic" (Parker, 1990a: 
in so far as 
192) . Thus, 
for example, an examination of text may lead one to 
identify a 'familial' discourse, a 'medical' discourse, a 
'racist' discourse, or a 'religious' discourse. Each 
discourse marking out a 'topic'. 
One of the problems associated with this conceptualisation 
of discourse is that it fails to call into question the 
common-sense assumptions we make about the nature of a 
topic and hence there "is a real danger that analytic work 
is simply being replaced by the analyst's common-sense" 
(Potter, Wetherell, Gill & Edwards, 1990: 210.). 
Furthermore, Parker offers very little in the way of 
warranting the claims he makes for the identification of 
certain discourses, beyond appeals to common-sense. Hence 
analytic practice is reduced to observing 'topics' thence 
termed 'discourses', and commenting upon their ideological 
nature and function. Sometimes, this process seems 
remarkably similar to that involved in the identification 
of themes in content analysis - although of course what 
Parker does wi th the 'discourses' he has observed is 
entirely different. 
Without belabouring the point, perhaps the final criticism 
relating to these two issues is that Parker's failure to 
produce working evidence for the observation of particular 
discourses makes his work especially susceptible to the 
customary criticism advanced by mainstream psychologists 
that there is no analysis in discourse analysis, and that 
such work constitutes good journalism at best, and 
political rhetoric at worst. 
Finally, despite the overtly political stance which Parker 
assumes, his form of discourse analysis has been less 
widely used than that of Potter and Wetherell in the 
deconstruction of oppressive social practice (although 
Burman has conducted some interesting work within the area 
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of developmental psychology; Burman, 1991a, 1991c, 1992). 
Furthermore, the material he selects either to demonstrate 
an analysis of discourse, or as the focus of his inquiry, 
quite often borders on the frivolous. For example, in 1988 
(Parker, 1988b) Parker analysed the discourse of a 2 minute 
20 second scene from the English radio soap, 'The Archers', 
and in a recent chapter (Parker, 1994) he illustrates basic 
principles of discourse analysis through the use of a 
sample text: the instructions on a packet of childrens' 
toothpaste (not surprisingly, we encounter the familiar 
'medical' and 'familial' discourses, among others). 
Similarly, early last year Parker presented a brilliant and 
witty paper at a conference in South Africa which took as 
its focus a discourse analysis of sci-fi literature. 
There is no doubt that examples such as these make for 
engaging reading or listening, and do reveal something of the 
manner in which dominant cultural practices are reproduced in 
the mundane aspects of daily life. However, Parker's desire 
to equate discourse analysis with political practice and 
resist its becoming "just another psychological method" (1992: 
20) could possibly be realised more effectively if 
occasionally he elected to deconstruct texts which may be seen 
more directly to maintain relations of oppression and 
domination. 
Potter and Wetherell's work differs from that of Parker 
(and Burman) with respect to level of analysis and 
practical application, as we noted above. The difference 
in level of analysis is governed by the theoretical 
conceptualisation of discourse and its implications for 
analytic practice. While, broadly speaking, Potter and 
Parker differ little in terms of the bald definition of 
discourse each proposes, Potter and Wetherell differ with 
respect to the considerable emphasis they place upon "the 
actual working of discourse as a constitutive part of 
social practices situated in specific contexts" (Potter, 
Wetherell, Gill, & Edwards, 1990: 209; original emphasis). 
This attention to 'local context' derives from the 
conversation analytic work developed by Harvey Sacks, who 
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pursued his graduate studies under the ethnomethodologists 
Garfinkel and Goffman. Sacks, and his colleagues Jefferson 
and Schlegoff, drew attention to the indexicality of 
language: 
The point here is that taking sentences in isolation 
is not just a matter of taking such sentences that 
might appear in a context out of the context; but 
that the very composition, construction, assemblage 
of the sentences is predicated by their speakers on 
the place in which it is being produced, and it is 
through that that a sentence is context-bound, rather 
than possibly independent sentences being different 
intact objects in and out of context 
(Scbeg1off, 1984: 52; original emphasis) 
The notion that meaning alters with local context 
represents a powerful resource in the analysis of 
discourse, rather than an obstacle to achieving 
understanding {Potter & Wetherell, 1987}. The indexicality 
of language is evidenced in its construction and variation 
which provides clues as to the function thereof. It is 
through an understanding of the construction, variation and 
function of talk or text that the manner in which discourse 
produces and reproduces particular relations of power, has 
particular ideological effects and supports particular 
social institutions is analysed. Thus an understanding of 
ideology and power is obtained through a detailed analysis 
{by combining discourse and conversation analytic work; 
Edwards & Potter, 1992; Roff & Potter, 1993; Kott1er & 
Swartz, 1993} of the structure and function of discourse 
since 'interpretative repertoires' are "abstractions from 
practices in context" {Potter et a1, 1990: 209; original 
emphasis} .. In contrast, Parker identifies 'discourses' in 
text directly because his reified conceptua1isation affords 
them an independent status {Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Potter et 
al, 1990}. 
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The value of providing a clear exposition of the way in 
which certain rhetorical devices and linguistic features go 
to make up particular interpretative repertoires which then 
function to sustain certain ideologies and particular 
relations of power, is that it makes it possible for the 
reader to critically examine and reflect upon the way in 
which the authors have 'read' or interpreted a particular 
text. As Potter and Wetherell note: 
In this way, the entire reasoning process from 
discursive data to conclusions is documented in some 
detail and each reader is given the possibility of 
evaluating the different stages of the process, and 
hence agreeing with the conclusions or finding grounds 
for disagreement. 
(1987: 172) 
Perhaps somewhat ironically it is the pragmatic approach to 
discourse analysis advanced by Potter andwetherell which 
seems to have been more successful in analysing the actual 
workings of power and ideology. A sizeable literature 
across a range of topics has been spawned by the authors 
themselves, sometimes in collaboration with various 
colleagues, and sometimes by other researchers. This 
includes, for example, discursive analyses of racism 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1988; Wetherel1 & Potter, 1986, 1992, 
Dixon et aI, 1994; Lea, in press), affirmative action 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1989), the reproduction of gender 
inequalities (Wetherell et aI, 1987), political discourse 
(Potter & Edwards, 1990), the social production of 
scientific knowledge (Potter & Mulkay, 1985; McKinlay & 
Potter, 1987), and 'rioting' (Potter & Reicher, 1987). 
This burgeoning literature may well reflect the particular 
strengths of Potter and Wetherell' s framework: their 
conceptualisation of discourse, their analytic method for 
the identification of interpretative repertoires, and the 
accessibility of the theory and method with respect to 
being put to good political use. However, as Burman 
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(1991b) has noted, progressive political practice is not an 
intrinsic feature of discourse analysis itself - but is a 
function of the discourse analyst. Thus, the framework of 
Potter and Wethere11 may inform political practice and 
struggle, as their own work on racism testifies, but 
equally, it may not. Furthermore by neglecting to directly 
theorise issues of ideology and power and incorporate those 
within a method of analysis, this framework is susceptible 
to being used in a way which neglects these salient issues, 
and becomes preoccupied wi th the intricacies of turn-
taking, pause lengths and specific speech-acts. In such 
instances the analytic focus becomes almost exclusively the 
local context at the expense of the ideological context 
within which talk occurs. The recent text by Edwards and 
Potter (1992) is exemplary - the book sets out to provide a 
model of discursive action, yet notions of power and 
ideology are entirely absent - a serious omission in both 
my, and no doubt Ian Parker's, opinion. 
In summary, on the one hand, Parker's discourse analytic 
framework explicitly deals with notions of ideology, power 
and social structure at the level of theory and method, yet 
does so in a manner which is problematic. On the other 
hand, while Potter and wethere1l' s approach may be 
criticised for not formally incorporating these ideas into 
their theory and method, it does seem better able to 
provide a critical analysis of the workings of power and 
ideology. 
While there is little doubt that the approaches of Parker 
and Burman, and Potter and Wetherell, are central to the 
development of an alternative critical social psychology, a 
discussion of significant developments in the field 
following the 'turn to language' would be incomplete 
wi thout considering the contribution of 'rhetorical 
psychology'. This perspective shares much in common with 
discursive psychology, but offers unique insights into the 
workings of what social representations theorist, Serge 
Moscovici, has termed 'the thinking society' (Moscovici, 
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1984). We briefly consider the impact of 'the rhetorical 
turn' (Simons, 1990) in the next section of this chapter. 
2.5 Rhetorical psychology considered 
A rhetorical approach to psychology shares much in common 
with the discursive approach outlined above (refer sections 
2.3 and 2.4): it too is anti-cognitivist in orientation 
(Billig, in press), is sensitive to the constructive and 
performative aspects of language and recognises that 
discourse is frequently characterised by variability - even 
in the case of holding strong views (cf. Billig, 1989). 
However, the rhetorical approach to psychology is more 
specifically oriented to the study of social thinking 
(Bi11ig, 1987, 1990b, 1991; Soyland, 1994a, 1994b) and to 
this end "not all instances of language-action are equally 
revealing" (Billig, in press: 13). 
Students of rhetoric take as their focus the argumentative 
aspects of discourse'since it is through an analysis of 
argument that thought may be observed. 'Private thinking' 
is seen as being "modelled" upon 'public argument', with 
the consequence that "the structure of the way we argue 
reveals the structure of our thoughts" (Billig, 1987: 111). 
Rhetorical theorists criticise cognitivist accounts for 
presenting a 'bureaucratic model of human thought' (Billig, 
1985b): a model which neglects the "two-sidedness of human 
thinking" (Billig, 1987: 41). From a cognitivist 
perspective individuals are theorised to cope with 
cognitive overload, thought to result from the multitude of 
stimuli which bombard the senses continually, by 
categorising the world into manageable and meaningful 
chunks. This perspective offers a very one-sided image of 
thought, reducing thinking to "the unthinking operations of 
the filing clerk" (Billig, 1987: 129). The argument of 
rhetorical theorists is not that such a model of thought is 
entirely wrong, but that it is incomplete. As Billig 
(1987: 130) argues, "the one-sided image needs to be opened 
out into a two-sided one". 
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'This objective is accomplished by embracing the maxim of 
the Greek sophist, Protagoras: that there are two sides to 
every question. Protagoras' principle of two-sidedness 
applies as much to the orations of the ancient Greek 
philosophers as it does to human thinking. Hence, Billig 
(198Sb, 1987) has argued that the process of categorisation 
(noted above as the cornerstone of a cognitivist account) 
is countered by that of particularisation ,(Billig; 1985b, 
1987) where categorisation refers to the process by which 
"a particular stimulus is placed in a general category, or 
grouped with other stimuli" and particularisation refers to 
the process by which "a particular stimulus is 
distinguished from a general category or from other 
stimuli" (Billig, 1985b: 82). In fact, Billig (1987) 
argues that categorisation presupposes particularisation, 
therefore ,the two are mutually inter-related. This is 
aptly demonstrated by the work of Phillip Ullah (1990: 174) 
on identity in second generation Irish youths: "Comments 
like 'I'm not Irish, I was born in England' and 'I'm not 
English, my mum and dad are Irish', show that the act of 
particularizing oneself is just as much a part of 
identification as is that of categorizing oneself". 
Rhetorical psychology is important because it draws 
attention to the argumentative aspects of thinking, but 
also because such a view accommodates a truly social theory 
of human thought. No longer are we bound to a perspective 
which envisages lone thinkers faultily categorising the 
barrage of information that impinges upon their cognitive 
faculties. Rather, people think and argue in terms of 
'common-places', shared common-sense values and ideas 
(Billig, 1987). In this respect, rhetorical theory has 
parallels with Moscovici's (1981, 1982, 1984) concept of 
'social representations', although the former emphasises 
the rhetorical or argumentative aspects of common-sense 
whereas the latter does not (Bhavnani has attempted to 
reconcile aspects of rhetorical psychology with social 
representations, cf. 1991; Billig, 1988a, 1992b reviews the 
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relationship between rhetoric and social representations; 
see also Potter & Litton, 1985). 
Thinking and arguing, then, occur within a rhetorical 
context: a context filled with the contrary themes of 
common-sense (Billig, 1987, 1991). Attention to the 
rhetorical context within which views are expressed 
facilitates an understanding of the variability of everyday 
conversation (where mainstream psychology is forced to 
suppress 
Billig, 
dialogic 
variability in line with its one-sided theory). 
like Bakhtin (1981), views human thought as 
(Shotter, 1992b). In Bakhtin's (1981) terms 
speakers may switch between different 'registers of voice', 
expressing contrary themes even within a single utterance. 
In Billig's (Billig et aI, 1988) terms, discourse embraces 
the dilemmatic nature of common-sense. Individuals engage 
in internal arguments with themselves in the same way that 
people argue with each other, 'taking the side of the 
other' (Billig, 1987, 1991) as they justify and criticise 
different ideological positions. Consequently, for every 
argument, there is a counter-argument - or, in Billig's 
(1987) terms, "'logoi' are always haunted, if not by the 
actuality of 'anti-logoi', at least by their possibility" 
(Billig, 1987: 46). 
TO be concerned with everyday thinking, with common-sense, 
is to be concerned with ideology (Billig, 1991; Moscovici, 
1983). Billig and his colleagues claim to "stress the 
ideological nature of thought" and "the thoughtful nature 
of ideology" (Billig et al, 1988; original emphasis). 
Thus, the rhetorical approach involves the study of 
'ideological dilemmas' (Billig et aI, 1988) or the contrary 
themes of common-sense which provide contradictory 
positions. For example, Billig et al (1988) have, 
identified the contrary themes of equality and authority in 
the thinking and classroom practice of school teachers, of 
health and illness in men who have undergone major heart 
surgery following cardiac arrest, and prejudice and 
tolerance in adolescents claiming to support the National 
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Front. Similarly, Billig's independent work on prejudice 
(1985b, 1988b, 1989), and views on the Royal Family (eg. 
1988c, 1989, 1990a, 1992a) is replete with examples of the 
non-unitary and contrary nature of ideological common-sense 
or the "'common-places' of rhetoric" (Billig, 1987: 192). 
In summary, a rhetorical approach has much to 
psychology - both mainstream and alternative. 
offer social 
The study of 
ancient rhetoric, drawing attention to the dialogic nature 
of human thinking, provides insights which are generally 
lacking in contemporary modern psychology (Billig, 1990b; 
Soyland, 1994a; 1994b). Furthermore, in formulating a 
fundamentally social account of human thought, rhetorical 
theory provides a framework for understanding issues of 
ideology and power - although, as Reicher (1988) has 
appropriately pointed out, Billig does not address 
satisfactorily the relationship between argumentation and 
the social practices which facilitate or constrain 
particular arguments. In eshewing an account which is 
overly deterministic, rhetorical psychology has perhaps 
gone too far the other way. To reaffirm human agency is 
important, but social transformation involves considerably 
more than marshalling the 'art of witcraft' to challenge a 
communities' common-sense (Billig, 1987) and to replace old 
common-places with new. 
The influence of a rhetorical perspective is not limited to 
the critique of traditional paradigms, however; it has 
implications for those adopting a discursive approach as 
well. Thus although Billig (in press: 8) has suggested 
that "'rhetorical psychology' could be portrayed as a sub-
section of a more general discursive psychology", it would 
seem that the rhetorical approach offers unique and 
penetrating insights which have enriched the work of 
discourse analysts by highlighting the argumentative 
aspects of discourse. One area in which the union of 
discursive and rhetorical approaches has proved 
particularly fruitful is the study of 'attitudes'. In the 
final section of this chapter we consider some of the 
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problems associated with this cornerstone of social 
psychological research, and the manner in which a 
discursive and rhetorical approach may overcome them. 
2.6 'Attitudes' reconsidered 
Michael Billig has noted: "If conversation and thinking are 
similar, then those who wish to study psychological 
processes should pay attention to the details of 
conversational interaction" (1990b: 291). Similarly, 
Burman and Parker (1993) and Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
advocate that since the constructs that form the topics of 
study within social psychology are not to found within the 
heads of individuals but within the language that has 
created them, social psychology should adopt the 
methodology of discourse analysis. 
Discourse analysis has been hailed as a radical new 
approach which 'promises' to revolutionise social 
psychology (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). One of those social 
psychological constructs which has already seen a radical 
reformulation is that of 'attitudes'. While historically 
the notion of 'attitude' has eluded parsimonious 
definition, more recently there has been some agreement 
that they refer to responses which "locate 'obj ects of 
thought' on 'dimensions of judgement'" (McGuire, 1985: 
239). Thus, on a given attitude scale individuals are 
required to express their 'attitude' toward a particular 
'object of thought' - Colgate toothpaste, 'black' people, 
or holidays abroad, for example. 
The fundamental assumption embodied within this 
conceptualisation of 'attitudes' is that they represent 
something enduring within people, and hence something which 
can be tapped, or measured, with an attitude scale (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987}. As such, 'attitudes' are 
unproblematically expressed through the medium of language, 
which reflects the existence of this 'inner reality'. 
Furthermore, 'attitudes' are anticipated to be relatively 
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stable and consistent: if you dislike mushy peas today, you 
will dislike mushy peas tomorrow. 
However, discourse analysts and rhetorical theorists 
disagree with this conceptualisation. As we have noted 
(refer se'ctions 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5), they argue that 
'attitudes' along with other psychological constructs are 
constructed through language (Burman & Parker, 1993) and do 
not have an existence 'outside' of it. Hence, the 
measurement of attitudes is problematic (a point we shall 
return to shortly). Furthermore, discourse is variable and 
does not correspond to the image of consistency advanced by 
attitude theorists. 
This lack of consistency was forcibly demonstrated in the 
work of Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) when they set out to 
examine the raging controversy surrounding an area of 
biochemistry termed 'oxidative phosphorylation'. The 
degree of variability evident in scientists' discourse 
encountered by Gilbert and Mulkay was, in their own words, 
"quite remarkable" (1984: 11): variability was present 
between different scientists accounts of the same event, 
between different written documents (eg. research papers 
and letters) produced by the same scientist, as well as 
within the course of a single interview with the same 
scientist. 
Struck by the variability in biochemists' accounts of the 
issues under debate, and the inherent plausibility of each 
account, Gilbert and Mulkay were forced to consider 
alternative methodological assumptions to those they had 
used previously. They state: 
We had to learn how to deal with variability in our 
accounts, in a way that recognised that the 
variability was not just a methodological nuisance, 
but was an intrinsic feature which we needed to 
exploit in our analyses. " 
(1984: vii) 
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The nature of discursive variability is not chaotic and 
incomprehensible (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). Rather, it conste11ates into certain 
observable patterns. For example in Gilbert and Mulkay's 
research, scientists' discourse varied depending on the 
context of linguistic production; namely, the experimental 
research paper and the semi-structured interview. Within 
the former context, an 'empiricist' repertoire predominated 
while in the latter a 'contingent' repertoire also 
prevailed. 
It is research like that of Gilbert and Mulkay which has 
informed the rise of discourse analysis within social 
psychology. Proponents of a discursive approach recognised 
that variability is an analytic resource, and that the 
notion of 'attitudes' is theoretically unable to deal with 
inconsistency (hence the need of those wedded to its use to 
employ methodological strategies which suppress variation; 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Unlike Gilbert and Mulkay 
(1984), traditional attitude researchers seem reluctant to 
rethink their theoretical base, and consequently continue 
to treat the inevitable variation in their data as error 
variance' . '. 
-However, it is not just the inability to theorise 
attitudinal inconsistency that is problematic with respect 
to the measurement and analysis of attitudes. Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) raise two other problems: the first of 
these relates to the status of the attitude object and the 
second to the translations made from participants' 
responses to researcher's categories. 
Traditional attitude research presumes the existence of the 
'attitudinalobject' (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). It fails 
to consider that the very construction of such objects 
depends upon respondents' cultural history. Respondents 
may therefore ascribe different meanings to the term which 
refers to the 'attitude object'. Simply stated, there is 
no guarantee that all respondents will interpret the term 
to mean the same thing. This is particularly pertinent 
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when the attitude object is not neutral, as is the case 
research on racial attitudes (Potter & Wethere11, 1987). 
For example, in South Africa academic discussion is 
frequently punctuated with the question 'Do you mean black 
black?'. This seemingly odd question relates to the lack of 
objective criteria for categorising people according to 
'race' (for reasons discussed in the next chapter). Does 
'black' refer to 'black African' or does it refer to 
everyone who is not deemed 'white'? 
The second problem Potter and Wetherell (1987) identify is 
the manner in which participants' discourse becomes 
translated into analyst's categories. The point they raise 
is that analysts may re-interpret respondents' answers in 
ways they never intended, offering Alan Marsh's (1976) 
research as a case in point. Marsh reported the attitudes 
of respondents who endorsed the category of 'completely 
unsympathetic' on his attitude scale concerning 'coloured 
immigrants' as being 'very hostile'. As Potter and 
Wethere1l (1987) note, hostility implies an active 
disposition, while lack of sympathy does not. 
A consequence of these conceptual and methodological 
problems is that, despite an enormous amount of research 
carried out over more than 50 years, 'attitude' research 
has not advanced significantly and remains fraught with 
problems. By offering a radical reorientation to the 
subject matter of psychology, the perspective of discourse 
analysis overcomes problems of cognitive reductionism, and 
individualism. Instead of divorcing mind from language, 
discourse analysts study the talk and texts where "images 
of the mind are reproduced and transformed" (Burman & 
Parker, 1993: 2). Language use becomes the focus of 
analysis - specifically the way in which accounts are 
constructed to serve different functions, as expressed in 
the variation that is typical of most discourse (Potter & 
Wetherel1, 1987). 
Discourse analysts, however, are not the only ones to have 
been critical of traditional approaches to attitudes and 
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their inability to account for discursive variation in 
particular. Rhetorical theorists assert that attitudes are 
not simply individual evaluative responses to a given 
attitude object (Billig, 1991). Such a view is 'one-sided' 
since: 
.. , what are often called 'attitudes' are not merely. 
rhetorical stances about the social world, but they 
are stances in relation to other stances: they are 
arguments about counter-arguments and about what are 
reasonable positions to take about matters of 
controversy 
(Billig, 1990b: 303). 
Attitudes, then, are positions on matters of controversy 
and as such occur within a rhetorical context. Moreover, 
this rhetorical context is shifting in nature, and as it 
changes so too will the nature of the attitudinal arguments 
advanced (Billig, 1987) - so much so that speakers may 
'take the side of the other', advancing the arguments of 
their adversaries, not just within the quiet confines of 
internal debate, but in the context of public argument. 
Attitudes should therefore be understood in terms of the 
argumentative or rhetorical context within which they 
originate. Hence, attitudes are fundamentally social, 
because of the context within which they operate and 
because their content, the attitudinal justifications and 
cri tic isms , is constructed from 'common-places', the 
common-sense maxims of every community (Billig, 1987). 
Rhetorical theorists' appeals for a truly social psychology 
are consonant with those of other critical theorists; 
discourse analysts, social constructionists and those 
advocating the study of social representations. However, 
it is the privileging of argumentative meaning and context 
which represents the unique contribution of a rhetorical 
approach, and which befits the variable and inconsistent 
nature of peoples' attitudes. This is perhaps best 
demonstrated in work on the rhetorical nature of racism. 
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Hitherto this phenomenon has been understood, by most 
psychologists at least, in terms of 'racial attitudes' and 
has been measured by a gamut of attitude scales which 
contain items such as 'Black people are lazy'. 
There is little doubt that, despite the considerable amount 
of research into the phenomenon of racism, it remains 
poorly understood. For example, traditional attitude 
theorists have battled to reconcile the bigot's negative 
attitude toward 'black' people and his(her_--ability-- to 
foster the occasional inter-racial friendship. Such 
inconsistency has plagued psychologists for decades -
despite their attempts to suppress it, or explain it away 
in terms of measurement error, or develop ever more complex 
theories and models (cf. Fishbein & Azjen, 1975; Azjen & 
Fishbein, 1980). 
The perspective offered by discourse analysis has provided 
psychology with a "genuinely new and alternative way to 
approach the topic of racism" (Sampson, 1992: cover 
remarks), while that of rhetorical psychology has revealed 
that "prejudice is not undilemmatically straightforward; 
there is a dialectic of prejudice" (Billig et aI, 1988). 
By deconstructing the nature of attitudes and highlighting 
their social construction, by harnessing discursive 
variability, by focusing upon the local geography of talk, 
and by emphasising the ideological nature of thought, new 
understandings of racism may be achieved. It is to the 
topic of racism that we now turn, in chapter three. 
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CHAP'l'ER 'l'HREE 
'RACE I AND RACISM: A CONCEP'l'UAL AND EMPIRICAL 
REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
Psychology in South Africa has been dominated by 
'intergroup relations' issues throughout 
Although the term 'intergroup relations' 
its history. 
suggests any 
number of intergroup cleavages (gender, class, language and 
religion, for example), in South Africa "there is little 
doubt that the central intergroup problem has been that of 
'race'" and "the issue of racial domination" (Louw and 
Foster, 1991:57). 
Psychology in South Africa emerged in the early 1920s with 
the establishment of departments of psychology at a number 
of universities in the country. Prior to this, various 
scientists exhorted colleagues to pursue psychological 
studies of 'race' (eg. Loram, 1921) but very little 
research was forthcoming (Louw and Foster, 1991). In a 
review of empirical South African psychological research 
published in recognisable journals before World War II, 
Louw and his colleagues (l993) identified a total of only 
33 studies, the first of which was published in 1925. 
The nature of studies concerning 'race' in South Africa 
parallelled developments in Europe and America, although 
they occurred approximately one to two decades later. 
Early South African research focused upon what Samelson 
61 
(1978 ) terms , race psychology' , concentrating on the 
measurement of 'objective' mental differences between the 
'races'. One of the most vigorous researchers in this area 
was M.L. Fick, a South African psychologist who trained at 
Harvard University. He concluded, following a series of 
studies, that 
Although all the facts regarding the educability of 
the Native may not be in, the available objective 
data point to a marked inferiority on the part of the 
Native in comparison with Europeans. This 
inferiority, occurring in certain tests in which 
learning or environmental conditions are equalised 
for the Native and European groups does not appear to 
be of a temporary nature. 
(Fick, 1939: 56) 
During the 1930s and 1940s, however, this position came 
under increasing attack (as had occurred earlier in Europe 
and the united States of America). One of the most 
extensive criticisms of the hereditarian explanation of 
test results was advanced by Simon Biesheuvel (1943), head 
of the Aptitude Test Section of the South African Air 
Force. In his book, African Intelligence, he concluded: 
under present circumstances ... the difference 
between the intellectual capacity of Africans and 
Europeans cannot be scientifically deter.mined 
(1943: 191) 
Influenced by European research trends, and by the findings 
of South African researchers, interest moved steadily away 
from the study of 'objective' 'racial' differences and 
toward 'the subjective side' (Same1son, 1978: 268): racial 
attitudes. The notion of 'attitude' is regarded widely as 
the cornerstone around which social psychology has been 
constructed (McGuire, 1985), and race attitude research has 
formed a fairly significant component of this body of work. 
However, in the light of criticisms levelled at 
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psychological research located within a positivist/ 
empiricist paradigm, the past decade has seen the genesis 
of several new perspectives regarding peoples' practice in 
respect of one another (refer chapter 2 for a more detailed 
examination of this topic). As noted, one of these 
approaches is discourse analysis which claims to be "a 
radical new perspective with implications for all socio-
psychological topics" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987: 32), 
including attitudes. 
This chapter takes as its focus the notion of 'race' and 
aims to trace the outlines of conceptual and empirical 
social psychological work in the field. Due to the fact 
that "tons of paper and type have been devoted to racism" 
(Kovel, 1988: 3) over the years, this review is biased 
toward South African material. The first section builds on 
earlier discussion (refer chapter 1, section 1.4) and 
critically addresses the concept of 'race'. Thereafter, 
sections 3.3 and 3.4 review South African research on 
intergroup 
attitudes. 
relations, and in particular on racial 
Recent psychological contributions (the theory 
of 'symbolic' racism, and the social cognition approach to 
prejudice) to the study of racism are examined in the 
following sections. The chapter concludes with a few 
points regarding a discursive approach to the study of 
racism. 
3.2 The Concept of 'Race' 
I know very well that in a scientific sense there is 
no such thing as race. As a politician, however, I 
need a concept that makes it possible to destroy the 
historical bases that have existed hitherto and to 
put in their place a completely new and anti-
historical 'order' and to give to this new order an 
intellectual basis. 
(quoted in Alexander, 1985a: 132, from Wilhelm Girnus, 
Wermacht Geschichte? Berlin/Leipzig, 1946: 16) 
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Although 'race' is often regarded as the classification or 
categorisation of people according to physical 
characteristics, it is "essentially social and political in 
meaning and reference rather than biological" (Boonzaier, 
1988: 58). Indeed, quotations such as the one above bear 
testament to this: it was reportedly said by Hitler in 
1934. 
This section of the thesis addresses some of the central 
issues surrounding the notion of 'race' (thereby building 
upon the ideas raised in the earlier discussion on 
terminology; refer chapter 1, section 1.4), with particular 
reference to the South African context. It serves too to 
clarify the author's stance with respect to what has been 
termed "a four letter word that hurts" (Fried, 1975: 38). 
A significant aspect of the 'modernisation' of Africa 
involved "the classification of detail into manageable 
units" (Harries, 1988: 25). Early European explorers and 
colonia1ists reacted to the unfamiliar and 'foreign' nature 
of the world with which they were confronted in Africa by 
imposing upon it their pre-existing systems of meaning, 
systems informed by "late nineteenth century evolutionist 
and Cartesian thought" (Harries, 1988: 37), as well as by 
developing those meanings in accordance with their own 
'new' experience (Banton, 1977; Miles, 1989). Acknowledged 
European 'experts', informed by positivist beliefs, arrived 
in Africa to delineate boundaries which, according to South 
African historian Patrick Harries, were seen to be "givens 
that were as historically discrete as they were 
incontrovertible" (1988: 25). In the name of science, 
objectivity and reason, the people of Africa were 
classified into various groups: groups which have informed 
oppressive political practice as well as stood as a basic 
unit of analysis for social scientists. 
Although "representations of the other" (Miles, 1989: 11) 
existed prior to European expansion and the advent of 
colonisation in the 15th century (Banton, 1977; Miles, 
1989), it was as a consequence of these developments that 
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the dichotomous discourse of 'civilisation' and 'savages' 
was established. Initially, these representations 
incorporated both positive and negative features, albeit 
rooted in conceptions of 'difference'. 
By the end of the 18th century, European representations of 
the African signified inferiority on phenotypical and 
cuI tural grounds. However, this inferiori ty was not 
predicated upon notions of inherent differences which were 
fixed and immutable; this was the prerogative of the 
emergence of 'race-science' in the 19th century (Miles, 
1989). Building upon earlier conceptions of 'the other', 
'race-science' constructed 'races' as biological types of 
human beings arranged in hierarchical relation to one 
another; an idea which still holds sway in various 
quarters, despite incontrovertible proof to the contrary. 
Undoubtedly, European 'race-science' impacted upon late 
19th century South Africa, merging with and transforming "a 
locally already-entrenched racism" (Foster, 1991d: 365) and 
serving as the basis and justification for the policies of 
segregation from 1910 and apartheid from 1948 (Boonzaier, 
1988). However, as early as 1858 the "Grondwet" 
(Constitution) of the South African Republic stated that it 
would "countenance no equality between white and coloured 
inhabitants, either in Church or in State" (reported in 
Suzman, 1960: 339). 
In more recent times the lives of South Africa's people 
have been overshadowed by the Population Registration Act 
(Act No. 30 of 1950). This act provided for the 
compilation of a Population Register in terms of which 
every person had to be classified as a 'white person', a 
'coloured person', or a 'native'. For details of the 
'definitions' contained within this piece of legislation, 
the reader is referred to Suzman's (1960) comprehensive 
review of racial classification in the legislation of South 
Africa. However, to highlight the absurdity of this Act 
which has been described as the corner-stone of the 
Apartheid policy of the Nationalist government, let us note 
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the definitions of a 'white person' and a 'coloured person' 
respectively: 
a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is 
generally accepted as a white person, but does not 
include a person who, although in appearance obviously 
a white person, is generally accepted as a coloured 
person. 
a person who is not a white person or a native. 
While two criteria are identified for the determination of 
'whiteness': obvious appearance and general acceptance (by 
'white' people, of course), 'colouredness' is ascertained 
solely by the negative process of exclusion. As Suzman 
(1960: 367) has noted "the legislature is attempting to 
define the indefinable" since "the absence of uniformity of 
definition flows primarily from the absence of any uniform 
or scientific basis of racial classification". 
Essentially, these labels denote "categories of people each 
of which is defined by the fact that its members share a 
common relationship to other categories in the South 
African polity and to the material base of the society" 
(Sharp, 1980: 8). 
While the infamous population Registration Act (1950) was 
repealed in 1991, the categories it sought to entrench 
remain ingrained in every aspect of South African society. 
As Leonard Thompson (1985) has argued, the political 
mythology that legitimises the social order of South 
African society is founded upon the assumption that 
humanity is divided into fundamentally different 'races' 
possessing inherently different physical and cultural 
qualities. For many South Africans it is self-evident that 
their society is comprised of different 'race groups', each 
with its own culture and traditions; it is believed that 
these groups have an objective existence in the real world 
(Sharp, 1988b). Consequently, and despite the changes of 
the recent past, the economic and social status of every 
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individual in South Africa continues to be governed by the 
legacy of his/her racial classification. 
The past few decades have seen a small but growing body of 
writing which has challenged the historically bounded and 
politically constructed nature of such categories (Harries, 
1988). Quite simply, "there is not a shred of 
scientifically respectable evidence to support" the view 
that there ever were, or currently exist, such things as 
'races' (Fried, 1975: 42). As La Fontaine has stated: 
there is no gene which determines an individual's 
race. 'Race' is a social category, not a scientific 
classification of Homo Sapiens, or an empirical 
reality. 
(1986: 2) 
However, 'pure' racial assumptions, categorisations and 
arguments are rare; more frequently racist talk and action 
makes reference to religion, culture, tradition and/or 
language (Miles, 1989; Boonzaier & Sharp, 1988). 
Consequently, the demise of scientific racism has had 
little impact upon popular assumptions of racial difference 
(Boonzaier, 1988). Indeed, there has been a recent 
resurgence of interest in biological arguments of racial 
differences, exemplified in the widespread appeal of the 
pseudo-scientific writings of socio-biologists such as 
Desmond Morris and Robert Ardrey (Barker, 1981). 
Historically, the preponderance of research in South Africa 
(and elsewhere) has served to perpetuate the existence of 
racial categorisation, and thereby afforded the notion of 
'race' unwarranted legitimacy. Sharp (1980) has noted how 
seldom social anthropologists in South Africa have 
questioned the validi ty of the 'ethnic' or 'racial' 
boundaries which inform their investigations. Indeed, most 
social scientists - psychologists being no exception -are 
trained as empiricists and therefore readily endorse the 
positivist assumption that reality is a directly-observable 
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phenomenon. Yet, critical engagement with constructs such 
as 'race' is essential "if racist practice is to be 
challenged and transformed (Alexander, 1985a; 1985b). 
Unfortunately, for social scientists who are critical, the 
issue of 'race' cannot lead to a straightforward rejection 
of the concept because while 'races' do not exist as 
biological or scientific entities, "the effects of the 
ideological process are very real" (Foster, 1991d: 363). 
Beliefs about the nature of 'race', irrespective of their 
truth or falsehood, have considerable social, political and 
economic significance (Banton, 1977). As Hilda Bernstein 
(1978: 5) has observed, the opponents of apartheid are 
forced into "a semantic trap" in that by using the language 
of apartheid, one has accepted something of its basic 
premise (refer also chapter 1, section 1.4). Indeed, it is 
just not possible to write about South Africa, and 
particularly issues of 'race', without employing the very 
concepts to which one is virulently opposed. Very often 
then research which implicitly, even explicitly, denies the 
existence of 'races' continues to distinguish between 
people on the basis of 'race' as a consequence of their 
differential experience. 
This trend is exemplified in South African research on 
racial attitudes. The move away from "race psychology" 
toward the study of racial attitudes in the 1930s was 
instituted by liberals concerned about the pervasive nature 
of racism; yet, such research was, and remains, replete 
with the uncritical use of racial categorisation. In the 
following section we examine the contribution of the man 
who initiated the study of racial attitudes in South 
Africa, and who dominated the field for some four decades. 
3.3 The Contribution of I. D. MacCrone 
There is no doubt that the notion of 'race' has been "an 
organising principle of South African society" (Louw & 
Foster, 1991: 67). Yet, the study of 'race' attitudes has 
not been a particularly significant feature of the South 
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African research landscape. Indeed, in the earlier part of 
this century - before 1950 - the work of I. D. MacCrone 
represented something of a lone voice in this regard (Louw 
& Foster, 1991). Louw and Foster (1991) account for this 
relative neglect in terms of the limited number of 
psychologists in South Africa at that time and the fact 
that 'race' attitudes were considered to be an issue only 
by people holding liberal views. 
MacCrone, who held senior positions at the University of 
the Witwatersrand (Head of the psychology Department, and 
later Principal and Vice-Chancellor) and within the 
Institute of Race Relations, devoted many years to the 
study of 'race' attitudes. Using a range of methods and 
diverse samples (including small samples of 'coloured', 
'Indian' and 'black' people; 1938, 1947), MacCrone sought 
to describe patterns of racial attitudes as well as explain 
their origins. His well known 'frontier hypothesis' 
postulated that the conditions of the 18th century eastern 
Cape frontier resulted in Afrikaans-speaking 'whites' 
embracing a narrow group-based ethnocentrism. In 
MacCrone's terms the frontier represented "not merely a 
place or a population but a process" (1961: 21). 
The 'frontier hypothesis' laid the groundwork for the 
development of MacCrone's (1953) notion of the 
'puritanical-Calvinist personality'. Following a series of 
factor analytic studies, he proposed that a particular 
personality type could be identified which was linked to 
ethnocentrism and negative attitudes toward 'black' people 
in particular. As Louw and Foster (1991) have noted, 
MacCrone's work strongly parallels that of Adorno et aI's 
(1950) theory of the Authoritarian Personality. Moreover, 
"MacCrone was clearly working along these lines before the 
publication of The Authoritarian Personality, and the basis 
for this, including the use of psychoanalytic concepts, was 
quite apparent as early as his 1937 book" (Louw & Foster, 
1991: 70; original emphasis). In fact, MacCrone's first 
paper investigating the psychological factors affecting 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
'white' racial attitudes drew a distinction between 
conscious and unconscious factors, and noted in respect of 
the latter: 
... but since this disguised expression is a proof 
of their urgency, they are probably not less but more 
potent than those factors which are found to be 
operative in the upper, superficial or conscious 
levels of the mind. 
(1930: 596) 
This extremely brief review in no way does justice to the 
fullness and significance of MacCrone's work; however, no 
study of 'race' in the South African context would be 
complete without reference to his pioneering contribution 
to the area. MacCrone provided much of the impetus (along 
with Pettigrew and Allport, refer section 3.4) for later 
psychological work on intergroup relations, and 'race' 
attitudes, and it is to this period in the history of South 
African studies of racism that we now turn. 
3.4 Race Attitude Research 
Research on the racial attitudes of children (refer Foster, 
1986b for a comprehensive review) and adults has 
constituted a significant proportion of South African work 
in the area of intergroup relations. A smaller and less 
systematic area of work has been concerned with the effects 
of racism upon 'black' identity and self-esteem (cf. Biko, 
1978; Foster, 1992, 1994; Manganyi, 1973, 1977, 1981). 
While there is no doubt that all of this work is important 
in the context of obtaining an understanding of racism and 
its effects in South African society, this discussion will 
focus upon adult attitudes since they have the greatest 
bearing upon the concerns of this thesis. 
To date, studies of racial attitudes in South Africa have 
tended to be oriented to examining the attitudes of 'white' 
people toward 'black' people, and have typically employed 
quantitative methods of data gathering analysis - various 
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types of attitude scales have been used. These have 
included Thurstone-type scales such as MacCrone's (1937a) 
and Lever's (1977) 'Attitudes towards the Native' scales, 
Likert scales such as Heavan and Moerdyk' s (1977) 
adaptation of Ray's (1976) 'anti-black' scale and Duckitt's 
(1990) 'subtle racism scale', social distance scales such 
as MacCrone's (1937) social distance questionnaire and 
various adaptations thereof (cf. Pettigrew, 1960; van den 
Berghe, 1962; Lever, 1972; Heavan and Groenewald, 1977; 
Spangenberg and Nel, 1983), measures to assess stereotypes 
such as Mynhardt and Plug's (1983) prejudice scale, the 
scale discrimination technique such as Colman's (1971) 
'attitudes to Africans' scale, and the semantic 
differential such as Nieuwoudt and Plug's (1983) and 
Thiele's (1988) measures of ethnic attitudes. For a 
comprehensive review of the use of attitude measurement in 
South Africa, the reader is referred to an excellent 
article on the subject by Foster (1991e). 
Research into racial attitudes over the past 60 years has 
yielded remarkably consistent results (Foster, 1991a, 
1991c). Four major trends may be discerned. First, South 
African racial attitudes exhibit a racial 'colour bar' on 
the part of 'white' people. In other words, 'white' people 
consistently prefer 'white' groups to all other 'black' 
groups, and this trend is greater for Afrikaans-speaking 
'white' people than it is for those who speak English 
(Foster, 1991c). Afrikaans speakers repeatedly manifest 
more prejudice towards outgroups than English speakers 
(pettigrew, 1958; Orpen, 1970a, 1970b; Mynhardt, 1980; 
Nieuwoudt & Nel, 1975; Lever, 1975) and are significantly 
more authoritarian (Heaven & Stones, 1980). 
Second, there is some evidence to suggest that Eng1ish-
speaking 'white' people in particular have become slightly 
more liberal in their views since the 1980s (Hofmeyer, 
1990). Third, contrary to the Human Sciences Research 
Council's (1985) report on intergroup relations in South 
Africa, 'black' and 'white' attitudes do not represent a 
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'mirror-image' of each other (Foster, 1991a, 1991c). 
'Black' people have been shown to be more tolerant than 
'white' with respect to all out-groups (Vergnani, 1985) and 
'black' people have consistently held relatively positive 
attitudes toward English-speaking 'white' people (Foster & 
Nel, 1991). Fourth, recent research (IDASA, 1990) has 
revealed that 'white' South African students still hold 
racist views suggesting that "racist attitudes are still 
prevalent in South Africa" (Foster, 1991c: 207). 
These findings are important, particularly within the 
context of South Africa's socio-political history, but the 
research is not without problems. Four key areas of 
difficulty may be distinguished. First, it takes 'race-
groups' as unquestioned 'givens', and in so doing serves to 
reproduce those groups (Foster, 1991a, 1991c). Second, 
this research is informed by traditional attitude theory 
which views the individual subject in isolation from issues 
of ideology, politics and power. Even those studies 
investigating racism as a function of conformity to social 
norms, locate that racism at the level of the unitary human 
subject and relegate society to 'an independent variable'. 
This is consummately illustrated in Nieuwoudt and Plug's 
(1983: 166) longitudinal study of racial attitudes which 
spanned the Soweto uprising. They comment, with respect to 
what they term 'The Soweto Effect': "The fact that time is 
the independent variable in this study merely means that we 
are interested in the effects of historical events on 
ethnic attitudes". One the most significant events in 
South Africa's history is thus transformed into a mere 
variable, the 'effect' of which is ascertained by a single 
score on an attitude scale. In addition, it may be more 
accurate to describe the events of the Soweto uprising as a 
cause rather than an effect in Niewoudt's study. 
The third problem associated with South African racial 
attitude studies is that they "have been long on 
description and rather short on explanation" (Foster, 
1991c: 207). Most studies are extremely thin on theory; 
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indeed, many omit to address the meaning of basic concepts. 
Notions such as 'authoritarianism' and 'social conformity', 
for example, are reified - treated as 'givens' - or defined 
operationally in terms of the measurement instruments 
employed. 
Some exception to this rule is to be found in the body of 
research informed by the psychoanalytically based theory of 
the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al., 1950). Many 
South African researchers turned to investigating the topic 
of racial attitudes generally and the role of 
authoritarianism in accounting for prejudice in particular, 
following the extended visits of well-known American social 
psychologists Gordon Allport and Thomas Pettigrew in the 
1950s. The hypothesis that authoritarianism may have 
little significance in societies in which prejudice is 
normative received considerable attention (cf. Pettigrew, 
1958, 1960; Colman & Lambley, 1970; Orpen, 1970a, 1970b) 
and in line with research elsewhere (eg. Bagley, Verma, 
Mallick & Yung, 1979; Yinger, 1983) was generally 
supported. For instance, South African 'whites' were found 
to be no more authoritarian than samples from Australia, 
Scotland or England (Ray, 1980). However, John Duckitt, a 
leading contemporary figure in South African 'race' 
attitude research has argued recently with regard to South 
African studies on authoritarianism, conformity and 
prejudice that "this evidence is far from conclusive and 
that this perspective has not yet been adequately tested" 
(1991: 180). In his critical review of this literature, 
Duckitt pinpoints a number of factors which seriously 
undermine the validity of the research; these include the 
reliance upon Pettigrew' s scale of social conformity 
(although Duckitt does not explain why this is a problem, 
it may be that he is concerned about the lack of 
triangulation of methods in this area), problems with the 
F-scale and its alternatives (eg. not balanced against 
acquiesence, low internal consistencies and reliabilities; 
Altemeyer, 1981, Duckitt, 1991) a predominance of small 
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student samples, and most significantly the absence of 
comparative data. 
Duckitt's criticisms are important and appropriate, 
particularly with respect to issues of sampling and the 
generalisability of results. A vast number of South African 
racial attitude studies have relied upon incidental samples 
of 'white' English-speaking students, and have failed to be 
circumspect about the generalisability of their findings. 
The work of Christopher Orpen (1975: 108) is exemplary. 
Orpen conducted three studies using 88 English-speaking 
students at the University of Cape Town, 90 English-
speaking students at the University of Cape Town, and 101 
English-speaking high-school students from middle-class 
homes. In the paper which reported these studies of 
authoritarianism and normative prejudice, Orpen concluded: 
"taken together, these studies point to the crucial role of 
the cultural milieu in shaping the attitudes of white South 
Africans toward non-whites in their midst" (my emphasis). 
No comment was made about the limitations of the samples 
used, nor about the differences between English and 
Afrikaans speaking 'white' people with respect to 
authoritarianism which Orpen (1970a, 1970b) had previously 
stressed. 
Given Duckitt's status in South African research on racial 
attitudes it is worthwhile examining his contribution 
briefly before turning to the final problem associated with 
this body of research. Duckitt (1983, 1988, 1991, 1993) 
attempted to address the limitations of previous research 
in a major study of racial attitudes in South Africa. He 
examined racial prejudice in a nationally representative 
sample of 'white' South Africans (Duckitt, 1988) using more 
recent measures of conformity (Marlowe Crowne . approval 
motivation scale) and authoritarianism (Ray'S balanced F-
scale) which have been shown to demonstrate good validity 
and reliability. The results of this study indicated that 
social conformity was not significantly related to 
prejudice, while authoritarianism was. This finding was 
74 
supported by two further studies in which Duckitt employed 
Altemeyer's right-wing authoritarianism scale (regarded as 
superior to the F-scale measures) leading Duckitt (1991: 
188) to conclude that " ... authoritarianism is a powerful 
determinant of prejudice in South Africa". 
Duckitt accounts for this apparent reversal in findings 
with respect to authoritarianism, conformity, and racial 
prejudice in terms of the soundness of the instruments used 
to measure these constructs. He argues that earlier 
studies involved the employment of unsound and invalidated 
measures; a problem he claims his research does not 
experience. Clearly, Duckitt's findings are important in 
terms of understanding racial prejudice. Further studies 
are needed to confirm or refute his significant findings. 
A final 'problem' associated with research into racial 
attitudes in South Africa (and elsewhere) is that it has 
been 'infiltrated' by researchers with dubious backgrounds. 
The most infamous of these is J.J. Ray (1976) who developed 
an 'anti-black scale' to measure attitudes towards 
aborigines in Australia which was adapted by Heavan and 
Moerdyk (1977) for use with South African samples. Ray's 
influence, albeit indirect, is interesting since he has 
longstanding links with the Nazi party (Billig, 1985a) -
links which Ray (1985: 441) maintains were for "the purpose 
of unobtrusive data gathering" (Ray, 1985: 441). Another 
researcher 'concerned' about racial attitudes and allegedly 
sympathetic to fascist views is A.J. Gregor (pers comm., 
Professor Don Foster) who conducted research on the 
development of racial attitudes in South African children 
(Gregor & McPherson, 1966). perhaps this is evidence 
enough that as noted earlier (refer chapter 2, sections 2.3 
and 2.4) politics and ideology constitute a fundamental 
part of social research. 
This synopsis of the dominant characteristics, findings and 
problems of South African research serves merely to sketch 
something of the nature of that research to date. In the 
following section, our discussion broadens to consider two 
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relatively recent developments in theorising racism: 
'subtle' racism and social cognition approaches to 
prejudice. 
3.5 The Nature of Racism 
It may be argued that while the layperson knows all too 
well what is meant by the terms 'race' and 'racism', the 
social scientist does not since "the range of literature, 
the number of competing theories, the plethora of 
definitions, 
bewildering" 
of the thesis 
the confusions and the agonizings are quite 
(Foster, 1991a: 2). The aim of this section 
is not to provide a comprehensive overview of 
this enormous literature, but to focus briefly upon those 
lines of thought which have the greatest relevance. Two 
theoretical accounts of racism which have been of 
considerable significance in the last decade or so are the 
theory of symbolic or modern racism, and social cognition 
accounts of stereotypes. It is to each of these that our 
discussion now turns. 
3.5.1 Racism: changing with the times? 
One of the more recent developments in racial theorising is 
that the nature of racism has changed: that the apparent 
decline in racism in the Western world actually represents 
a change in the form of racism. This 'trend' is mirrored 
in theorising across a number of Western countries as is 
evident in the work of Frank Reeves (1983), Martin Barker 
(1981) and Michael Billig (1987, 1991; Cochrane & Billig, 
1984) in Britain, Teun van Dijk (1987) in the Netherlands, 
Wetherel1 and Potter (1992) in New Zealand, Sears, Kinder 
(Sears & Kinder, 1971) and McConahay (McConahay & Hough, 
1976) in North America, and John Duckitt (1991, 1993) in 
South Africa. 
Generally, it appears that crude expressions of racism are 
no longer countenanced. Racism has assumed a more 
disguised form, one which has been variously characterised 
as 'new', 'symbolic', 'modern' or 'subtle'. Racial 
discourse has been subject to the process of what Reeves 
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(1983) terms 'sanitary coding'. It has become variable and 
shifting (Bi11ig, 1991; Wethere11 & Potter, 1992) and as 
such more deniable. 
In South Africa, very little research has been conducted 
along these more recent lines. In fact, the work of John 
Duckitt (mentioned earlier) stands out as the only attempt, 
apart from a small study conducted by Lea and her 
colleagues (Lea, Bokhorst & Colenso, in press), to examine 
the thesis that racism has changed. Duckitt (1988, 1991, 
1993), informed by developments in North America, sought to 
gauge the nature of racism in South Africa; his question: 
has racism in South Africa assumed a 'subtle' form? The 
remainder of this section will focus upon this theoretical 
development in racial theorising since it constitutes an 
important and sustained body of work, and has been applied 
to the South African context. 
In the 1970s and early 1980s a number of authors (eg. 
Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears & 
Kinder, 1971) argued, in response to findings using 
traditional measures of racism which indicated a decline in 
anti-black prejudice, that the nature of white racism had 
changed. These theorists contend that "old-fashioned 
racism, with its trinitarian creed of white supremacy, 
black inferiority, and racial segregation, has fallen out 
of fashion" (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986: 130). 'Old-
fashioned' or 'red-necked' racism has been replaced by a 
'new' racism, a racism that is 'symbolic' or 'modern' in 
form. 
The impetus for these new theoretical developments 
originated in research carried out by Sears and Kinder 
(1971) concerning the reactions of suburban 'whites' to the 
1969 mayoralty campaign in Los Angeles. This study 
revealed a discrepancy between 'white's' endorsement of 
racially egalitarian values and opposition to social 
policies associated with those values. 'White' voters 
seemed to harbour abstract and moralistic resentments 
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towards 'black' people, leading Sears and Kinder (1971) to 
formulate the concept of 'symbolic racism'. 
Later, following further research in the area, the two 
researchers refined their definition as follows: 
a blend of antiblack affect and the kind of 
traditional American values embodied in the Protestant 
Ethic. symbolic racism represents a form of 
resistance to change in the racial status quo based on 
moral feelings that blacks violate such traditional 
American values as individualism and self-reliance, 
the work ethic, obedience, and discipline. 
(Kinder & Sears; 1981: 416) 
In the meantime "working somewhat independently" (Kinder, 
1986), another team of researchers, McConahay and Hough 
(1976) also distinguished between 'symbolic racism' and 
'old-fashioned' (so termed because it is "now out of style 
in sophisticated and opinion-making circles~'; p. 24) or 
'red-necked' racism (so termed because it was/is "most 
fervently expressed by the uneducated and by lower class 
whites"; p. 24). 
'new' racism: 
They too provided a definition of the 
the expression in terms of abstract ideological 
symbols and symbolic behaviours of the feeling that 
blacks are violating cherished values and making 
illegitimate demands for changes in the racial status 
quo 
(1976: 38) 
In essence then, 'symbolic racism' is assumed to be typical 
of affluent and suburban American whites, is thought to be 
rooted in early socialisation, and is purported to manifest 
in a set of behavioural acts (eg. opposition to busing, 
affirmative action) that are justified on a non-racial 
basis but that maintain the racial status quo. Thus, 
symbolic racism embraces 'whites' rejection of the 
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principles of racial injustice simultaneous with their 
continued resistance to social policies designed to address 
such injustice. 
Although empirical support for the theory has been 
Hardee & 
symbolic 
forthcoming in a series 
Batts, 1981; McConahay, 
of studies (eg. McConahay, 
1982; 1986), the notion of 
racism has not escaped serious criticism. Indeed, it has 
been criticised on terminological, conceptual and empirical 
grounds. Sniderman and Tetlock (1986: 130), perhaps the 
theory's most thorough cri tics, have concluded that 
symbolic racism is "in practice, a flawed idea". 
Some of the confusion surrounding the notion of 'symbolic 
racism' stems from a tendency in the literature to regard 
all theorists in this area as operating from the same 
premises (Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986; and Kinder, 1986 are 
notable exceptions). While there is considerable overlap 
between the conceptions of Sears and Kinder and that of 
McConahay, sensitivity to the differences in perspective 
may clarify some of the apparent inconsistencies. 
While both conceptions emphasise the abstract nature of 
symbolic racism, the insignificance of personal experience, 
the central role of early socialisation, and the twofold 
operation of the components of prejudice and traditional 
values (Kinder, 1986), they differ with respect to the 
symbolic racist's perspective upon racism in American 
society. McConahay's conception of the symbolic racist 
incorporates a belief that racial discrimination no longer 
prevails. Sears and Kinder (Kinder, 1986) are critical of 
this view arguing that such an approach "encourages a 
tendency to label people who are racist when they are not" 
and "a tendency to write off traditional racism as a spent 
force when it is not". This reactionary stance seeks to 
locate racism predominantly within the working class, and 
to protect the middle class from ugly name-calling. There 
certainly appear to be other areas of disagreement between 
the two 'schools' of thought but these are beyond the scope 
of this review and the reader is referred to Sniderman & 
79 
Tetlock's (1986) comprehensive critique for the intricacies 
of further differences. 
Notwithstanding the differences between theorists in this 
area, the symbolic racism formulation is fraught with 
problems at almost every level. Indeed, the term itself 
has been a source of hindrance leading Donald Kinder, who 
originally coined it along with colleague Donald Sears, to 
express reservations. Some years ago he asserted that 
their selection of 'symbolic racism' to connote the 
construct was "a move I have come to regret" (1986: 153) 
and "an unfortunate choice" (1986: 155). Somewhat earlier, 
McConahay and colleagues changed the term to 'modern 
racism' "in order to emphasize the contemporary, post-civil 
rights movement nature of the beliefs and issues" (1981: 
565). They note that while modern racism is symbolic, so 
too was old-fashioned racism. The critics too find the term 
unsatisfactory; Lawrence Bobo, in his appraisal of 
symbolic racism expresses a preference for the term 
'sophisticated prejudice' (1983: 1196). 
Of course, such debate reflects underlying conceptual 
problems and not simply a predilection for 'nice names'. 
Pettigrew (1985: 339) regards the term as "slippery" and 
the formulation as suffering "conceptual vagueness". One 
aspect of these problems relates to the conceptual 
relationship between the two components of prejudice and 
values. While symbolic racism theorists emphasise that 
this form of racism is "the conjunction of racial prejudice 
and traditional American values" (Kinder, 1986: 154; 
original emphasis), in particular, individualism and self-
reliance, others (eg. Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986) have 
speculated as to whether traditional values simply serve to 
mask or camouflage racism, or are genuine. 
Further ambiguity in this regard arises, as Kinder (1986) 
admi ts, from the term 'symbolic racism' which fuels 
misunderstanding in that it gives undue emphasis to the 
racism component and neglects the value component. In 
short, it does not adequately reflect the hypothesised 
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nature of 'symbolic racism' which is racial prejudice and 
traditional values. McConahay's (McConahay et aI, 1981) 
preference for the term 'modern racism' embodies the same 
problem in that it fails to address the fundamental dualism 
the term embraces (prejudice and values). 
Another problem located at the conceptual level surrounds 
the fact that symbolic racism theorists argue that this 
form of racism does not stem from self-interest or 
realistic group conflict motives (Kinder & Sears, 1981). 
However, the manner in which they conceptualise these 
notions is extremely narrow in that it accounts only for 
objective and not subjective experience (Bobo, 1983; 
pettigrew, 1985). In a re-analysis of the Michigan 
National Election Study data used by Sears and his 
colleagues, Bobo (1983), employing a definition of self-
interest which included subjectively perceived threat, 
found that opposition to busing reflected both prejudice 
and group conflict motives. 
Inevitably, conceptual vagueness translates into empirical 
confusion and a further host of problems are discernible 
regarding the operationalisation of the construct and the 
empirical evidence to support its existence. While Kinder 
(1986: 161) attests that research evidence reveals that 
"symbolic racism and traditional racial prejudice are 
empirically distinct, and have separate and independent 
political effects", others are less convinced. Criticism 
comes from various quarters: research evidence for the 
claim is weak (Weigel and Howes; 1985), operationalisation 
of symbolic racism is inconsistent and not clearly 
distinguished from traditional racism measures (Pettigrew, 
1985), and how does one interpret intercorrelations between 
tests purportedly measuring two different things (Sniderman 
& Tetlock, 1986)? 
Ultimately, it would appear that the "conceptual and 
empirical distinctions between symbolic racism and 'old-
fashioned' prejudice have been exaggerated" (Wiegel & 
Howes, 1985: 117). For example, Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn 
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(1993) in a comprehensive analysis of different forms of 
racism, found that symbolic racist beliefs lay very close 
to those of biological racists. Moreover, "antiblack 
prejudice is still strong among American whites" (Crosby, 
Brom1ey and Saxe, 1980: 546). Indeed this is a position 
acceded to by Kinder (1986) who agrees that earlier he and 
Sears may have "claimed too much" in arguing that American 
whites had become racially egalitarian and that traditional 
racism was 'dead' among affluent and suburban whites. 
Hence, he acknowledges that "old-fashioned racism remains 
alive and all too well" (Kinder, 1986: 161), although he 
continues to maintain that the political impact of 
traditional racism is negligible in comparison to subtle 
racism. 
Finally, an issue which does not appear to have been 
addressed in the literature pertaining to symbolic or 
modern racism is that of the theory's class and urban bias. 
The notion of symbolic racism is confined to the attitudes 
of 'white' people who are both middle-class and suburban 
(refer to the definitions cited above), yet, 
debate concerning this topic very often operates 
acknowledging the hypothesised specificity 
academic 
without 
of the 
construct. In other words, symbolic racism is referred to 
as if it were applicable to the entire population; general 
statements abound in the literature such as "the nature of 
white racism has changed during the last decade" (Weigel & 
Howes, 1985: 117). Thus 'white' becomes synonymous with a 
particular sector of the population: suburban and middle-
class. This practice is problematic in itself; however, it 
also draws attention away from the fact that amongst other 
sectors of the population, racism remains prevalent and 
arguably more rampant. 
In summary, the theory of symbolic racism is important in 
that it attempts to account for perceived changes in 
attitude amongst certain sectors of the 'white' population. 
However, it is fraught with problems, as detailed above. 
In South Africa, the concept has not been widely adopted, 
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save for the work of John Duckitt (1991, 1993) who has 
developed a 'Subtle Racism Scale' for use with local 
samples in order to address the fact that the use of 
traditional measures in South Africa "has become 
increasingly problematic with the social changes of the 
past decade, and specifically the collapsing legitimacy of 
Apartheid" (1993: 116). While the Subtle Racism Scale has 
been reported to have good construct validity (Duckitt, 
1991), a recent study by Lea and her colleagues (Lea, 
Bokhorst & Colenso, in press) has raised doubts about the 
empirical relationship between the constructs of 
traditional and symbolic racism. No significant difference 
was found between the mean scores obtained on measures of 
symbolic and traditional racism completed by 150 South 
African school-children. The findings of this small study 
suggest that racism involves hitherto unaccounted for 
components in addition to traditional and subtle 
expressions of racial prejudice. 
Perhaps the greatest problem with this work is that it 
remains located within a positivist-empiricist 
epistemology. Studies of this nature have been criticised 
severely since the 'turn to language' outlined earlier 
(refer chapter 2, section 2.2) and many authors have argued 
convincingly that racism is not best conceptualised as 'an 
attitude' (refer chapter 2, section 2.6). Similarly, 
discursive and rhetorical theorists have levelled criticism 
at social cognition accounts of prejudice. 
3.5.2 Social cognition approaches to prejudice: a 
critique 
Social psychology has been informed by various theoretical 
approaches during the course of its history, but as noted 
earlier the past two decades have witnessed "a tidal wave" 
with respect to what may be termed the social cognition 
framework (Eiser, 1986; Howitt et aI, 1989; Leyens et al., 
1994: 75). Social cognition approaches focus upon the way 
in which people think about themselves and others; although 
different tendencies (Fiske & Taylor versus Hamil tion) 
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within the approach tend to emphasise different aspects of 
person perception in this process (Leyens et al., 1994). 
In crude outline, social cognition approaches view the 
social world as "extremely rich in variety and diversity" 
(Hamilton & Trolier, 1986: 128). Consequently, the sensory 
faculties of the human subject are seen to be bombarded by 
an excess of stimuli. In order to make sense of, and cope 
with, this bewildering array of stimuli, the processes of 
human perception and cognition need to simplify, order and 
organise the stimulus world. This is achieved through the 
process of categorisation (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Various 
studies have confirmed peoples' tendency to group together 
that which is similar and to differentiate between that 
which is not. Moreover, this process applies equally to 
elements of the material and social world; that is, to 
categorising things such as line lengths (eg. Tajfel & 
Wilkes, 1963, 1964; Tajfel, 1981), or other people (Wilder, 
1978). Hence, as Potter and Wetherell (1987: 116) point 
out, categorisation "is seen as a natural phenomenon, 
rather like breathing", or in the words of Leyens and his 
colleagues (1994: 77): 
A human being without prejudgement would be nothing 
more than biological magma. 
Categorisation, then, functions to minimise the differences 
between stimuli in order to simplify the complexity of the 
stimulus world. In so doing, however, it necessarily 
distorts that stimulus world (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986): 
while categorisation is vital to competent functioning, it 
has the drawback of misrepresenting 'reality' and thereby 
introducing biases and misperceptions. 
One of the central areas of investigation in social 
cognition research is the conditions under which categories 
and prototypes remain unaltered, and those under which that 
information is changed in the light of new information. It 
is for this reason that the study of stereotypes and 
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stereotyping are "ideal objects" of study for social 
cognition researchers (Leyens et al., 1994: 77). 
Building upon the assumptions that categorisation 
constitutes a primary element of human thinking and that it 
involves both a simplification and distortion of the 
stimulus world, social cognition theorists view 
stereotyping as "the outgrowth of normal cognitive 
processes" (Taylor, 1981: 83). Indeed, Hamilton and Trolier 
(1986) have commented that efforts to explore the extent to 
which cognitive factors alone produce prejudiced outcomes 
"has progressed with impressive success". Stereotyping and 
racial prejudice are seen as the 'normal' and inevitable 
consequences of the nature of human thought (Billig, 
1985b) . Moreover, stereotypes are seen as something 
positive - they facilitate and smooth social interaction -
rather than as something evil and negative (Fiske, 1994). 
The crux of a social cognition approach to prejudice is 
again succinctly captured by Leyens (Leyens et al., 1994: 
18) : 
There is no pathology in stereotyping, but the 
content of stereotypes may be pathogenic. 
Despite the popularity of the categorisation approach in 
respect of understanding the nature of prejudice, it has 
received powerful criticism from discursive and rhetorical 
psychologists alike. Three aspects of that critique will be 
focused upon in turn. First, Michael Billig (1985b, 1987) 
.has seriously questioned the premises which inform the 
categorisation approach. Second, Wetherell and Potter 
(1992) raise important points in relation to issues of 
'representation and reality' in social cognition research. 
And third, this approach has failed to produce a truly 
social account of prejudice. 
Billig's (1985b; 1987) attack on categorisation theory 
pivots around its 'bureaucratic model of human thought'. 
This model, argues Billig, produces an image of the thinker 
as a filing clerk dully following the rules associated with 
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the dreary routines of the job. Billig argues that a rule-
following model of thought is not incorrect, but that it is 
incomplete: 
Human thinking may express prejudice, but tolerance is 
not an impossibility; we can shut unpleasant truths 
from our mind, but we can also face up to them; we may 
behave like timid rule-following bureaucrats, but 
rule-creation, rule-breaking, and rule-bending can 
also occur; we may process information, but that is 
not all we do. 
(Billig, 1987: 130) 
From a rhetorical perspective, categorisation is not a 
biological necessity; rather, in line with Protagoras's 
ideas about the two-sidedness of human thinking, the 
process of categorisation and its opposing process, 
particularisation, are central to understanding human 
thought (Billig, 1985b; 1987). Peoples' talk is oriented 
to the context within which it is generated and this may 
lead them to speak in terms of categories, or to make a 
special case. For example, Cochrane and Billig (1984) 
found a 'genteel fascism' among 15 and 16 year old children 
of predominantly working class neighbourhoods from West 
Midland schools. This was exemplified by discourse which, 
while endorsing racist practice (the expulsion of 'non-
whites' from Britain), acknowledged that prejudice is 
wrong. 
Rhetorical psychology has challenged the one-sided view of 
thought propounded by social cognition theorists, and its 
implications for prejudice. Prejudice is no longer 
regarded as the mere categorisation of people who are 
perceived to be similar to each other, yet different to the 
perceiver. Instead, prejudice is viewed as dilemmatic or 
dialectic, and recently there has been an outpouring of 
studies to confirm this (cf. Billig, 1988b, 1991; Condor, 
1988; Dixon et aI, 1994; Essed, 1988; van Dijk, 1987; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1986, 1992). 
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The second angle of attack upon social cognition approaches 
to prejudice comes from Wetherell and Potter (1992) and 
concerns the manner in which reality is represented. These 
authors highlight an inherent contradiction within social 
cogni tion theory. On the one hand the process of 
categorisation is said to structure human perception and 
cognition, and therefore could be seen to be constructing 
thought. On the other hand, the characteristics which 
influence category selection are viewed as 'real'; as 
Hamilton and Trolier (1986: 129; original emphasis) note, 
categorisation is assumed to "reflect 
similari ties and differences" between people. 
actual 
While 
veridical representation is possible, it is not always 
achieved: the limitations of human cognition require that 
the individual fail in the face of the complexity of the 
stimulus world. 
The principal issue Wetherell and Potter (1992) raise is 
that social cognition approaches are unclear as to where 
the line should be drawn between a cognitive act which 
represents an accurate reflection of reality and that which 
represents a mistake. From a discursive perspective (and a 
rhetorical one) people use language to construct different 
versions of the world. Thus, people are not seen as 
passive victims of their cognitive structures, mechanically 
categorising the world into manageable pieces as they go 
about their lives (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Instead, as 
Edwards (1991: 515) puts it : "categories are for talking". 
Categories, and their particulars, are drawn upon flexibly 
in the construction of talk and in relation to its 
function. 
The third line of criticism that may be levelled at social 
cognition approaches to prejudice concerns their inability 
to offer a truly social theory of human thought, for while 
the content of stereotypes may be widely shared, the 
process of stereotyping is, by definition, an individual 
one. In Billig's terms (1985b, 1987), it is the lone 
bureaucrat who is sifting through the disorderly 
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information with which s/he is provided, filing that which 
is relevant and discarding that which is not. 
Unfortunately, the social categorisation approach remains 
locked within individual-social dualism. Even when applied 
to groups rather than individuals (cf. Tajfel, 1978), it 
"succeeds in evacuating the social content entirely from 
(an) explanation of the perception of intergroup 
differences" (Henriques, 1984: 75). Or, as Billig et al 
(1988: 2) observe: 
Cognitive psychologists have been notably remiss in 
examining how the processes of cultural and 
ideological history flow through the minds of their 
laboratory subjects. 
It would seem that social cognition theory has failed in 
its promise to revolutionise psychology's understanding of 
prejudice. As argued earlier (refer chapter 2), it is the 
pathway of discursive psychology that appears to point the 
way forward. 
3.6 Summary 
In an attempt to overcome individual-social dualism, a 
small group of predominantly European based social 
psychologists (e.g Billig, 1985b, 1987, 1991; Henriques et 
al., 1984; Parker, 1989, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) 
has been exploring alternative conceptions of the human 
subject. In the past five years there has been a steady 
rise in discursive studies which appear to offer "a 
genuinely 'new psychology' compared with what has gone 
before" (Harre & Gillett, 1994: vii). One of the topics to 
which a discursive approach has been applied is that of 
racism. 
A discursive approach to racism provides an entirely 
different conceptualisation to traditional psychological 
theory. To recap, such an approach views racism as a 
"series of ideological effects, with a flexible, fluid and 
varying content" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 59). Racism is 
not to be found inside the heads of human subjects, but is 
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sought in language, for language is the principal medium of 
the ways in which meaning serves to sustain particular 
relations of power. 
'Races' as biological entities do not exist, they are 
"ideological practices all the more effective because they 
appear as natural and inevitable results of biology or 
experience" (Wetherell, 1986: 77). They achieve the status. 
of social reality through ideological processes such as 
'racialisation' (Miles, 1989). However, while ideology is 
historical and produces human subjectivity, human beings 
also re-produce ideology in their everyday lives (Foster, 
1991d) . Finally, ideologies such as racism are closely 
related to material practices of domination (although 
theorists differ with respect to how this relationship is 
articulated) . 
To date, discursive studies of racism represent but a 
fraction of the research in this area. A handful of 
studies have been conducted in Britain (e.g. Billig et al., 
1988; Bil1ig, 1991; Cochrane & Billig, 1984; Pickering, 
1994), the Netherlands (e.g. van Dijk, 1987; 1988; 1992) 
and New Zealand (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1988; Wetherell & 
Potter, 1986; 1992). In South Africa, when I began this 
research, there was but one published paper (Kottler, 1990) 
in the area: it attempted to address discourses of racism 
in anthropological texts, but was devoid of theory and the 
analysis was not particularly scintillating either. Given 
the unique nature of racism in South Africa, it seemed 
astonishing that psychologists were reluctant to seriously 
pursue this avenue of research. A discursive approach to 
racism appeared to offer exciting possibilities - for 
'mapping the language of racism' in that country, and for 
informing anti-racist training. At last, we turn to the 
study itself. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE METHOD 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined research on racism. 
argued that much of that research is limited 
It was 
by the 
positivist and empiricist base upon which it is founded. 
This study, like that of Wetherell and Potter (1992: 98l, 
sought not to yield "yet another psychologically reductive 
study of racism", but rather to produce a psychological 
account of racism which located that phenomenon firmly 
wi thin the ideological context within which it is 
expressed, and practised. 
This chapter aims to chart the development and execution of 
the study; in so doing the questions which drove this study 
will be illuminated. The first section describes the 
forces which propelled me to examine the topic of 'race' 
and racism, and the preparatory groundwork which I 
undertook before beginning the study itself. 
4.2 preparing the Ground 
4.2.1 The Politics of Psychology 
I was born in South Africa, two years after the Sharpville 
Massacre, in a 'whites' only maternity hospital in Cape 
Town. The Population Registration Act required that on my 
birth certificate I be defined in terms of 'race'. So I 
entered a 'world' thoroughly permeated by racism, 
characterised by racial injustice and inequality. However, 
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the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act, 
the Separate Amenities Act, and the Group Areas Act kept me 
blissfully 'ignorant' of the horrors of apartheid for most 
of my childhood - except for the time I could not get to my 
gymnastics class in central Cape Town because "the 'blacks' 
were rioting". It was 1976. 
Upon leaving school I went to University to read sociology 
and psychology. There I discovered a different 'reality' 
to the one I had known before. First year Sociology was 
absorbing, riveting: our lecturers included Neville 
Alexander, and Frederik van Zyl Slabbert - both astute 
intellects and politically involved. The course was 
structured around key sociological constructs: 'race', 
'ethnicity', 'nation', 'tribe', 'culture' ... Each one was 
systematically examined and unmasked. Berger and Luckman's 
(1979) text 'The social construction of reality' became my 
inspiration; it provided an explanation for the fluidity of 
reality I experienced, something I previously had been 
unable to account for. 
Psychology, in contrast, predominantly lacked a critical 
edge. Hence my delight when I happened upon the work of 
French philosopher and psychologist, Lucien Seve (1975; 
1978). Here was a psychology which seemed not to suffer 
from the social-individual dualism which pervaded the 
discipline of my choice. Despite occasional highlights 
such as these, I completed my undergraduate training 
undecided whether to pursue postgraduate work in sociology 
or psychology. Social psychology on the face of it seemed 
to offer a solution, but I knew it did not (refer chapter 
2, section 2.2 and chapter 3, section 3.5 for a critique of 
traditional social psychology). In the end, I plumbed for 
'clinical' psychology Honours - the result, an academically 
challenging year but one in which I became thoroughly 
disillusioned with the elitist nature of the discipline. 
Finding the idea of setting up in private practice and 
seeing an endless stream of comfortable middle-class 
'white' people too much to bear, I withdrew my name from 
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the short-list of candidates for the highly sought after 6 
places on the Clinical Masters Programme. Instead I joined 
'the struggle' and signed up to do a Masters degree in 
Community psychology. 
The ensuing eight years represented the groundwork for my 
Phd, and lead to my decision to register at Loughborough 
University in 1992. It was during this time that my ideas 
crystallised and my objectives as a psychologist became 
clear. I wanted to be involved in an 'alternative' 
psychology - a psychology which pertained to all people, 
but particularly to those who were oppressed or silenced. 
Moreover, the way forward was not that of food-parcels and 
platitudes, but through challenging the very structures 
which served to reproduce unequal relations of power. 
Many of our days at university in the 1980s, were 
characterised by mass meetings, peaceful marches, and 
violent confrontations with the police. Psychology became 
clandestine meetings, letters to the newspapers, press 
conferences, rubber bullets, teargas, purple rain (dye used 
by police to mark 'political agitators') and the occasional 
sjarnbok weal if you were 'white' - far, far worse if you 
were 'black' (cf. Foster et aI, 1987). And pervading all 
this was the issue of 'race'. It dominated our lives every 
second of the day; sometimes implicitly, sometimes 
explicitly. All of us, irrespective of the category to 
which we had been assigned, seemed to be grappling with 
similar issues. 
Like Wendy Hollway (1989: 9; original emphasis), I cannot 
say "at what point ... I started doing research". I too 
read widely over this period, had endless discussions with 
friends, colleagues and comrades, and kept a diary. The 
diary was filled with ideas and thoughts and questions. In 
about 1990, struggling to accommodate what I had observed 
and experienced with mainstream theory, I turned to the 
theory of social representations. At first, it seemed to 
hold an enormous amount of promise. However, apart from 
the ambiguous and inconsistent nature of much of 
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Moscovici's writing (Bhavnani, 1988), and the diverse 
nature of the research conducted in the name of social 
representations, the group bounded nature of the theory 
(Potter & Litton, 1985) seemed too limiting. 
Moscovici's theory of social representations could not 
account for the degree of variability I encountered between 
and within peoples' talk. Were they racist? Sometimes the 
answer was clearly yes, and sometimes it was clearly no. 
Was I racist? sometimes the answer was clearly yes, and 
sometimes it was clearly no. I felt frustrated by 
psychology's inability to account for the nature of the 
problem which confronted me until I discovered a 
theoretical framework which fitted with my experience. A 
discursive framework, and more specifically a rhetorical 
framework, enabled me to understand the racism I 
encountered: it constituted an 'ideological dilemma' 
(Billig et aI, 1988). I knew then that I wanted to explore 
peoples' talk about the category of 'race' and the issue of 
racism. It was time to begin the pilot work. 
These brief historical traces may seem of little 
consequence to those unfamiliar with alternative 
psychological perspectives. However, it is widely 
acknowledged that research is not neutral and value-free 
(Fairclough, 1989; Parker, 1992). Indeed, from the 
perspective of Personal Construct Theory "personal 
experience is a rich and relevant source from which to 
derive, and in terms of which to argue, psychological 
issues" (Bannister, 1981: 195). Researchers do bring to 
their work their personal experiences and political values. 
This affects their choice of topic and the manner in which 
they perceive it (Wilkinson, 1988; Fairclough, 1989). 
Hence, it is important to 'declare ones interest' both in 
terms of producing a self-reflexive analysis, and providing 
the reader with an understanding of what informed the work. 
Importantly, this process of self-declaration is not seen 
as undermining the merits of the research, as Norman 
Fairclough (1989: 5) has stated: 
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The scientific investigation of social matters is 
perfectly compatible with committed and 'opinionated' 
investigators (there are no others!), and being 
committed does not excuse you from arguing rationally 
or producing evidence for your statements. 
Some authors prefer, in the spirit of declaring their 
position, to categorise themselves - as 'marxist' and 
'feminist' (eg. Gill, 1991), for example, or 'socialist' 
(eg. Fairclough, 1989). I have reservations about this 
method of asserting lines of allegiance because I think 
there is a danger of a certain glibness on the one hand, 
and a lack of clarity on the other. Many such terms are 
not so easily defined, and dispensed with. Of course all I 
have done, instead of choosing to construct myself in 
terms of specific categories, is to construct a brief 
narrative detailing the events which led to this Phd. 
Although the·· narrative may well lead to my being 
categorised, I hope that by providing 'a potted history', 
the reader is better able to judge the influence that this 
, 
has had'upon my work. 
4.2.2 The study begins to take shape 
It was toward the end of 1990 that my ideas crystallised 
into wanting to explore peoples' talk about the category of 
'race' and the issue of racism. At that time there were 
three constituencies within which talk about 'race' and 
racism arose from time to time. Each of these 
constituencies had an interest in the 'Academic Support 
Programme' run at the University to accommodate the needs 
of students from disadvantaged educational backgrounds; 
that is, students who were not 'white'. 
The first constituency was the students themselves. I held 
a post straddling the departments of Academic Support and 
Psychology then, being responsible for all aspects of 
academic support in the Department of Psychology. 
Frequently, the sort of problems students encountered were 
rooted in 'race'. We had numerous discussions. The second 
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constituency was the staff of the Psychology Department, a 
politically diverse group for "in seriously divided 
societies, social science is itself seriously divided" 
(Jubber, 1986: 113). Occasionally, affirmative action 
issues would arise resulting in sometimes heated debate. 
The third constituency comprised the first year psychology 
tutors: 27 young South Africans, predominantly 'white'. As 
first year co-ordinator I had a good deal to do with the 
tutors; I trained them, met them fortnightly to discuss 
tutorial content and saw them individually whenever they 
had difficulties. Many of these difficulties were 
constructed as having to do with 'black' students (then 
approximately 20% of the first year psychology student 
population): their isolation, non-participation, poor 
language skills and the complexity of assessing some of 
their work. 
The tutors were a bright, articulate group. I knew them 
well since I had been responsible for their appointments, 
and, as mentioned, saw them often. Like them, I was a 
young 'white' middle-class South African. Broadly 
speaking, we shared a liberal to left-wing view. In short, 
we had much in common. They trusted me and knew me to be a 
person of some integrity and sincerity. On the whole, it 
would probably be fair to say that we liked each other and 
our meetings, both formal and informal, were usually 
relaxed and friendly. 
The point of mentioning these three constituencies is that 
they provided me with the ideas that I wanted to explore 
further. It was here that issues of 'race' and racism were 
openly discussed at certain times; sometimes in a 
restrained and polite manner, but more often in the context 
of debate and disagreement. This was not something which 
occurred within the context of my political work; that is, 
as an active member of a number of organisations within the 
National Liberation Movement, and as a member of the 
executive committee of two. To have raised ideas of 'race' 
or what constituted racism within that context would have 
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been politically insensitive and somewhat perilous, for 
obvious reasons. 
At first I toyed with the idea of using snippets of 
discourse about 'race' and racism as they naturally arose. 
However, after a couple of weeks of systematically 
attempting to gather spontaneously occurring accounts, I 
realised it was wholly impractical. Instances of 'race' 
talk were entirely unpredictable, occurred infrequently, 
and very seldom constituted more than a 'moment'. Even if 
discourse on 'race' had been of a more frequent or 
sustained nature, recording instances of talk would have 
proved difficult. I would have had to tape whole meetings 
or tutorial groups hoping for perhaps five minutes of 
relevant material. This was not the way forward. 
It seemed that if I wanted to access peoples' talk about 
'race' and racism, I was going to have to elicit it. Group 
discussion, while interesting, would not have provided the 
depth of discussion I was after. In the South African 
context in particular, people are extremely cautious about 
what they say and to whom on matters of 'race'. I needed 
to speak to people one-to-one, but they needed to be people 
who would trust me and be prepared to talk, debate and 
discuss as openly as possible. 
paralleled that of Hollway (1989: 
Once more my experience 
16): "I knew which people 
were capable of exploring themselves in the kind of way 
that would tell me something, and I also knew how to relate 
to them in order to facilitate this." It was the tutors. 
I drew up a list of open-ended questions which I thought 
provided the framework for a thorough and wide-ranging 
discussion on 'race' and racism. This I discussed with a 
number of my academic colleagues who were also active in 
the struggle against apartheid. On the strength of their 
suggestions, I added in a 'section' on identity and 
effected a few minor changes. This schedule of questions 
formed the basis of, what would be called in the orthodox 
literature, my 'unstructured interview' (cf. Breakwell, 
1990) . 
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Two interviews were conducted to pilot the interview 
schedule; primarily, to ascertain whether it would elicit 
the kind of material I was after, and to obtain feedback 
from the interviewees as to their experience of the 
interview itself. Both of the pilot interviewees had been 
employed previously as Psychology I tutors but had left the 
university at the time of the interviews. Each interview 
was held at a time and place convenient for the 
interviewee, and lasted approximately three hours. 
In the feedback sessions after the interview, the 
interviewees expressed the opinion that our discussion had 
been extensive and deep. My schedule of questions seemed 
to constitute a useful framework for stimulating and 
sustaining discussion. I found I barely had to glance at 
the schedule, as most of the 'topics' I wanted to cover 
arose spontaneously. However, the schedule of questions 
did provide me with a useful mental check-list which 
ensured that I covered all of the aspects of 'race' and 
racism that I wanted to address. 
Listening to the tape-recordings of the two interviews 
confirmed my sense that their informal and unstructured 
format had more than achieved its objective: the material 
was dense, rich and varied. Moreover, in response to my 
final question of the interview: "Is there anything we 
haven't covered that you feel is important in respect of 
issues of 'race' and racism?", the two interviewees had 
commented as follows: 
I think we have exhausted everything, (laughter) 
utterly and totally (Pilot interviewee 1) 
Are you joking! (laughter) I didn't realise there 
were so many issues! (Pilot interviewee 2). 
Both participants were also extremely positive about their 
experience of the interview. They were asked to comment on 
aspects such as the structure and flow of the interview, 
interviewer style, and level of rapport. The only 
suggestion for improvement came from the first interviewee 
and this was that, given the length of the interview, the 
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option of a break to obtain some coffee would be a good 
idea. I included this in the second pilot interview with 
positive results. The break was useful and facilitated the 
congenial atmosphere I wished foster. 
Finally, and to my surprise, both pilot interviewees 
expressed their 'gratitude' for being asked to participate. 
They declared that South Africans need a 'safe' space to 
explore issues of 'race' and racism, but do not have one. 
This idea was to be echoed in the responses of the study's 
participants (and led to my running a series of workshops 
to address the issue), to whom we now turn. 
4.3 The Participants 
For discourse analysts, the issue of sample size is not 
necessarily 'the bigger, the better' as it is wi thin 
traditional social science. Due to the labour-intensive 
nature of analysing discourse, and to the shift in analytic 
focus from individual to discourse, the researcher is no 
longer bound by the need to produce enormous samples. 
Instead, the researcher should be guided by his/her 
research question (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). For the 
purposes of this study, the group of tutors with whom I was 
working seemed an ideal 'sample' for the reasons outlined 
above (refer section 4.2.2). By discourse standards the 
number of people interviewed in this study and the amount 
of material analysed could be judged to be large. However, 
I felt that there was no rationale for selecting certain 
tutors and not others, and that a larger sample would 
create the opportunity to test the degree to which 
discourses or interpretative repertoires are expressed 
within a fairly homogenous group. 
All 27 tutors were interviewed; of these 25 defined 
themselves as 'white', one defined himself as 'Indian' and 
another defined herself as 'black'. For the purposes of 
this study these two interviewees were not included in the 
analysis. This was not a decision which was taken lightly 
as it goes against my principle of seeking not to 
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perpetuate notions of 'racial' difference in psychological 
research. However, after analysing the discourse of these 
two participants along with the remainder of the group it 
became clear that, for obvious reasons (namely, decades of 
racial oppression and discrimination), there are 
differences between the discourse of the oppressed and the 
discourse of the oppressor. Furthermore, the inclusion of 
these interviews would have proved unwieldy as they 
introduced a whole gamut of other issues. Consequently, I 
conducted further interviews with young South Africans 
defined as 'not white' and hope to produce the results of 
this separate study elsewhere in due course. 
The participants of this study, then, comprised ten men and 
fifteen women: a total sample of twenty-five. They ranged 
in age from 19 years 3 months to 26 years 10 months and 
were all students at one of the 'liberal', English-speaking 
universities in South Africa. Approximately half were post-
graduate students (5 registered for Masters and 8 for 
Honours degrees) and half were undergraduates (all in their 
final year of registration). The majority (84%) of 
participants was registered for Arts or Social Science 
degrees, while a minority (16%) was registered for Law, 
Science, or Business Science degrees. 
participants were reading Psychology as 
all postgraduates were registered 
Psychology. 
All undergraduate 
a major course and 
for degrees in 
All participants described themselves as coming from middle 
to upper-middle class backgrounds. Most of the 
participants' families would be described as professional, 
with at least the father having received some form of post-
school qualification and occupying a blue-collar position. 
In 55% of cases mothers had received post-school 
qualifications and were employed. Only 20% of mothers were 
housewives. 
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4.4 The Interviews 
The research interview plays a crucial role in any study 
reliant upon this method for producing its analytic 
material. This section of 'The Method Chapter' considers 
the interview in detail, from issues relating to the status 
of the interview within a discourse analytic perspective to 
the transcription and presentation of interview material. 
4.4.1 The status of the interview within discourse 
analytic research 
Until very recently the research interview has been 
understood within a positivist framework; that is, it has 
been seen as a methodological tool for gathering scientific 
information in the form of verbal reports which are used to 
infer things about human cognitive processes (cf. 
Bainbridge, 1985). The value of simply asking people about 
the things you wish to know has long been recognised. 
Gordon Allport first noted the merits of this approach in 
1942 (Brown & Canter, 1985). Over the years, interest in 
gathering peoples' accounts has been sustained by 
researchers such as George Kelly (1958; personal construct 
theory and repertory grid) and Rom Harre (Harre & Secord, 
1972; open-souls doctrine). More recently, there has been 
increased recognition of the status of 'ordinary 
explanations' as respectable and unique data (Antaki, 1988; 
Brown & Canter, 1985). 
However, despite the fact that interviewing is generally 
accepted as a valid method of research, it is also regarded 
as having serious limitations because, in itself, it 
comprises "a social process of considerable complexity" 
(Brenner, Brown & Canter, 1985: 1). Some of these 
limitations include the time-consuming nature of conducting 
interviews that will yield valid and reliable data, the 
potential for bias arising from the intensive nature of the 
encounter, the possibility that respondents may refuse to 
answer sensitive questions, and a host of difficulties 
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associated with making sense of the interview material once 
it is to hand (Brenner et al., 1985). 
There is no doubt that these problems do apply to 
interviews as seen within the parameters of orthodox 
psychological research. However, the status of the 
interview within discourse analytic research is very 
different to that within traditional research (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). As Potter and 
Mulkay (1985: 248) argue: 
Instead of attempting to produce definitive versions 
of participants' actions and beliefs, ... interview 
data should be used to reveal the interpretative 
practices through which participants come to construct 
versions of their social world. 
Interviews are no longer seen as the means to access a 
'reality' of attitudes and opinions; rather, they are 
viewed as providing instances of discourse which become 
'topics in their own right' (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). 
Hence, there is no need to adhere to the systematic and 
formal approach usually adopted within interviews in order 
to maximise response consistency. Variability is no longer 
treated as a "mere technical difficulty" (Potter & Mulkay, 
1985: 252), but as an inevitable and important feature of 
discourse (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; refer chapter 2, 
sections 2.2 and 2.3 for detail). 
Informed by this theoretical re-orientation to 'the 
interview', a discursive approach assumes a different 
method of interviewing to that traditionally used. No 
longer restricted by the formal procedures necessary to 
confine discursive variability, discourse analysts use 
interviews in an 'interventionist' and 'confrontative' 
manner (Potter & Mulkay, 1985; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
Thus, the same issue may be approached a number of times in 
an interview (for instance, within the context of different 
topics) in order to establish the links "between the 
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interviewee's accounting practices and variations in 
functional context" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987: 64). 
Although discourse analytic studies may make use of a 
variety of sources for obtaining analytic material (such as 
archival material, newspaper articles, audio-tapes of radio 
programmes, video-tapes of television programmes, and 
transcriptions of specific social interactions such as 
police interviews with suspects or social work interviews 
with clients) the advantage of conducting interviews is 
that the researcher may actively intervene and explore 
prevailing ideological common-sense (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987) . 
It is no doubt for this reason, that interviewing has been 
used in a number of key discourse analytic studies: Gilbert 
and Mulkay's (1984) research on scientists' interview talk, 
Wetherell and Potter's (1992) research on racism, and 
.. 
Ullah's (1990) research on social identity, for example. 
The next section details how the interview was used within 
this study. 
4.4.2 Conducting the interviews 
The study was introduced to the tutors at one of the 
regular fortnightly meetings I held with them. I explained 
that I was doing my phd on issues of 'race' and racism and 
that I wanted to explore these issues with people who knew 
me well enough to feel comfortable to do so. I also said 
that although, or perhaps because, 'race' was such a 
salient issue in South Africa, it was something that we 
seemed to think about a great deal, but often not with much 
clarity. I informed them that it was these sorts of issues 
which would form the basis of the interview. 
I explained why I wanted to use the tutors (as outlined 
above, refer section 4.2.2) but stressed that they were 
under no obligation to participate if they did not wish to 
do so. I reassured them that it would have no impact upon 
my relationship with them and the work (as employee or 
student) they did in the Department of Psychology. I 
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suggested that if they did not wish to participate they 
left me a note to this effect; if I did not receive a note, 
I would approach tutors individually with a view to setting 
up a mutually convenient time for the interview. Questions 
were invited about any aspect of the study at this point. 
No one declined to participate in the study. Interviews 
were conducted throughout the course of the academic years 
1991 and 1992 but were specifically scheduled during 
periods of low pressure with respect to the tutors' own 
work and that of their students. 
All interviews were conducted in my office. I had been 
concerned about the possibility that this context may 
invoke too much of the lecturer - student/tutor dynamic. 
For this reason I discussed the setting of the interview 
with the tutors at the meeting in which the research was 
introduced. Tutors unanimously expressed their willingness 
to be interviewed in my office and claimed that my fears 
were unfounded ("we've never seen you in that role anyway, 
why should we now?"; Lucy). Despite these assurances, the 
issue of my status in relation to that of the interviewees 
must be addressed in terms of a reflexive analysis (refer 
section 4.6). The interviewer-interviewee relationship is 
characterised by unequal relations of power (Bhavnani, 
1991), and this was reinforced here by lecturer-
student/tutor relations. 
For the purpose of the interview both interviewee and 
interviewer sat in comfortable chairs away from the 
researcher's usual work-space. To avoid unnecessary 
disturbances, the office telephone was transferred to 
another line and a large 'do not disturb' notice was posted 
on the office door. The interviews lasted between two and 
four-and-a-half hours, and were audiotaped. A letter of 
appreciation was sent to each participant. 
4.4.3 The interview outlined 
The purpose of the interview was to elicit accounts of 
'race' and racism from young, 'white', middle-class, 
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English-speaking South Africans. To this end, a detailed 
schedule was developed (refer appendix I and 2) which set 
out the questions to be asked and which specified probes 
and potential follow-up questions. 
The structure of the interview was tripartite, comprising 
an introduction, a 'body', and a conclusion. The opening 
moments of the interview were taken up with my explaining 
to the interviewee that I was interested in peoples' 
accounts of 'race' and racism. I placed considerable 
emphasis on the fact that it seemed to me that as 'white' 
South Africans in the context of imminent political 
transformation, we frequently seemed to be engaged in 
personal struggles with our selves about these issues. 
This was something that I 'knew' from my close contact with 
the tutors as a group, and it provided a spring-board for 
legitimating discussion about issues of 'race'. 
Interviewees were invited at this juncture to ask 
questions, of clarification or information. Unlike 
interviews with strangers where this procedure is something 
of a rite of passage and rarely elicits any response, the 
interviewees in this study frequently did avail themselves 
of the opportunity to ask questions. These were sometimes 
of a personal nature (eg. why did I choose this topic for 
my Phd?), and sometimes related to issues which I hoped to 
cover in the interview (eg. how was I defining racism?). 
The former I answered candidly, while the latter were used 
to reassure the interviewee that questions of such a nature 
were precisely the reason for this research and constituted 
exactly the kinds of things I had hoped we could think 
through and discuss in the interview itself. 
When all questions had been addressed, I asked the 
interviewee's permission to tape the interview (none 
refused) and informed them that our discussion would be 
entirely confidential. I assured them that their responses 
would remain anonymous in terms of the written Phd or any 
publication which might arise from the study. Finally, I 
asked the interviewee not to discuss any aspect of our 
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interview with any other tutor until all the interviews 
were complete. 
The last part of the 'introduction' to the interview 
involved my asking the interviewee a number of biographical 
questions (refer appendix 1). I sometimes felt that they 
disrupted the flow of the interview and in retrospect I 
think it may have been more satisfactory to have asked 
interviewees to fill in a short biographical questionnaire 
at the end of the interview. 
The interview itself covered five areas or themes (refer 
appendix 2). These were: the notion of 'race', 'race' in 
the South African context, racism, self-identity, and 
political affiliation and opinions. Each area comprised a 
number of questions or topics, and various probes and 
follow-up questions. Every question was viewed as a point 
of discursive departure and not as an end in itself. 
Consequently, any question could lead to a series of 
further questions in order to explore fully the ideas and 
opinions of the interviewee. 
Each question was informed by a set of loose assumptions 
and was put to interviewees for a purpose: to elucidate a 
particular aspect of young 'white' South Africans' talk 
about 'race' and racism. In order to stimulate as much 
discussion as possible about 'race' and racism, I 
indirectly tapped South African commonplaces, I drew upon 
issues I knew to be contentious in the South African 
context, and framed questions which were informed by 
psychological theory such as symbolic racism (Kinder & 
Sears, 1971) and social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982). 
Thus each of the questions and potential probes was put to 
participants for a reason and discussion was 'controlled' 
and not allowed to range entirely freely. Potter and 
Wetherell (1987: 165) note with respect to this kind of 
interview: 
Bringing off an interview which systematically covers 
a range of topics, yet is open-ended enough to allow 
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the respondent to elaborate on their views in a 
relatively naturalistic conversational exchange, is a 
craft skill that takes some developing. 
However, during the last ten years I have participated in a 
number of programmes aimed at developing interviewing 
skills, have conducted many interviews across a range of 
contexts, and have taught interviewing skills to diverse 
groups of people, therefore I felt comfortable with this 
form of interview. 
The 'body' of the interview was concluded when the 
interviewee and I seemed to have exhausted all avenues of 
discussion, rather than after a specific period of time had 
elapsed. The interview simply continued until it reached a 
point where discussion waned; that is, when I felt that all 
the areas and sub-areas I wished to discuss had been 
covered, and when the interviewee did not pick up any more 
points raised in the interview - either by me or by 
him/herself. 
At this juncture, then, I would begin to draw the interview 
to a close. First, I would ask the interviewee if there 
was anything that we had not discussed that s/he felt was 
important, or if there was anything else s/he wanted to say 
in relation to anything we had talked about. Sometimes 
this invitation stimulated further discussion {for example, 
interviewees may have attempted to clarify their position 
here}, and sometimes it did not. I would then invite the 
interviewee to ask questions or make comments about any 
aspect of the interview or the wider study. This quite 
often resulted in a conversation about discourse analysis 
or my studying overseas, for example. Finally, I would 
thank the interviewee for their time and convey my 
appreciation of their participation. 
This closing period usually took ten to fifteen minutes 
and, in my opinion, was exceedingly important. It provided 
the space for both the interviewee {and the interviewer} to 
relax, to laugh, and to prepare to re-enter the world 
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outside my office door. Although much has been written on 
the importance of the closing stages of an interview (cf. 
Grummit, 1980; Hunt & Eadie, 1987; MacKenzie Davey & 
McDonnell, 1986; Russell, 1972), the intensity of these 
interviews (which left the interviewee, in particular, 
drained and exhausted) made this process extremely 
necessary. 
4.4.4 The issue of empowerment 
Finally, it is important to add a note to this discussion 
of the interview regarding the issue of empowerment. A 
small, but significant, body of writing has been developing 
within the social sciences in the last few years which has 
been concerned with "what it means to do research in an 
unjust world" (Lather, 1988: 570; cf Lather 1986; Bhavnani, 
1988, 1990, 1991). One of the assumptions informing the 
conduct of research within this context is that an 
emancipatory social science must build empowerment into its 
research design, and contribute to social transformation by 
developing appropriate social theory. As Deschamps (1982: 
97) has noted: 
It is necessary to insert into social psychology a 
concern with problems of power, or, more precisely, 
with relationships of power. If this is not done, ... 
(there is a) risk of skirting around a number of 
phenomena the studY of which is indispensable for our 
understanding of certain forms of social behaviour. 
In South Africa, in particular, there have been increasing 
calls for psychology to become more socially 'relevant' or 
'appropriate' (cf. Dawes, 1986; Berger & Lazarus, 1987; 
Perkel, 1988); that is, to take account of the unequal 
relations of power (class, 'race', gender, disability) that 
pervade the society. 
This study was fuelled by my own abhorrence of human 
injustice, and constituted an extension of my previous work 
with oppressed and stigmatised communities (cf. Lea, 1986; 
1988; Lea & Foster, 1990). However, although the 
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participants in this study were not exactly in need of 
empowering, this did not mean that the interviews omitted a 
social change element. Part of my role as interviewer, and 
one legitimated within the discursive paradigm, was to 
actively encourage participants to think through the 
foundations of their racism and to confront their 
inconsistencies and ambiguities. There was implicit within 
my interviews a consciousness-raising agenda. That this 
was 'successful' may be implied from the feedback I 
received from participants in the months after the 
interviews. A number of them claimed things like "you 
know, I stop myself in mid-thought sometimes since we spoke 
and say 'now hang on here'" (Paul) and "I look at black 
people differently since our interview. I even find myself 
saying to my boyfriend 'Excuse me?' when he makes a 
comment" (Jennifer). perhaps not unexpectedly, one 
interviewee who had grown up in an area where 'black' 
people were seen as particularly menacing, found that the 
interview had stirred up 'too much' and we decided that a 
few sessions of therapy were necessary. I referred her to 
a colleague. 
4.4.5 Transcription and presentation 
From a discourse analytic perspective it is imperative that 
the entire proceedings of an interview be transcribed for 
two reasons. First, transcription itself constitutes a form 
of analysis (Ochs, 1979) and second, "the researcher's 
questions become just as much a topic of analysis as the 
interviewee's answers" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987: 165). 
The interviewer's questions actively construct the context 
within which the interviewee's response is framed. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to explore discourses 
thoroughly from a partially transcribed tape as discourse 
analysis requires endless reading and re-reading of the 
text as the initial codings and discursive patterns 
identified shift and change as the analysis evolves. It is 
for this reason, that I think Hollway's {1989} approach of 
selectively transcribing is somewhat risky. 
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A researcher's system of transcription needs to accord with 
the type of analysis s/he wishes to perform (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). My interest lay 
in the content of the discourse, not the process - although 
the two can never be entirely separated. I did not need to 
attend to the conversation analytic detail of the talk, 
therefore I adopted a system which could be described as 
loosely Jeffersonian (cf. Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; 
Jefferson, 1985 for fuller version and original 
conventions; refer appendix 3 for example). The approach 
taken here is very similar to that adopted by Wetherell and 
Potter (1992) in respect of their interviews with 'white' 
New Zealanders. This method of transcription maximised 
readability and the extracts presented in the following 
chapters of this thesis are included in the form in which 
they were transcribed. 
Each of the interviews was transcribed verbatim by an 
extremely experienced research assistant using her own 
sophisticated equipment (top of the range hi-fi, foot-pedal 
and headphones) including a graphic equaliser to clarify 
the occasional unclear passage. Complete transcription 
constituted an enormous task: 25 interviews averaging 3 
hours in length. Although Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
estimate a rate of about 10 hours of transcribing to one 
hour of tape, an experienced transcriber not hampered by 
including detailed conversation analytic conventions may 
take 5 hours to one hour of tape. Nevertheless, this 
translated into some 375 hours of transcribing time. 
The final corpus of transcribed material comprised some 
1000 lines of text. The next step involved what to do with 
it. In the following section, I outline the method of 
analysing discourse used in this study. 
4.5 The Best Method of Discourse Analysis 
We have discussed, 
(refer sections 2.2 
fairly extensively, 
and 2.3 in particular) 
in chapter two 
the theoretical 
principles which inform a discursive perspective. However, 
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before introducing the method of discourse analysis used in 
this study, it may be useful to recap upon a few of the 
central ideas which inform the manner in which analysis is 
conducted. 
It will be recalled that orthodox qualitative methods of 
analysis tend to assume the existence of a pre-linguistic 
transcendent reality, a 'truth' which may be revealed 
through its repeated appearance in the accounts of research 
participants. Discourse analysts reject this assumption on 
the grounds that there is no 'truth' beyond that which is 
constructed through language (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Edwards & Potter, 1992). Hence, the central feature 
differentiating discourse analysis from traditional social 
science methods is its treatment of discourse as a topic in 
its own right (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). 
Typically, traditional qualitative studies operate 
according to the methodological principle of what Gilbert 
and Mulkay (1984: 7) term "linguistic consistency"; that 
is, if a "sufficient proportion" of participants' 
narratives seem consistently to account in the same way for 
a particular social practice, then such narratives are seen 
as reflecting that social reality. From this perspective 
the context of discursive production is only attended to in 
order to dismiss inconsistency between accounts which 
undermines the researcher's interpretations; in other 
words, some explanation is proffered as to why a particular 
account may deviate from the 'truth'. 
The difficulty with this perspective is that the context of 
linguistic production is viewed as a source of error 
variance, rather than as an integral part of the production 
of participants' discourse (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The 
traditional view therefore neglects the idea that "all 
language functions in contexts of situation, and is 
relatable to those contexts" (Halliday, 1972: 28-29; 
original emphasis). The context-dependent nature of 
participants' discourse confirms that discourse can not be 
seen as reflective of that which it purports to describe, 
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since any observed similarities in discursive content may 
be due as much to similarities in the context of linguistic 
production as to similarities in the events recounted 
(Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). 
Discourse analysts view discourse as inextricably related 
to the context of its production. Peoples' accounts are 
assumed to vary according to the functional context within 
which they are produced (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The 
focus of a discursive analysis is therefore upon "the 
dynamic and organised properties of language use" 
(Wooffitt, 1992: 46) and no attempt is made to go 'beyond' 
the text in order to account for participants' attitudes or 
actions. From the perspective of Potter and Wetherell 
(1987; 1992), the analysis of discourse is oriented to the 
principles of construction, function, and variation. 
However, as Ian Parker (1992: 43) has pointed out: 
The analysis of texts has to be placed in cultural 
context, and an understanding of discourse dynamics 
developed in an account of tensions and 
transformations in culture. 
Consequently, the conception the reader gains from a text 
is produced by the particular form and sequence of the 
words in that text and their location within 'general 
cultural systems of meaning' 
Wethere1l, 1984). 
(Potter, Stringer, & 
It is important to recognise that these social and cultural 
contexts are themselves products of discourse since they 
are constructed through the use of recurrent patterns of 
language. Hence, text and context are intricately 
intertwined and are not neatly bounded: 
Our use of language in defining the social does not 
take the form of a ghostly presence outside of the 
social. Rather a society comes into being in the way 
that it does precisely through the associations 
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actors make as they recruit others to 
definition of it. 
(Bowers and Iwi; 1993: 364, original emphasis) 
their 
Although the past decade has witnessed a burgeoning 
interest in discourse analysis, it is not possible to speak 
of discourse analysis as a single unitary entity since this 
would be to gloss over the philosophical distinctions which 
inform different approaches (Burman & Parker, 1993). 
Furthermore, discourse analysts seem unanimous in their 
view that it is not really possible to outline a method of 
discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Fairclough, 
1992; Burman & Parker, 1993). Despite this, a number of 
authors have attempted to present guidelines aimed at 
facilitating an analysis of discourse (cf. Potter & 
Wethere1l, 1987; Fairclough, 1989, Parker, 1992), although 
none of them are particularly helpful to the new initiate. 
Potter and Wetherell (1987: 168), for example, provide the 
advice that performing a discursive analysis is akin to 
"riding a bike" rather than "baking cakes from a recipe". 
Although their chapter on 'how to analyse discourse' does 
provide some useful pointers regarding the pragmatic 
aspects of going about a discourse analysis, it does not 
leave the reader very enlightened about actually analysing 
discourse. Ian Parker's (1990a, 1992) 'steps' for 
discovering discourses do not prove much better, although 
they are useful in terms of clarifying some of the 
theoretical ambiguities that plague discourse analysis. 
Norman Fairc10ugh (1992), a sociologist/linguist, has also 
attempted to address the problem of 'doing discourse 
analysis'. His chapter, again, presents only guidelines and 
is useful in terms of pragmatics. However, in being 
closely tied to his theory of discourse which aims for a 
"detailed linguistic analysis with the dynamism of social 
change" (Frawley, 1993: 421), Fairclough's method is vague 
and lacks detail at times (Zupnik, 1991). 
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In short, there is no simple formula for achieving a 
discourse analysis. The most accurate 'description' of 
what it is that discourse analysts do comes from Potter and 
Wethere11 (1987: 169): 
there is a broad theoretical framework, which 
focuses attention on the constructive and functional 
dimensions of discourse, coupled with the reader's 
skill in identifying significant patterns of 
consistency and variation. 
Thus while certain researchers rely heavily upon their own 
intuition and experience to analyse discourse (eg. Ho11way, 
1989), others attempt to systematically warrant their 
findings in terms of their theoretical frame of reference 
using linguistic evidence (eg, Wethere11 & Potter, 1992). 
My preference to work within an accepted analytic framework 
is linked clearly with my history of conducting and being 
involved in research within the South African context. The 
argument is as follows: our research takes place within 
societies which remain wedded to positivist notions of 
knowledge. Progressive research, aimed at effecting 
change, will have no effect if it can be decried as 
emotional journalism. Transformative research must have 
political power, it must be able to convince people of the 
need for change. A policy of treading a fine line is 
needed - working within a progressive frame of reference, 
but one which has the power to be translated into 'hard 
evidence' should the need arise (we shall return to this 
issue in the discussion). 
This principle was most forcibly demonstrated by the South 
African State's response to the work of Professor Don 
Foster and his colleagues (1987) on detention and torture 
in South Africa. 'Experts' were paraded in the national 
press denouncing his findings on the basis of the 
'unscientific' nature of the research. Fortunately, 
Foster's research was sufficiently 
people within South Africa, as 
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'scientific' for many 
well as the wider 
• 
international community, to be disparaging of such a 
response. The credibility and legitimacy of the research 
led to its having widespread repercussions. 
In summary then, the method of discourse analysis followed 
here accords with the guidelines espoused by Potter and 
Wetherell (1987). This involves first coding the material 
into categories, potentially of research interest, before 
undertaking the analysis proper. The analysis itself is 
oriented to identifying patterns of variability and 
consistency in the material, and then analysing the 
function and effect of the discourse, using conversation 
analytic type strategies to provide the linguistic evidence 
for one's claims. 
Finally, although I had no knowledge of Wetherell and 
Potter's (1992) New Zealand study until I was well into my 
own research, working within their theoretical framework 
has proved fruitful in that it has facilitated a comparison 
between the language of racism in South Africa and that in 
New Zealand (refer chapter 9, section 9.1). However, 
before turning to the analysis of the research material, we 
need to introduce the issue of reflexivity, one of the 
corner-stones of a discursive analysis. 
4.6 The Issue of Reflexivity and the Role of the 
Researcher 
In South Africa, perhaps in contrast to Britain and Europe, 
it is fairly widely acknowledged among English-speaking 
Departments of Psychology that reflexive, critical studies 
are needed at this point in the intellectual history of our 
discipline (Levett, 1989). However, while the concept of 
reflexivity is adroitly used in the witty conversation of 
post-modern intellectuals, its meaning frequently remains 
ambiguous. Wilkinson (1988) has suggested that this is 
because it is used in different ways and at different 
levels of analysis by different researchers. 
The term 'reflexivity' may at once seem astonishingly 
simple, and confusing. However, it is possible to identify 
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two central facets associated with the construct, both of 
which have their origin in George Kelly's (1958) Personal 
construct Theory. The first of these relates to the notion 
that "the language of construct theory is directly and 
equally applicable to psychologist and subject" (Bannister, 
1981: 194). In other words, any psychological theory 
applies as much to the researcher as it does to the people 
whom s/he studies, since they both actively construct the 
world around them. 
Reflexivity, therefore, challenges the objectivist 
commitment of 'science' to discovering 'reality', to laying 
bare the 'truth', the 'facts'. Rather, it urges us to 
recognise that at the heart of science lies representation 
(Woolgar, 1988a). The manner in which we conceptualise a 
problem will affect the way in which we study it, and 
account for our findings (Henwood & Parker, 1994; Parker, 
1992). Moreover, by studying something, we change it. 
Recognition of the discursive construction of 'science' and 
its 'data' has precipitated interest in examining the 
process through which 'scientific' knowledge is created. 
For example, a body of literature has emerged which takes 
as its focus 'the sociology of scientific knowledge', or 
SSK (eg. Mulkay & Gilbert, 1982. 1983; Potter & Mulkay, 
1985; Woolgar, 1988a, 1988b; Ashmore, 1989). However, it 
has been argued that by exposing the subjective and 
constructivist nature of 'science', researchers are "sawing 
the branch upon which they sit" (Latour, 1988: 155): by 
deconstructing the truth claims of 'natural' scientists, 
social scientists are also deconstructing the status of 
their own 'knowledge', for the issue of reflexivity applies 
as m~ch to the texts of sociaf science, as it does to any 
, , 
others. Hence, psychologists, too, are 'exposed' as being 
in the game of fact-construction (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
Indeed, it is for this reason that generally reflexivity 
has been portrayed within the social sciences as a 
'problem' - and has been ignored (Woolgar & Ashmore, 1988). 
However, Woolgar (1988b) argues that in order to come to 
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• In the current study two aspects of the researcher's 
relationship to the researched need to be acknowledged. The 
first concerns the academic relationship between researcher as 
lecturer and researched as students/tutors. The power 
differential embodied in this relationship would have affected 
the nature of our interaction despite participant's assertions 
that they saw me as friend and equal, and the emphasis upon 
participatory democracy in the programme in which we were 
jointly involved. 
The second aspect of the research relationship concerns the 
possibility that the researched were aware of the researcher's 
political position. It is likely that interviewees were aware 
that I was not in favour of the political status quo; however, 
many 'white' people in South Africa would have declared a 
similar position at that time. Moreover, it is unlikely that 
any of the interviewees knew the extent of my involvement in 
the liberation struggle since I never encountered any of them 
in the course of my political work. 
terms with the way in which representation pervades 
science, our approach should be reflexive since we need to 
explore ways of investigating our own use of 
representation. Such a commitment to a reflexive analysis 
has been observed in both discourse and conversation 
analytic research; however, Wooffitt (1992) maintains that 
it is within the domain of discourse analysis that the 
implications of reflexivity have been more fully explored. 
The advantage of discourse analysis is that it urges 
reflexivity upon the researcher and those who read the 
researcher's writings (Parker, 1992). Moreover, 
reflexivity is viewed as "a resource for, rather than an 
obstacle to, empirical research" (Wooffitt, 1992:67). 
This brings us to the second facet of 'reflexivity' 
mentioned at the beginning of this section: the notion that 
a reflexive analysis involves the researchers' awareness of 
and sensitivity to his/her own role and the influence it 
has upon and within the research process. It is argued 
that if reflexivity is to be taken seriously: 
one is obliged to acknowledge the continuity 
between the psychological processes of researcher and 
researched, and to accept that they are necessarily 
engaged as participants in the same enterprise - a 
dialogue of knowledge construction 
Wilkinson (1988: 495) 
• Ideally, in recognition of the social construction of 
'scientific' knowledge, discourse analysts need to construct 
analyses characterised by what Potter and Wetherell (1987: 
183) term 'a self-referential' quality, examining 
simultaneously the topic of investigation and the researcher's 
analysis of that topic. 
4.7 Summary 
Discourse analysis represents a radical re-formulation of 
psychology and, as such, requires an entirely different 
methodology. This chapter has sought to elucidate the main 
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issues pertaining to the method of research employed in 
this study. However, the manner in which these issues have 
been presented may be slightly misleading. Discourse 
analysis is fundamentally a process. Hence one does not 
code, analyse and write-up in neatly sequential steps. 
Rather, one moves back and forth between these stages in 
the research process as the analysis of discourse is re-
formed until a satisfactory and coherent account of the 
discourse dynamics can be formulated. 
The next four chapters detail my discursive analysis of the 
talk of young 'white' South Africans, each one tackling a 
different aspect of the discourse. Finally, we turn to the 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ANALYSIS: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK 
5,1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to ~resent the preliminary 
analysis of the research material. The analysis of 
discourse is a long and difficult process, and my objective 
in presenting these early stages is to provide the reader 
with some insight into the way in which that process was 
developed in this study. Too often discourse analysts omit 
to explain how they arrived at their conclusions. It is my 
belief that this constitutes an oversight on their part 
(refer chapter 2, section 2.4). If discourse research is 
to carry weight and to have value, the manner in which 
conclusions are drawn must be made explicit. 
In getting to grips with the research material, 
Wetherell (1987: 167) recommend "some coding". 
coding and attempting to find patterns in 
Potter and 
Months of 
the data 
eventually proved fruitful. Participants seemed to be 
using three main discourses in their accounts of 'race' and 
racism. It is the principal aim of this chapter to 
describe these discourses. Having done so, it will be 
possible to move to a detailed analysis in the following 
three chapters although, of course, it is almost 
impossible to describe without analysing since description 
is already a form of analysis. 
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• In addition, it is important to provide a caveat to the 
reading of the discourses defined here. Each of the three 
discourses embraces a set of arguments which draws upon two 
sources; namely, lived ideologies or commonplaces about social 
interaction and certain aspects of social psYchological theory 
(it 'will be recalled that all participants had pursued an 
undergraduate psychology training). The former are reinforced 
and empowered by the latter. Thus the discourses of 
biologism, cognitivism and constructivism do not constitute 
veridical representations of particular psychological 
theories, but embody the manner in which some of the ideas 
associated with those theories are harnessed to lay arguments 
in order to provide scientific weight to claims in respect of 
issues of lrace' and racism. 
5.2 Defining Discourses 
Repeated readings of the interview transcripts led to the 
definition of three discourses which participants used in 
the construction of talk about the nature of 'race' and 
racism. The following three sections define and describe 
the discourse of biologism, the discourse of cognitivism, 
and the discourse of constructivism. Examples from the 
interviews are cited to demonstrate how each discourse is 
identified in the text. Since the main purpose of this 
chapter is to describe the discourses, as a precursor to 
the analysis proper, it is not my intention to burden the 
text with detailed accounts of rhetorical devices and 
linguistic manoeuvres. • h""'/jr ,to invoke the words of 
Wendy Hollway (1989; 53-54) in relation to the discourses 
she identified in her own doctoral thesis, these categories 
"do not refer to actual entities. They are heuristic, that 
is, they are tools to help in organising the accounts of 
participants and I have judged their utility and 
comprehensiveness accordingly". 
5.2.1 The discourse of bio1ogism 
The discourse of biologism pivots around the idea that 
'races' are immutably different, occasioned either by 
references to overt biological differences or to 
insurmountable cultural differences. The former arguments, 
known as 'scientific racism' (Miles, 1989) embrace the 
notion that 'races' constitute biologically distinct 
entities "whose capacities and achievements (are) fixed by 
natural and unalterable conditions which (are) common to 
the collectivity" (Miles, 1989: 32). The 'scientific' 
discourse of 'race' originally arose in the context of the 
development of science and its application to the natural 
world, but later came to include the social world of the 
late eighteenth century (Banton, 1987: 28-64). By the 
1950s, there was strong evidence to suggest that the idea 
of race had no scientific value at all (Miles, 1989:36). 
UNESCO, for example, published a series of statements 
concerning the nature of 'race' around that time. One of 
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these concluded that "race was less a biological fact than 
a social myth" (cited in Barkan, 1992: 341). Despite this, 
'scientific evidence' continues to bolster arguments for 
the existence of populations with a distinct biological 
character (Banton, 1977: 16-17; Guillaumin, 1980: 46). 
While arguments which attest to the scientific status of 
'race' may still find expression today, modern racial 
discourse typically avoids the declaration- of open anti-
black sentiment. It is for this reason that recent 
theorists have propounded the emergence of a 'new', 
'modern' or 'symbolic' racism (Barker, 1981; Kinder & 
Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986). Today, references to a 
biological basis of 'race' are often obfuscated and 
ambiguous; instead, the inevitability of racial segregation 
is warranted via insurmountable cultural differences - that 
is, a 'differentia1ist' racism (Taguieff, 1984; cited in 
Ba1ibar, 1991a). Etienne Balibar has described this form 
of racism as "racism without races" (Balibar, 1991a: 21) 
since, like biological 'arguments, it too serves to 
naturalise racial 'differences' and to see those 
differences as immutable and insurmountable. In other 
words, "culture can also function like a nature" (original 
emphasis), for although a differentialist racism replaces 
biological heredity with insuperable cultural differences 
it sees those differences as operating like biology. 
Consequently, cultural integration is seen as tantamount to 
'the intellectual death of humanity and would perhaps even 
endanger the control mechanisms that ensure its biological 
survival" (Balibar, 1991a: 22). 
The following series of extracts provides examples of the 
way in which the discourse of biologism was articulated in 
the talk of the young 'white' south Africans who 
participated in this study: 
Tom: I would start off with a sort of scientific basis, 
looking at differences (.) in which case you can 
only get five races: caucasoid, negroid, mongoloid, 
australoid etcetera 
120 
Joe: Okay well I know the caucasoids which are the white 
race and the negroids which are the American 
blacks, australoids and (.) what are the others? 
Jennifer: My mother thinks that there's something 
different. She says that the brain size is 
different and that they're less clever and that 
but I don't know how true it is (.) there might be 
something to it. They apparently did research (.) 
you know she goes to all these conferences and she 
says there was some sort of research and the way 
they think is different . 
Glen: 
Nick: 
Gill: 
... but there are certain things that are inherent 
to a race which are never going to see (.) are 
never going to mix successfully with different 
aspects of another race. 
I avoid mass meetings because I can't remember who 
said it, but someone said there's always a whiff of 
the lynch mob and there is (.) you know I don't 
like to think that I'm scared of them for race 
reasons but I suppose I have to consider that. 
I mean if you take away the word 'race' and you 
substitute it with ethnicity or you take that away 
and you substitute it with something else (.) I 
mean there is there is some kind of ... people are 
different but I don't know what (.) I don't know 
what ... 
The discourse of biologism was identified in the corpus of 
interview material where the speaker made reference to the 
scientific status of 'race', and/or to the immutability of 
'differences' between 'race-groups'. Statements such as 
those made by Tom, Joe and Jennifer constitute examples of 
'scientific racism'; Tom and Joe speak about the 
"scientific" division of the human population into five 
"pure races" (caucasian, mongolian, malay, american and 
ethiopian), while Jennifer refers to research which seems 
to approximate Mortons's craniometry ("the brain size is 
different"). The elements of a 'differentialist racism' 
are apparent in statements such as "there are certain 
things that ... are never going to mix successfully with 
different aspects of another race", "I don't like to think 
I'm scared of them for race reasons", 
different but I don't know what (.) ... ". 
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and "people are 
Thus far this discussion has been oriented to delineating 
the elements which comprise the discourse of biologism in 
order to demonstrate how I identified this discourse in the 
text. However, despite the emphasis upon description at 
this stage, it is necessary to make some preliminary 
comments about the function of the discourse. Principally, 
the discourse of biologism functioned to construct the 
category of 'race' and the phenomenon of racism as 'fact'. 
In other words, speakers constructed accounts which 
appeared to constitute a description rather than a claim. 
As we shall see in following chapters, various rhetorical 
devices and linguistic strategies enable speakers to "make 
a specific version appear literal, solid and independent" 
of themselves (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 105). 
With respect to the discourse of biologism, this was 
accomplished through overt reference to 'science' on the 
one hand, and widespread evidence of 'natural' cultural 
difference and segregation on the other. By externalising 
racism in this manner, the speaker constructed racial 
differences as 'real', as existing 'out there' and by doing 
so managed to disclaim a racist identity: the speaker was 
not expressing the contents of an irrational mind, but was 
merely commenting upon social 'reality'. Moreover, this 
reality served to legitimate racist practice. 
The way in which the discourse of biologism functions in 
the talk of young 'white' South Africans should become 
clearer in the chapters which follow. The aim of this 
cursory description has been to familiarise the reader with 
the nature of this talk. In short, text which conveyed the 
immutability of race, through reference to biological or 
differential ideas was identified as embracing the 
discourse of biologism. In the following section, a 
different set of arguments is described. These I have 
termed the discourse of cognitivism. 
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5.2.2 The discQUrse of coqnitivism 
The discourse of cognitivism is informed by lay beliefs 
about human cognitive processes and intergroups relations, 
as well as some of the central tenets of the psychological 
theories of social cognition and social identity. Social 
psychology is largely dominated by the study of social 
cognition (Eiser, 1986) and as students of psychology, the 
participants in this study have all been exposed to social 
cognition research as well as to the work of social 
identity theorists. 
Edwards and Potter (1992: 13) term as 'cognitivism' the 
approach "of claiming for the cognitive processes of 
individuals the central role in shaping perception and 
action". For the purposes of this analysis, that which is 
defined as a discourse of 'cognitivism', will include 
accounts informed by both social cognition and social 
identity type arguments since both approaches foreground 
the importance of cognitive mechanisms - social identity 
theory is premised upon the notion that "the understanding 
of the cognitive 'mechanics' of stereotypes is essential 
for their full and adequate analysis" (Tajfel, 1981: 145). 
Consequently, although social identity theory operates at 
the level of intergroup relations (social cognition 
theorists operate at the level of the individual) and 
incorporates the motivational elements of achieving 
positive self-identity, it remains a cognitive account 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Furthermore, speakers tended 
to conflate social cognition and social identity type 
accounts suggesting they best be conceptua1isd as 
constituting a single discourse. 
The discourse of cognitivism, then, comprises rudimentary 
ideas about social categorisation combined with those of 
social identity to offer an account of racism. However, at 
this juncture in the interests of defining and describing 
this discourse clearly I shall discuss the social cognition 
and social identity elements separately, although within 
the text these two sets of arguments were intertwined. 
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Social cognition theorists assert that "the social world 
continuously presents a rich, varied, and complex stimulus 
environment that can easily tax the attentional and 
information-processing capacities at the perceiver' s 
disposal" (Hamilton & Trolier, .1986: 142 l43) . 
Consequently, social perception is selective, the process 
of categorisation simplifying the diversity of the social 
world and making it comprehensible. This categorisation is 
assumed to "reflect actual similarities and 
differences" (Hamilton and Trolier, 1986: 129; original 
emphasis) between people, but categories may also bias the 
manner in which information is processed, organised and 
stored in memory, as well as the type of judgements 
(stereotypes) made about members of those social 
categories. 
Racial prejudice is viewed within this perspective as an 
error of the latter variety. Although, social cognition 
theorists would argue that any form of prejudice is 
probably multiply determined, they propound the primacy of 
cognitive mechanisms in this process. As Hamilton and 
Trolier (1986: l52) argue: "biases inherent in our 
information-processing systems can, in and of themselves, 
have profound implications for understanding stereotypes 
and stereotyping" (my emphasis). In accounting for 
prejudice in terms of natural biases within information-
processing systems, social cognition theory views prejudice 
as inevitable. As Billig (1987: l26) has observed: 
"prejudice is the inescapable outcome of thought". 
The discourse of cognitivism draws upon these sorts of 
ideas to account for racist practice as is illustrated in 
the following series of extracts: 
Liza: 
Joe: 
I mean I think it's a natural tendency for people 
to categorise. I really do believe that, so in 
that way I don't think you can ever do away with 
prejudice really. 
Our human system is biologically tuned to notice 
these differences otherwise we couldn't notice them 
in the first place 
124 
Andrew: Race is just a category that people, other people 
put other people into (.) on the basis of the 
colour of skin '" It's also a way of making sense 
of all the different (.) one is bombarded with so 
much stimulus and I guess race categorisations are 
like giving things names. It makes ordering all 
this information you receive simpler. 
Luke: I don't know, it's difficult because I sometimes 
think whether people categorise because that is how 
they have been taught to think or whether it is 
something innate in people and I don't know. It 
woul d be ni cer to think tha tit's no t inna te 
because then you could do away with things like, 
or theoretically do away with things like race. 
Traay: I think that the categories in themselves are 
quite innocent enough but it's just the notions 
that you ascribe to them and the ways of seeing 
them that become harmful 
James: Because I do believe that people are inherently 
racist (.) well not inherently but rather that 
racism is quite an important part of human beings 
generally, no matter who they are. 
Nick: It's [reducing racism] a long slow process but I 
think it is going to change of necessi ty. Of 
course, we'll find something else to pick on ... I 
mean, look at the world. Where are the non-
prejudiced people, ~ there any? 
The discourse of cognitivism, defined in terms of the ideas 
behind social cognition type arguments, was identified in 
the text through reference to ideas which expressed the 
biological need for humans to categorise and those which 
articulated the potential for biases to arise as a 
consequence. Statements such as "its a natural tendency 
for people to categorise" (Liza), "one is bombarded with so 
much stimulus" (Andrew), "our human system is biologically 
tuned to notice these differences" (Joe) , and "it makes 
ordering all this information you receive simpler" (Andrew) 
constitute examples of the former. Instances of talk which 
made reference to the prejudiced outcome of social 
categorisation included: "the categories in themselves are 
quite innocent enough but it's just the notions that you 
ascribe to them ... that become harmful" (Tracy), "people 
are inherently racist" (James), "it would be nicer to think 
125 
that it's not innate" (Luke) and "we'll find something else 
to pick on" (Nick). 
Before describing the remaining features of the discourse 
of cognitivism, brief commentary upon the function of these 
arguments is warranted. In the main, the discourse of 
cognitivism functions to absolve the individual from 
responsibility for racist practice on the grounds that 
everyone is racist. Since the process of categorisation is 
biologically functional and universal, individual human 
subjects cannot be held accountable for the unavoidable 
consequences thereof. Racism is inevitable. 
These arguments also enable the speaker to construct him-
or herself as desirous of being non-racist. For example, 
Luke says "it would be nicer to think that its not innate". 
As we shall see in later chapters, this discourse enables 
speakers to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' racists. 
'Good' racists comprise people like themselves who although 
at the mercy of their biology try not to be racist, while 
'bad' racists comprise 'other' people who not only submit 
to their biology but also engage in racist practice with 
intent. 
As noted above, although social cognition type arguments 
formed a significant part of the discourse of some of the 
participants in this study, it was usually supplemented by 
talk which drew upon the ideas behind the work of social 
identity theorists. social identity theory, like social 
cognition theory, stresses "the importance of the adaptive 
cognitive functioning of Man in the causation of prejudice" 
(Tajfel; 1981: 141); hence, it too links racism to ideas of 
biased and stereotypic judgement (Wetherell & Potter, 
1992). However, social identity theory goes beyond this 
view and takes as its focus intergroup relations. In 
assuming the social identity of a group, people become 
ethnocentric - preferring their own group (the in-group) 
and discriminating to various degrees against people of 
other groups (the out-group). In essence, social identity 
is defined as "the cognitive mechanism which makes group 
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behaviour possible" (Turner, 1982: 21), while a social 
group represents a number of individuals who have 
internalised the same category membership as a component of 
their self-concept (Turner; 1982: 36). 
These sorts of ideas were incorporated into the talk of the 
young 'white' South Africans in this study in the following 
ways: 
Luke:I think to a lot of people it [race] is important in 
the sense that it influences their relations with 
other people. And I think with some people it is 
more important than for others. People who 
perceive a need to identify themselves with certain 
groups. 
Sam: I did a research thing last semester on the 
symbolic construction of boundaries, and boundaries 
no matter what they are are important, just to get 
an in- and an out-group. 
James: I think (.) I think we all need differences er I 
think I need differences because if I didn't have 
differences then for example um I'd feel incredibly 
insecure (.) I think differences then for example 
are ~ necessary for your sense of being in the 
world [laughs). So sorry to take another paradigm 
I think it's (.) in order to have an identity you 
need to compare yourself to others. 
Nick: ... you need to categorise the world in some way, 
because you need to have a feeling of belonging to 
something which I think necessitates there being 
something to which you don't belong. And I think 
race is a set of assumptions about that grouping 
you've created. 
Heidi: Perhaps there is a need in everyone for belonging 
to something but perhaps some people view it in 
different contexts, like they'll feel they belong 
to running (.) whereas maybe if you don't have that 
many other commitments to which you feel strongly 
it would be easier for them especially in this 
country to fall back on your race, you know, at 
least you belong to that group if not to any other. 
Andrew: People will always find some feature to define the 
ingroup and an outgroup (.) to define their group 
as opposed to someone else's group and race is a 
hell of a useful thing to do it along those lines 
so I don't think it will stop. [What do you think 
is behind that mechanism of ingroup-outgroup 
stuff?] I think it's to do with knowing what your 
identi ty is and being more secure in yourself, 
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Emma: 
having an ingroup kind of reinforces that identity. 
I'm not that person, I'm this kind of person. 
People are very protective of their own (.) so for 
instance you're very protective of your family ... 
and then it sort of extends and people seem to take 
race as an extension of themselves so you know 
every white is an extension of a white person and 
I think it might be the same for other race 
groups. 
The discourse of cognitivism has been described above as 
including textual reference to the biological role of 
social categorisation, and the in,evitability of prejudice 
as an outcome of thought. However, as noted, the discourse 
of cognitivism also incorporated social identity type 
notions in particular the cognitive need for 
categorisation linked to the importance of social groups. 
Examples of statements which refer to the cognitive need 
for social categorisation include "you need to categorise 
the world in some way because you need to have a feeling of 
belonging to something" (Nick) and "we all need 
differences" (James) in order to "find some feature to 
define the ingroup and an outgroup" (Andrew): we also saw 
examples of this aspect of the discourse of cognitivism in 
the previous series of quotations. The signficant role of 
social groups was articulated through statements such as 
"you need to have a feeling of belonging to something" 
(Nick, and also Heidi), "if I didn't have differences ... 
I'd feel incredibly insecure" (James, original emphasis), 
"boundaries no matter what they are, are important, just to 
get an in- and an out-group" (Sam) "its to do with 
knowing what your identity is and being more secure in 
yourself" (Andrew), and "differences ... are very necessary 
for your sense of being in the world" (James, original 
emphasis) . 
We have noted already that the discourse of cognitivism 
serves to remove responsibility for racism from the speaker 
by universalising racism through reference to biological 
mechanisms of social cognition. Lay beliefs about 
'intergroup relations' supported by some of the ideas 
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behind social identity type arguments serve to reinforce 
the inevitablility of antagonism between different social 
groups through appealing to the role of groups in meeting 
the social needs of individuals. Here the argument is 
slightly different to the one we reviewed above. Humans 
categorise the world in order to create social groups to 
which they can belong. Again, though, this process is 
fuelled by a 'need' which is universal ("we all need 
differences", James). This 'need' entails two primary 
components, both of which are important for the 
psychological well-being of the individual: the need to 
establish an identity, and the need for a sense of 
security. 
The power of this argument lies in its 'veracity'. The 
notion that universal and fundamental psychological needs 
become the basis for group hostility assumes a factual 
status (this is something we shall return to in following 
chapters) . The consequent feelings of identity and 
security lead one to feel "very protective of your own" 
(Emma) which in turn excuses feelings of animosity toward 
others. Thus racism is 'understandable' in terms of the 
biological mechanisms of human social cognition and in 
terms of the basic needs of the human psyche. 
Again social identity type arguments facilitate a division 
of the social world into 'good' and 'bad' racists since 
'race' is just one of many potential categories in terms of 
which the individual may chose to identify him- or herself 
(refer Heidi, for example), and since the psychological 
need for belonging is greater in some people than in others 
(refer Luke, for example). 'Good' racists, the speaker 
included, chose not to identify themselves primarily in 
terms of 'race' and do not feel a great need to belong to a 
'racial group'. 'Bad' racists elect to identify with their 
(the implicit assumption being that this is a 'real' group) 
'race' and consider it to be important for their sense of 
identity. 
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In summary, this section has described talk which I have 
defined as the discourse of cognitivism: a discourse 
drawing strongly on a number of social 'commonplaces' and 
upon the ideas behind social cognition and social identity 
theory. In the next section, the third discourse - the 
discourse of constructivism - is defined. 
5.2.3 The discourse of constructivism 
The discourse of constructivism "asks one to suspend belief 
that commonly accepted categories or understandings receive 
their warrant through obseryation" (Gergen, 1985: 267). It 
challenges the objective basis of knowledge by asserting 
that the terms in which the world is understood are 'social 
artifacts'. Consequently, the objective criteria for 
identifying "such 'behaviours', 'events', or 'entities' are 
shown to be either highly circumscribed by culture, 
history, or social context or altogether nonexistent," 
(Gergen, 1985: 267). Human beings are seen as possessing 
agency rather than being the passive processors of 
information (Sarbin & Kitsuse, 1994). Wetherell and 
Potter's stance on the concepts of race, culture and nation 
are exemplary of a constructivist position: "race, culture 
and nation are not natural phenomena but constructed 
categories. Modern accounts of groups are closely related 
to current social arrangements and must build on past 
discursive achievements. Categories change and what was 
once ideologically useful and persuasive can become 
obdurate and awkward material stubbornly resisting the 
reworkings of later generations" (1992: 118). 
As before, this brief description merely serves to sketch 
the defining characteristics of what I have termed a 
discourse of constructivism in the accounts of young 
'white' South Africans. The following series of extracts 
demonstrates how this discourse appeared in the text of the 
participants in this study: 
Luke: I mean on one level there are certain differences 
there. For example in this country white people 
have had more privilege through you know years of 
discrimination, since 1600, you know white people 
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Sam: 
Nick: 
have had certain advantages. But there is nothing 
intrinsic to being white (.) it's more a 
coincidence, historical factors which have produced 
the sort of situation we have in this country. Ja, 
I mean the mechanics of how it happened are very 
complex, processes happening over centuries but 
it's that kind of thing I suppose it could be 
called social construction (.) social construction 
of race. 
Race is a socially constructed thing which makes it 
important in the eyes of the people watching. 
Race ... I think it's essentially something that 
peopl e make up 
Jennifer: ... and I think race is just what people make 
of it, I think it's not something that's there. I 
think it's more of a thing up here in the head you 
know I think it is very much a mental 
Liza: 
Ruth: 
construct. 
Well ... [race has arisen] through politics 
history really (.) all the way up through 
centuries and then obviously apartheid was 
cherry on top in that way. 
and 
the 
the 
I don't recognise race okay? I don't think it's a 
(.) I think it is an absolute construct okay so 
for me it doesn't mean anything. Yet to say that 
it's not an issue ... because I mean I think that 
politics seems to revolve around these supposedly 
objective factors that people are calling race (.) 
you're trying to explain people in terms of a whole 
lot of cri teria which is worthless unless it's 
going to be used as a political tool. 
The discourse of constructivism was identified in the above 
extracts through reference to ideas of 'race' as a 
constructed category, and 'race' as being ideologically 
useful. With respect to the constructed nature of 'race', 
statements such as 'race' is "an absolute construct" 
(Ruth), or 'race' is "a mental construct" (Jennifer), as 
well as notions that 'race' has been constituted "through 
the centuries" (Liza & Luke), through "politics and 
history" (Liza), "historical factors" (Luke), and 
"apartheid" (Sarah) constitute examples. With respect to 
the idea that 'race' is an ideologically useful category, 
statements such as "these supposedly objective factors that 
people are calling race" (Ruth) and 'race' is "a political 
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tool" (Ruth) "which makes it important in the eyes of 
people watching" (Sam) are exemplary instances. 
Again, while the aim of this section is to define and 
describe the discourse of constructivism, it is necessary 
to comment briefly on the general function of the discourse 
before moving to the analysis proper. 
clearly later, the function of 
As we shall see more 
the discourse of 
constructivism is to acheive for the speaker a non-racist, 
even anti-racist, identity. It communicates not only the 
speaker's fundamental opposition to racism, but to the very 
category of 'race' itself. In rejecting the category of 
'race' and critically deconstructing the historical, 
economic, political and social construction thereof, the 
discourse of constructivism accomplishes for the speaker a 
critical, progressive, even left-wing position. At the 
same time, as we shall see in the chapters that follow, the 
discourse of constructivism shields the speaker from 
criticism of racism if they do express racist views because 
this discourse includes arguments about the way in which 
people are positioned by dominant ideologies. Thus, in 
South Africa, the occasional racist 'slip' is excused on 
the grounds that the speaker has been powerfully socialised 
into a racist discourse. 
5.3 Summary 
In summary this short chapter has sought to define the 
three discourses which dominated the talk of young 'white' 
English-speaking South Africans'; however, this 
'description' has oversimplified the complex nature of 
'race' talk in two ways. First, these discourses did not 
occur as discrete entities. Talk typically comprised an 
intricate web of at least two discourses, and sometimes all 
three. Second, these discourses are related to the 
declared political affiliation of the speaker. In the 
interview, participants defined themselves as Nationalist, 
Liberal or Left-wing in response to a question which asked 
where they located themselves on the political spectrum. 
At first, I treated these responses as comprising yet more 
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'race' talk, but after months of unsuccessful pattern 
searching I found a pattern. The corpus of material I had 
gathered needed to be understood in terms of these three 
political groups, then my search for pattern in the data 
was rewarded. Perhaps not surprisingly, the language of 
racism in South Africa was related to politics. 
Nationalist, Liberal and Leftwing participants provided 
different sorts of accounts - in terms of the discourses 
used to construct those accounts and in terms of the 
rhetorical strategies used to accomplish specific 
linguistic ends. 
In brief, Nationalist speakers tended to draw upon the 
discourses of biologism and cognitivism, Left-wing speakers 
tended to draw upon the discourse of constructivism and to 
a lesser degree the discourse of cognitivism, and Liberal 
speakers tended to draw principally upon the discourse of 
cognitism but also incorporated both the discourse of 
biologism and the discourse of constructivism. In the 
chapters that follow, I attempt to untangle the complex web 
of South African 'race' talk, to provide an analysis of the 
"dialectic of prejudice" (Billig et al; 1988: 100). To do 
so, I tackle each political group separately, therefore the 
next three chapters present a treatise on Nationalist, 
Liberal and Left-wing talk respectively. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
NATIONALIST TALK: 'THAT ISM ON THE END 
MAKES IT NASTY I 
6.1 Introduction 
This first analytic chapter takes as its focus the talk of 
participants I have called 'Nationalists'. Nationalists 
were united by their avowed support for the National Party 
in South Africa; that is, the party which came to power in 
1948 and was still in power at the time of the interviews. 
In short, National party supporters supported 'the 
apartheid regime' . 
The talk of interviewees defined as nationalist was 
constructed in terms of the discourses of biologism and 
cognitivism described earlier (refer chapter 5, sections 
5.2.1 and 5.2.2) Although~ocial construction!~t arguments 
c;" '"'0% OT ch.!! /)R~/;'''O//st. '/ncerv/ew:".; 
were used occasionall~ these tended to occur early in the 
interview, and in relation to formal questions such as 'How 
would you define race?'. Since most of the interviewees 
were aware of the interviewer's opposition to the 
Nationalist government, these responses were in all 
likelihood governed by the phenomenon of impression 
management. By articulating critical views, nationalists 
may have been attempting to present themselves as 
progressive and non-racist within the context of an 
interview with someone whom they believed to be supportive 
of such a position. However, beyond approximately ten 
minutes into the interview and within the context of 
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personal and informal conversation, the discourse of social 
constructionism was rare. 
The discourses of biologism and cognitivism employed in the 
talk of nationalists constructed for the speaker the 
position of 'realist' - a term used frequently among this 
group. Realists, unlike idealists (those nationalists 
defined as to the left of themselves), do not attempt to 
deny the 'facts'; those being that 'races' represent 
biologically distinct entities, that there are 
insurmountable cultural differences between different 
'races', and that biological processes of human social 
cognition adaptively function to determine such 
differences. These 'facts' provide nationalist speakers 
with the warrant to deny that they are racist on the 
grounds that all people could be considered racist. For 
them, it is only a minority of irrational people who 
actively discriminate against others that are truly racist. 
This chapter unravels these discursive constructions and 
specifically examines how the discourses of biologism and 
cognitivism function to achieve a position of 'non-racist' 
for members of this group. 
6.2 'If you mix a horse and a cow. do you qet another 
race?'; The Discourse of Bio1oqism 
The discourse of biologism comprised two forms of argument, 
a scientific racism and a differentialist racism (refer 
chapter 5, section 5.2.1). 
forms, and frequently the 
All nationalists drew upon both 
two were blended together. The 
following series of quotations presents examples of 
scientific racism which occurred within the context of 
discussion about the development of people in different 
parts of the world. This was a topic which nationalists 
spoke of at length, in contrast to liberals or leftists. 
It occurred relatively early in the interview within the 
ambit of discussion about defining 'race': 
Tracy: Okay, it couldn't have been the environment so it 
must have been something in the people [] As they 
say if Africa had been left and not discovered and 
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things went on as they were doing it would have 
been desolate by now. 
Jennifer: To be fair I don't think they meant to be the 
oppressors, that is the whole European nature. They 
want to go out, they want to explore, they want to 
see what it is all about. They see it as progress 
(.) we see it as progress and I think that is part 
of the problem with South Africa at the moment we 
are trying to change a lot of things that are not 
inherently part of them which is a contradiction 
because I started off saying there is no race. 
But there are differences. 
Sarah: Maybe the white person had a stronger drive to 
explore to see how things worked whereas the black 
culture was quite happy with the way things were 
going. I think maybe it is something in the drive 
that white people want to dominate maybe in the 
same way that men dominated over women. The woman 
has to stay at home as the fibre of society so the 
man is the creator and maybe the same things 
happened with blacks. The blacks were the slaves 
[giggle] and couldn't aspire to anything and didn't 
have the opportunity. 
In each of these extracts, the speaker accounts for the 
'differences' between 'black' and 'white' people in terms 
of inherent characteristics. Tracy loosely refers to 
"something in the people" which she proposes explains why 
Africa would have become desolate if it had been left to 
its original inhabitants. Although not specified, this 
"something" appears to be of a similar order to Jennifer's 
notion of "nature" and Sarah's ideas of "drive". This was 
a common theme in the talk of nationalists: the 'inherent 
differences' between 'white' and 'black' people were 
described in terms of the qualities 'white' people had and 
'black' people lacked (a presence or absence of drive, 
ambition, or motivation, respectively). Indeed, this is a 
very thinly disguised characterisation along the lines of 
the classic racial stereotype. 'White' people are regarded 
as motivated to discover new things and progress, while 
black people are seen as lazy and lacking in initiative. 
It is generally acknowledged that today overt racist 
remarks are not acceptable (Billig, 1991). How then do the 
nationalists attempt to accomplish a position of non-
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racism, when articulating the sort of ideas cited above? 
In short, they organise their accounts into factual 
descriptions, the status of which is warranted through a 
number of rhetorical devices and linguistic strategies. 
Tracy, for example, couches her argument within the logical 
format of 'if not x ... , then y' - if not the environment, 
then something in the people. This constitutes an 
example of the rhetorical device of 'empiricist accounting' 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992). Tracy's argument is then 
reinforced by her appeal to the social commonplace that 
without the intervention of 'white' people, Africa would 
have been devastated by its 'black' inhabitants. Tracy 
distances herself from this more contentious assertion by 
shifting her interactional "footing" (Goffman, 1981); that 
is, she indicates that the views are those of another, 
unnamed, source. Moreover, the idea that Africa would have 
become desolate save for the 'white' person's intervention 
represents something of a common-place in right-wing 
circles. As Clayman (1989: 30) has noted, "the number of 
persons aligned with a given statement can be seen as an 
index of its facticity. Thus, a widely endorsed view is 
not easily dismissed as the idiosyncratic artefact of a 
particular person's understanding, for such support endows 
it with a certain intersubjective validation". 
Jennifer invokes principles of fairness and equity to 
warrant her assertion that "Europeans" did not intend to 
oppress others but were governed by their "nature". The 
construction of a three-part list ("they want to go out, 
they want to explore, they want to see what it's all 
about") emphasises the point Jennifer wishes to convey; 
that is, that "Europeans" possess a natural drive to 
"progress". The repetition of "they see it as progress, we 
see it as progress" lends further weight to the idea. 
While "they" appears to refer to the group Jennifer has 
termed Europeans, the referent of the first person plural 
(we) in the second utterance remains unclear. It could be 
referring to 
alternatively to 
the interviewer-interviewee pair; 
a broader subset of 'white' people, for 
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example, those who are educated. The effect of the use of 
'we' is to indicate that Jennifer is not solely responsible 
for the position she is reporting, she is expressing the 
opinions of at least one other person (the interviewer) and 
probably more (cf. the 'we discourse'; Wodak & Matouschek, 
1993) . 
Finally, Jennifer provides a contemporary example as 
further evidence of the 'fact' that 'white' and 'black' 
people are inherently different (and which absolves 
'whites' of any responsibility for racism). The problems 
of South Africa she argues, stem from the differences 
between the 'races': it is 'black' people who represent the 
real problem since they can not keep up with the changes 
that 'white' people are trying to effect since certain 
"things are not inherently part of them". At this 
point Jennifer acknowledges the contradiction between her 
argument at the beginning of the interview that there is 
"no (such thing as) race" and her current line of thinking. 
However, it is dismissed with a perfunctory "but there are 
differences", possibly because she is confident that she 
has put her case strongly enough. 
Sarah attempts to warrant her account of differences in 
"drive" between 'white' and 'black' people by comparing 
'race' to 'gender'. She parallels the 'fact' that men have 
dominated women for centuries with the domination of 
'whi te' people over 'black'. However, perhaps most 
extraordinarily she does not draw out common themes of 
injustice and oppression, but describes a natural order in 
which 'white' men created, supported by women (the fibre of 
society) while 'black' people were destined to be "the 
slaves" . 
racist 
saying 
justify 
lack of 
Possibly because this argument is so blatantly 
(and sexist), Sarah gives a nervous laugh after 
"blacks were the slaves" and then attempts to 
this utterance by commenting on 'black' peoples' 
aspiration and opportunity. 
These examples demonstrate how the discourse of biologism 
serves to establish 'races' as 'fact' (although not always 
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successfully, as we see in Sarah's account); that is, as 
having a real existence independent of the ideas of human 
beings. Implicit in these 'facts' is a hierarchy of races 
with 'white' people creating, progressing, and uplifting 
others, while 'black' people contentedly accept the status 
quo. Such descriptions construct the nationalist as the 
dispassionate observer reporting on the 'facts'. The 
speaker is not the irrational bigot, but a rational being 
appraising an external reality. 
Although nationalist talk was strongly' framed by the . {Qs r)(>.t~Oj Q// '7Q~/I)"?ah:.s~S cYr~4J ~O"7 cn/s P~7v~$cd: /""~.c.::lvr~e. i"o p1?7/~ \ 
arguments of 'scientific racism~, perhaps tlie more dominant o/~~~~ 
manifestation of the discourse of biologism was that of 
differentialist racism (Taguieff, 1984). The central 
feature of differentialist racism, as noted earlier, is the 
insuperability of cultural differences. Arguments along 
these lines tended to be lengthy, incorporating detailed 
illustration of the points made and for this reason we 
shall consider a single extract of text. 
The passage is taken from an interview with Glen and 
occurred within a very long sequence of talk in which he 
was addressing the question of whether 'race' influences 
his judgements of people. In the midst of denigrating 
'black' taxi drivers and expressing strong reservations 
about being in a group of 'black' people, he paused and 
then said: 
Glen: I don't know if it is appropriate to put it in 
here but personally I don't believe there's much 
hope for racial harmony in this country and I 
really don't think there's much scope for it 
throughout the world. The fact that racism (.) 
race was involved in legislation here for so many 
years I believe blinds people to the fact that 
racism is prevalent in most countries. (.) and I 
really don't believe that there can ever be racial 
harmony because the differences are too great and 
going back to sport , I mean we have two classic 
examples. 
This extract represents an example of a speaker providing a 
clear self-interruption of their talk. Glen had been 
describing his response to 'black' taxi-drivers and groups 
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of 'black' people when he suddenly interrupts himself with 
"I don't know if it is appropriate to put it in here". As 
Jefferson (1974) has noted, self-repair may be directed at 
correcting errors in the attempt to speak appropriately to 
particular people within particular circumstances. Thus 
Glen displays his sensitivity to, and understanding of, the 
interactional consequences of his racist utterance by 
embarking upon a protracted account of racial differences, 
presumably in an attempt to warrant his earlier statements. 
Given the context of the repair, Glen is cautious initially 
with respect to his argument of racial incompatibility. 
His use of the terms "much hope" or "much scope" create the 
impression of someone who is reasonable; although Glen is 
sceptical, he has not ruled out completely the achievement 
of racial harmony. Glen attempts to achieve a neutralistic 
posture with respect to 'race' by constructing racism as 
'fact' citing national and international evidence for the 
widespread prevalence of racial disharmony. 
Moreover, within his argument there lies an implicit 
criticism of people to the left of Glen's position (those 
later identified as 'idealists'). As Billig (1987) has 
observed, the context of rhetoric comprises not only the 
opinions which the speaker is attempting to justify but 
also the counter-opinions which are implicitly or 
explicitly being criticised. Glen reproaches "people" 
(presumably non-racists and anti-racists) for being 
"blinded" by the crass form of racism that occurs within 
South Africa, and for not having the sagacity to realise 
that racism is a universal and inevitable phenomenon. In 
short, as Sarah said: "Apartheid did not cause racism, 
racis'm caused apartheid". 
Glen hereby presents himself as the acute analyst 
reflecting upon the national and international scenario and 
observing 'truths', while 'others' attempt to deny the 
reality of racial differences. Having established 'the 
facts', Glen is in a position to put his case more 
strongly. The earlier and gentler version "I don't 
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actually believe there's much hope or scope" translates 
into the firmer "I don't believe that there can ever be 
racial harmony". 
Further warrant for this latter statement is provided in an 
extremely vivid and lengthy example taken from South 
African sport. The extract has not been reproduced because 
of its extensive nature but in essence it contrasted 
'white' South Africans playing rugby against New Zealand in 
a stadium cloaked with the National flag and supported by 
'white' spectators singing 'Die Stem', with the 
simultaneous occurrence of 'black' South Africans playing 
soccer against Cameroon in a stadium cloaked with ANC flags 
and supported by 'black' spectators singing 'Nkosi Sikelele 
Afrika' . 
Glen's example, with its references to cultural symbols 
such as flags and songs, and deployed to bolster arguments 
for peoples' natural and inevitable 
own' is representative of Taguieff's 
racism, or what Balibar terms 
preference for 'their 
(1984) differentialist 
'neo-racism' (l99la). 
Interestingly, and in support of the point that Balibar 
makes with regard to culture functioning like nature, Glen 
concludes this narrative with "there are certain things 
inherent to a race which are never going to see (.) are 
never going to mix successfully with different aspects of 
another race" (my emphasis). In other words, culture blurs 
into nature even within a single utterance, or as Bakhtin 
(1981: 291) would argue the "'languages' of heteroglossia 
intersect each other in a variety of ways". 
In summary, in what amounts to some 60 lines of text, Glen 
constructs an argument for the existence of 'races', and 
their fundamental incompatibility. These' facts' are 
established via the arguments of scientific and 
differentialist racism, or what I have termed the discourse 
of biologism. This discourse functions to shield Glen from 
criticism on grounds of racism because it establishes 
racism as having an independent reality 'out there'. 
Consequently, Glen can deny that he is racist (see also 
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Cochrane & Billig, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1992; van 
Dijk, 1992) - he is not an irrational bigot, he is merely 
reporting 'the facts'. 
While these 'truths' certainly played a centr~l role in the 
(' /00 ~ tiT tf.-1;:S c7~ero vt1,'/;-;sed L"'A",....",...) 
arguments of nationalist% members of this group also 
marshalled a second line of defense against potential 
criticism on the grounds of racism. This second set of 
arguments, like the first, has biology as its base but 
concerns the cognitive functioning of human beings. The 
discourse of cognitivism, while providing powerful 
arguments of its own serves to reinforce those of the 
discourse of biologism as we shall see in the following 
section. 
6.3 'It's perfectly natural after all'; The Discourse of 
Cognitivism 
The discourse of cognitivism embraces the commonsense 
notions of human perception which have informed the 
development of social cognition and social identity theory, 
and some of the central features of those theories (it will 
be recalled that the participants in this study had read 
psychology at university). The central tenet which 
underpins the discourse of cognitivism therefore is that 
certain processes of social cognition are biologically 
functional; that is, they enable the human being to order 
an otherwise chaotic world. However, .biases in human 
information processing may occur; indeed, are inevitable. 
Consequently, racism is unavoidable. 
In this section, we examine the manner in which these 
arguments are employed by nationalists to support racist 
practice. This is achieved by examining first a set of 
extracts which demonstrate predominantly (although not 
exclusively) social cognition-type arguments, and second a 
lengthy extract illustrative of talk which embraces social 
identity-type arguments. This distinction is made in order 
to deal with the material clearly and simply; however, as 
will be seen, it is a 'false' distinction in that often 
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both forms of talk were intertwined in anyone piece of 
discourse. 
The following three extracts were taken from a range of 
contexts since this set of arguments proved to be fairly 
popular: 
Jenni£er: I think people like some sort of order in their 
lives and if there was no definitions or boundaries 
or anything we wouldn't know where to go or who we 
are. So you say well r.) like you ask me well, I'm 
20 years old, and I'm female and I'm a varsity 
student. I immediately have three categories. I'm 
not a male, I'm not older and I don't work. And 
I'm white. Those things they create a picture of 
you 
Heidi: Categorisation need not necessarily be a bad thing 
as I said before I think it is important for people 
to belong to groups (.) and I think whatever group 
you form people will feel that their group is 
better than the other group. So if it happens to 
be based on race, so what? As long as people don't 
behave terribly to those people and treat them 
inferior. 
'l'racy: I think the categories in themselves are quite 
innocent enough but it's just the notions that you 
ascribe to them and the ways of seeing them that 
become harmful. That ism on the end sort of makes 
it nasty. 
The three extracts above provide evidence of the way in __ I 
t"V&V;-' Cl;// ~L!/ona.hS-Z.s ¥,f~,z t!!~e.se. arv?",.,.,el"7i"s z!o Y,u;y/~~ o/~rt!~ 
which Nat1onalists~drew upon social commonplaces 6.bofft 
human perception, and some of the central ideas associated 
with social cognition theory. The function of this type of 
argument was to provide the speaker with a powerful warrant 
for the division of the social world into 'races'. In 
particular three arguments were used to defend racist 
practice. First, categorisation is a necessary process 
which "provides order" in an otherwise disorderly world 
("they create a picture of you"). Second, the categories 
in themselves are neutral ("not necessarily a bad thing", 
"quite innocent"), and third, categorisation has positive 
benefits in terms of identity ("it is important for people 
to belong to groups", they define "who we are"). This 
third line of argument, however, approximates the ideas of 
Social Identity Theory. As noted, discourse is convoluted: 
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it is hardly ever characterised by discrete discourses 
following neatly on from one another, unless perhaps the 
context is one of 'pretty conversation' (Billig, 1987). 
In each of these extracts, the negative consequences of 
categorisation are ignored or downplayed, while the 
positive effects are highlighted. Jennifer provides a 
general argument (" if there was UQ. definitions or 
boundaries or anything"; my emphasis) about a specific 
category ("race" categorisation) to reinforce the notion 
that categorisation is essential. Moreover, the 
significant function of categorisation attains factual 
status through the construction of a series of three-part 
lists (Jefferson, 1990). The first of these communicates 
the disorderly implications of not categorising ("no 
definitions or boundaries or anything"), while the second 
two emphasise the useful definitional function of 
categories ("I'm 20 years old, and I'm female and I'm a 
varsity student"; "I'm not a male, I'm not older and I 
don't work") . 
Significantly, Jennifer has avoided the category of 'race' 
until this point, then she tacks on "And I'm white". This 
manoeuvre may be oriented to Jennifer's primary objective 
of constructing an argument in favour of racial 
classification and her recognition that such an argument 
requires a racial referent if it is to be effective. It 
could also signal Jennifer's attempt to demonstrate how 
little significance the category of 'race' has for her, 
hence 'white' is not a central characteristic in her self-
definition. Perhaps most importantly, it serves to 
reinforce Jennifer's notion that 'race' is one category 
among many (the factual status of which she has already 
established) and therefore 'just' because she recognises 
the category does not mean that she is racist. 
Heidi and Tracy convey similar ideas in the extracts 
presented above, although Heidi incorporates some of the 
ideas of social identity theory. Tajfelian notions of 
ethnocentrism are used to bolster feelings of superiority, 
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and Heidi asserts this position using the strategy of 
challenge ("so if it happens to be based on race, so 
what?") - an extremely unusual manoeuvre for Heidi and for 
the sample as a whole. Tracy on the other hand attempts 
to downplay the negative consequences of categorisation 
(" it's just the notions that you ascribe to them"; my 
emphasis). Her use of the word 'just' intimates that 
stereotyping is something minor and relatively uncommon; 
although ironically Tracy describes people of other 'race' 
groups as 'them', somewhat undermining her argument. 
In short, these extracts demonstrate how the ideas of 
social cognition theory form the basis of arguments which 
are used to bolster racist practice . They function to 
support the idea that racists represent an irrational 
minority and that it is only the members of this small 
group who make stereotypic judgements or act in overtly 
racist ways. However, as we saw in the extract from Heidi, 
the ideas of Social Cognition Theory seldom occur in 
isolation. 
While the previous extracts focused upon the way in which 
notions of social categorisation may be mobilised to defend 
racist arguments the following excerpt, taken from an 
interview .with Joe, demonstrates how the ideas behind ~~~S ("0// /Y4'''4'?ch.res .......,. ... #'e <!/.$(! 4' c:' 
Social Identity Theory may be used to the same effect,{ ..r""o.-?~ /0,...,.,.., or 
wi thin the context of a discussion on racism, the <>-~fu,,",<!-'1~ 
Q ;t;/,orJ1'? h 
interviewer asked "okay, so what constitutes racism? Whatu-."" .. cos,,"s 
sorts of things would be racist for you?". -c t::Je?S <",?(Jre The extract ~""/r"".,( 
char? /h cited below constitutes Joe's response. 
Joe: Saying like bad things about another race. But then 
I ask myself you know in the town of Oranje there 
we have a group of people, are they being 
discriminatory or reservatory? Are they just 
trying to keep their whites together or are they 
trying to exclude the blacks? Do you see what I'm 
saying? Are we trying to exclude people or are we 
trying to keep people together? Now those people 
in Oranje could be perceived as being racist 
because they are throwing the blacks out or 
otherwise they could just be perceived as being 
reservatory because they are just trying to keep 
the whites in. How do you look at it? Do you look 
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at it from that side or from that side? (.) If 
someone says 'I'm establishing this town just tor 
whites', that is racist for me but it is not as 
badly racist because he's not picking out the 
blacks or the coloureds or the chinese. She's 
saying 'I'm merely reserving this for whites, I'm 
not racist against the blacks, it's just including 
only the whites' Instead of the guy who says 
'blacks stink, coloureds are alright, Indians are 
mediocre and whites are fine'. Now there we have 
racism because we have specific physical groups 
defined, each one giving a different attitude 
towards them. 
Joe constructs his answer around an example drawn from 
contemporary South African political debate. It concerns 
the intentions and actions of a group of right-wing (some 
would say extreme right-wing) Afrikaners who have 
determined that a town called Oranje in the Northern Cape 
shall be exclusively for 'whites'. All 'black' people who 
originally lived in the town have been forcibly removed and 
no 'black' people are allowed in the town, not even as 
servants. 
Joe begins by providing an almost rehearsed response 
"saying bad things about another race". He then appears to 
wish to qualify this statement, his use of the word 'but' 
at the beginning of the next sentence would seem to suggest 
this intention. However, the nature of what he is about to 
say is extremely delicate, the majority of 'white' South 
Africans would see the inhabitants of Oranje as racist. 
Joe shifts interactional 'footing' (Goffman, 1981) in an 
attempt to achieve a neutral posture, formulating the issue 
as a series of questions. The repetition of the central 
dilemma Joe identifies suggests that he is aware of the 
possibility of being accused of racism. Hence he asks "Do 
you see what I'm saying?", and distances himself from the 
ideas by framing the abstract question "How do you look at 
it?1I 
Joe's phrasing of his final question ("do you look at it 
from that side or from that side?") embraces the dilemmatic 
nature of the issue: is ethnocentrism discriminatory? It 
also hints at 'two sides of the same coin' and has 
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undertones of the 'white' side versus the 'black' side. 
Irrespective, the dilemmatic nature of the issue is clearly 
communicated and this functions to construct the idea of 
racism as problematic and not achieving easy resolution. 
The driving force behind this argument is psychological 
theory in the form of social identity theory; that is, that 
groups of people (such as race-groups) display own group 
preference or ethnocentrism. Hence Joe' s question "are 
people who prefer their 'own' being merely reservatory, 
acting in accordance with their 'nature'''. Following on 
from what he argued earlier, Joe is asking if it reasonable 
to argue that preference for one thing necessarily implies 
discrimination against something else. Having established 
the reasonableness of the proposition, he puts his opinion 
more strongly. 
In the following lines, Joe portrays the difference between 
racism and 'bad' racism using a series of hypothetical 
examples (Wooffitt, 1992) and shifts in interactional 
footing (Goffman, 1981). The footing shifts back and forth 
from first person to third person, the latter being a 
hypothetical third party. The hypothetical example serves 
"to distil regularly occurring features of events and bring 
them together in a form which may not strictly represent 
the occasions of their occurrence in 'real life'" 
(Wooffitt, 1992: 84). Thus Joe is able to portray his 
response to what he constructs as two different types of 
people, the 'bad' racist and the 'ordinary' racist. (He 
ignores the possibility that the same person may well be 
responsible for both sorts of statements; indeed, in all 
likelihood would be given his right-wing example). The 
'bad' racist is therefore caricatured using the strategy of 
extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) as someone who 
would comment on seeing a 'black' person "he's a kaffir and 
he steals and he's an alcohol abuser". The word 'kaffir' 
is seldom employed today due to its overtly racist 
denotation. Again, the rhetorical strategy of the three-
part list repeatedly formulates the type of racist 
sentiments that a 'bad' racist may employ. 
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By contrast, the 'ordinary' racist is represented as being 
'just' ethnocentric, and not discriminatory. The manner in 
which Joe uses the word 'just' slips between his two 
examples of reported speech. In the first, the hypothetical 
person is establishing the town "just for 'whites"'; 
however, in the second example in which Joe interprets the 
person's position, the word just is replace with a synonym 
"I'm merely reserving ... " as well as being used itself but 
in a different context "it's just including ... ". The 
meaning of 'just' therefore shifts from connoting that one 
is doing something for a specific group of people to 
connoting that one is doing something insignificant (I'm 
only doing ... ). Hence with a subtle shift in meaning Joe 
constructs an argument which makes claims that there is 
little wrong with own-group preference: an argument 
premised upon commonsense understandings of intergroup 
relations, and bolstered by the ideas of social identity 
theory with which Joe would have become acquainted in the 
undergraduate study of psychology. 
To reinforce the distinction he is attempting to assert Joe 
formulates another hypothetical example of the reported 
speech of the 'true' racist. This example provides Joe 
with the elements from which he wishes to distil his 
argument. That is, that 'true' or 'bad' racism involves 
the identification of specific groups and the application 
of negative attributes to members of those groups. However, 
Joe still hedges his commitment to such a position by 
maintaining that ethnocentrism "is still racism but for me 
it's not as bad". 
6.4 'Pacing the facts'; The Realist Talks 
The nationalist speaker achieves for him/herself the 
position of non-racist by advancing an extreme definition 
of racism, and by accounting for racist practice in terms 
of a series of 'facts' about the world. While each of 
these 'facts' functions as a warrant for the position that 
nationalist speakers assume in relation to issues of 
'race', it is their incorporation into the category 
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'realist' that provides the argument with its ultimate 
force. Indeed, the selection of linguistic categories (in 
this case, realist and idealist) is rhetorically 
significant; "they are designed for talking" and accomplish 
specific interactional objectives (Edwards, 1991: 537). 
Nationalists disclaim a racial identity and justify their 
stance on racial issues by accounting for their actions in 
terms of 'keeping their feet firmly on the ground' and 
'facing the facts'. Furthermore, their arguments 
simultaneously criticise people (cf. Billig, 1987) to the 
left of themselves for being idealists - for "having their 
heads in the clouds" and "not being able to face up to 
reality" . 
The following sequence of talk occurs about three quarters 
of the way into an interview with Heidi and is exemplary of 
the arguments nationalists made with respect to the notions 
of 'realism' and 'idealism': 
Interviewer: And how have your views changed over time 
( .) or haven't they changed much? 
Heidi: Well, when I was much younger it [race] wasn't 
important at all so I didn't really think about it 
and then when I started thinking about it quite 
seriously I was very very angry about it. I sort 
of went to the extreme you know 'this is terrible 
that these things happen' and that's when I joined 
the group at school and then I was jolted back 
again to my normal 'well, it doesn't really 
matter'. And I don't know (.) my views have 
basically become more realistic now I think. I 
think that's the only real change, not any extreme 
notions. 
Interviewer: And by 'realistic' , what do you mean? 
Heidi: Well that I view things in terms of real people 
and not things that I've heard other people say 
and things I would wish and some sort of 
idealistic society that I would have wanted in 
high school. 
In this sequence of talk, Heidi draws flexibly upon the 
categories of 'realist' and 'idealist' in order to 
construct an image of herself ap not racist. As with most 
(",f".s-% 1:')/ ..-Vc ~ .. 'tJ"Q./,J~$ .... ~ ~ol!Q./"J 
interviewee~who made use of these terms, they are invoked 
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toward the end of the interview. This presentation strategy 
(although probably not conscious) serves to 'correct' any 
earlier misperceptions that the speaker suspects may have 
been conveyed: the speaker is not racist, s/he is merely a 
realist. Indeed, nationalists would argue that their 
idealism is constrained by the realities of racial 
difference. A closer examination of the discourse of Heidi 
will reveal how nationalists achieve this rhetorical goal. 
The first aspect of Heidi's talk which is of significance 
is her description of how she felt ("very, very angry") 
when she began to reflect on racial issues in South Africa. 
This phrase represents yet another example of extreme case 
formulation (Pomerantz, 1986), here used to maximum effect 
in the sense that Heidi is attempting to construct an 
account of her feelings as extreme, and 
her next utterance validates the 
idealistic. Indeed, 
function of this 
rhetorical strategy: "I sort of went to the extreme you 
know". Heidi then shifts 'footing' (Goffman, 1981) and 
makes use of reported speech to communicate the sort of 
things she would have been saying at that time, as opposed 
to her views now. The tone of "this is terrible, that 
these things happen" was exaggeratedly earnest and 
troubled, again functioning to highlight that which she 
wishes to construct as an unnecessarily extreme response. 
It was these feelings of concern that led Heidi to join a 
group at school which set up social gatherings aimed at 
bringing 'black' and 'white' children together. Perhaps 
not unexpectedly (given the complexity of the situations 
under which contact leads to improved intergroup relations; 
Foster & Finchilescu, 1986; Mynhardt & du Toit, 1991) this 
experience proved to be negative for Heidi (she described 
it in detail earlier in the interview). Her interactions 
with 'black' children served to highlight racial 
differences and not reinforce similarities. When speaking 
about the incident Heidi said "I couldn't feel like one of 
them at all. I felt very much like one of us, above these 
other people that were rushing to the table". Hence Heidi 
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describes being "jolted" back to her previous position, 
communicating the 'shock' she experienced at 'discovering' 
how 'different' "these other people" were. This 
description constructs Heidi as being concerned with issues 
of 'race' and racism, but constrained by the 'reality' of 
the differences between her and 'black' people. In other 
words, racism is firmly located out there, it is 
externalised and is not a result of Heidi's irrational 
personality. 
The use of reported speech ("well it doesn't really 
matter") again serves to distil the central elements of 
Heidi's position which seems to be that racial differences 
are of no consequence as long as one does not have to have 
contact across the boundaries that define them. She 
reinforces this position by reiterating that it is one of 
'realism' (recognising that there are differences), and not 
extremism (denying differences) . 
Finally, Heidi defines realism in terms of what it is - a 
concern with "real people" (again emphas is ing 'real' 
differences) - and in terms of what it is not using the 
powerful construction of three-partedness (Jefferson, 
1990). At this point her implicit criticism of those who 
do not share her view is most clearly evident. 'Idealists' 
do not form their own opinions but view the world through 
the eyes of others, they live in a fairy-tale land of 
wishes and dreams, and they remain in an extreme phase of 
desiring an ideal society that is characteristic of 
adolescents. 
In summary, the case of Heidi se~ves to demonstrate how 
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nationalists select and use particular caeegorie~ realist 
and idealist, in order to disclaim a racist identity. 
Through establishing a series of 'facts', nationalists 
account for their actions in terms of realism; that is, 
they attempt to "make their discourse 'reasonable' by 
finding external reasons for discrimination" (Bi11ig, 
1988b: 91). In addition, implicit in nationalists' 
justifications of their position are the seeds of criticism 
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of those with whom they share an argumentative context. As 
we have seen, nationalists claim that they 'facing the 
facts' while others cling to their wishy-washy ideals. 
In the final section, we shall examine the rhetorical 
strategy of denial which pervaded nationalist discourse. 
Clearly, if 'races' are a fact and racism an inevitability, 
then all people may be considered racist. For the 
nationalist, racists represent that handful of irrational 
personalities who act in overtly prejudiced ways; they, by 
contrast, are not racist - they are realists. 
6.5 'It'S not my fault': Denial and the Absence of 
Reflexivity 
Denials of racism assume a prominent role in contemporary 
racist discourse (Cochrane & Billig, 1984; van Dijk, 1992) 
and are epitomised in the classic disclaimer 'I'm not 
racist, but ... '. However as we shall see in the following 
two chapters (refer section 7.3 and 8.3 respectively), 
denials of racism were not a feature of the discourse of 
left-wing interviewees in this study, and were uncommon in 
the accounts of liberals. However, this well-known 
phenomenon was characteristic of the talk of nationalists, 
possibly because the nationalists in this sample were 
similar to the type of people interviewed in previous 
studies. 
The lower frequency of denials of racism in this study, 
compared to others, may be attributable to aspects of the 
South African context (refer chapter 7, section 7.3), but 
remains difficult to explain in the absence of actually 
comparing the material. However, differences between the 
political groups in this study in their use of denial 
appear to be related to the nature of the argument 
developed to disclaim a racist identity. 
Briefly, all interviewees attempted to externalise 'race' 
and the phenomenon of racism via some combination of the 
discourses of biologism, cognitivism and social 
constructionism. However, while left-wing and liberal 
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interviewees admitted that they had internalised racism, 
nationalists failed to describe a process whereby they were 
socialised into being racist or positioned by a discourse 
~II 
of racism. Hence, 
racism remained a 
they" denied that they were racist: 
function of 'real' differences, of 
'facts' external to the individual and beyond their 
control. 
It is for this reason that, while left-wing and liberal 
discourse was replete with references to personal 
experience of racism and was laden with accounts of guilt 
and self-reproach, these were almost entirely absent within 
nationalist discourse. For nationalists, the reality of 
racial difference and antagonism was unquestioned and 
therefore they did not assume personal responsibility for 
it. Their talk was typically constructed around this 
'fact': "You see I take quite a selfish attitude. I say 
these people are much more different to me but that's not 
my fault. The fact that it is like that is not my fault" 
(Glen; original emphasis). Thus, while the admissions of 
racism of left-wing and liberal speakers were functionally 
linked to discourse which was reflexive (cf. Ashmore, 1989; 
Woo1gar, 1988b) in nature, the denials of racism of 
nationalist speakers were functionally related to talk that 
was characteristically non-reflexive. 
The following sequence of extracts, serves to illustrate 
how nationalist denials of racism function within the non-
reflexive nature thought. Again they are gleaned from a 
variety of interview contexts, but stem principally from 
talk about relationships with people who are not 'white' 
and narratives of the speaker's personal development. 
Jennifer: I've got a very very good friend, one of my best 
friends is a coloured girl and she's a wonderful 
person and I really get on with her and we're 
really good buddies and (.) but I always think to 
myself thank goodness she's no t one of those 
coloured people. The fact that she is coloured 
doesn't come into it because she doesn't act 
coloured. 
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Sarah: I didn't know the difference between a black and a 
white or Uncle Peter and the garden boy 
Tracy: We were talking about some family that wanted to 
move into Meadowlands and I said 'well, why not?' 
And he said 'well Tracy remember, they're coloured' 
and I said 'oh yes, oh ja. ' 
.Toe: Intimate in sexual relationship? [yes] Not with a 
black person, no. with a coloured girl, yes. I've 
seen some very beautiful coloured girls. But not 
wi th a black girl, no. I've always found that 
physical characteristics are the initiator of 
anything and I don't think I could find a black 
girl that was beautiful (.) but I think what we 
are looking here is a preference for physical 
characteristics, not a preference for race. 
These extracts typify the talk of nationalists and possess 
features identified in other studies concerned with 'race' 
talk (eg. Billig, 1991; van Dijk, 1987). Jennifer even 
provides us with a 
black' statement. 
classic 'some of my best friends are 
Her version is formulated to maximum 
effect by means of the rhetorical strategies of extreme 
case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) 
friend", and the construction of 
"a very very good 
a three-part list 
(Jefferson, 1990) "she's a wonderful person", "I really 
get on with her", "we're really good buddies" . 
Interestingly, Jennifer's disclaimer does not function to 
ward off a racist attribution, quite the contrary. Instead 
of the traditional 'I'm not racist, some of my best friends 
are black', Jennifer's formulation is the exact opposite 
"One of my best friends is a coloured girl ... but ... 
thank goodness she's not one of those coloured people". 
This extract typifies the non-reflexive nature of 
nationalist talk. While left-wing and to a lesser degree 
liberal interviewees would have engaged in some reparative 
work following a statement so transparently racist, 
nationalists rarely did so. This is possibly because the 
arguments of liberals and those on the left fundamentally 
questioned the category of 'race', while those of the 
nationalists asserted the legitimacy of the category on the 
basis of 'differences'. These differences, however, were 
not limited to those between 'black' and 'white', but 
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included 'differences' between 'good' 'black' people such 
as Jennifer's friend and 'bad' 'black' people who were to 
be avoided. 
The accounts of Sarah and Tracy incorporate another 
argument commonly associated with denials of racism; that 
is, that the speaker is unaware of 'race'. Again, this 
contrasts sharply with the other two groups of interviewees 
who admitted that they were extremely conscious of 'race'. 
Ironically, Sarah uses the term 'garden boy' in the example 
she uses to warrant her argument that she fails to notice 
peoples' skin colour. Her very language belies the fact 
that she was only too aware of the difference between 
"Uncle Peter and the garden-boy" (Note: garden 'boy' was 
the term traditionally used to refer to 'black' adult men 
employed in the gardens of 'white' households. However, in 
recent years it has become increasingly unpopular due to 
its overtly racist connotations). 
Tracy uses reported dialogue in a brief account of her lack 
of awareness of 'race'. The exchange occurs between Tracy 
and a 'coloured' friend and the topic of discussion is a 
family desirous of moving into an area called Meadowlands, 
very close to where Tracy lives. Meadowlands was a 'white' 
area under the previous Group Areas Act which was still in 
force at the time of the conversation. Tracy is attempting 
to construct an image of herself as someone for whom 'race' 
means nothing. However, to simply assert this is not 
sufficient. By reporting a conversation with another 
person, significantly not a white person, Tracy lends 
credibility to her account. Moreover, she is able to 
register her 'lack of understanding' as to why the family 
could not move into Meadowlands and her almost vague 
recollection of the issue at stake "oh yes, oh ja". The 
utterances of the voices of Tracy and her friend are 
designed to reveal that her lack of awareness of 'race' was 
confirmed by a 'coloured' person: he gently reminds her 
that the family is 'coloured'. 
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In the final extract in this series, Joe is responding to a 
question from the interviewer about having an intimate 
relationship with someone who was not white. This question 
was put following a fairly extensive discussion about the 
interviewee's relationships with people of other 'races'. 
The gist of Joe's argument is that he could not have a 
sexual relationship with a 'black' woman because he does 
not find them physically attractive. He denies that such a 
position is racist in two ways. First, he attests that he 
could have such a relationship with a 'coloured' person and 
uses the familiar strategy of extreme case formulation 
("some very beautiful coloured girls") to emphasise the 
point. Second, he directly denies that not finding "black 
girls" attractive is racist, and attempts to argue that it 
is simply an issue of certain physical characteristics 
using the common-place that physical attraction is the 
factor that propels one to get to know someone better. 
In summary, the talk of nationalists was replete with 
denials of racism and was characterised by an absence of 
reflexive thought. Consequently, it was very different to 
the talk of interviewees on the left and those of liberal 
persuasion. For nationalists, the discourses of biologism 
and cognitivism established 'race', racism and the 
perception of racial differences as universal truths. 
Racism was located 'out there' entirely, and was denied any 
presence 'within' the nationalist speaker. Possibly 
because nationalists were convinced of the force of their 
own argument, they failed to be reflexive. Furthermore, 
critical self-reflection may have revealed elements of 
racism within the speaker and that would have fundamentally 
undermined the position they were attempting to construct. 
6,6 Summary 
In summary, the talk of Nationalists was constructed 
principally in terms of the discourses of biologism and 
cognitivism. However, the two were not mutually exclusive. 
The common thread which bound them together and caused them 
to blur into one another was biology. In total four 'facts' 
156 
were established through reference to the ideas of 
'science I • 
1. 'races' are biologically distinct entities, inherently 
different from one another (scientific racism). 
2. 'races' remain 'naturally' separate due to insuperable 
cultural differences (differentialist racism). 
3. the process of social categorisation is a natural and 
functional biological mechanism which reflects actual 
similarities and differences evident in the 'real' world 
(social cognition type arguments). 
4. universal cognitive processes predispose all people to 
ethnocentrism, and therefore to 
groups other than their own 
arguments) . 
discriminating against 
(soc ial iden ti ty type 
The ideas embodied within the first premise are reinforced 
by each of the following three. Cultural differences 
mirror inherent biological differences, biological 
mechanisms of social cognition confirm that distinct groups 
exist in the world 'out there', and feelings of enmity 
towards those other groups reflect natural patterns of 
segregation. These four aspects of nationalist 'race' talk 
combine to provide the speaker with a powerful warrant for 
denying that s/he is racist. Nationalists claim that they 
are not irrational bigots, rather that they are merely 
providing a factual account of an external reality. 
Consequently, they define themselves as realists. 
In the following chapter the focus of discussion is the 
talk of liberals. As we shall see, their language of 
racism presents quite a different picture. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
LIBERAL TALK: 'I'M SORRY ABOUT ALL 
THE CONTRADICTIONS' 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter concerns the talk of those participants whom I 
have termed 'Liberals'. These speakers declared their 
support for the Dem,?cratic party, a small party to the left 
of the Nationalist party and historically associated with 
liberal 'white' English-speaking South Africans. Liberal 
talk differs from the Nationalist talk examined in the 
previous chapter, and the Left-wing talk analysed in the 
subsequent chapter, in terms of the discourses and 
rhetorical devices used in the construction of accounts of 
'race' and racism. 
The talk of interviewees who defined themselves as Liberal 
was constructed in terms of all three of the discourses 
identified earlier (refer chapter 5, sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2 
and 5.2.3); that is, the discourses of biologism, 
cognitivism and con$tructivism. Althouqh the discourse of" ve",t!Aj-Ve . .:Id /?.It!.rJl'/~Ne.es /h Lh./s ~r()~ 07r&v qPOr7 /fh/'s t:6:rC~G/'-St! f/t!.t ~ h 
cognitivism was primarv.l, the talk of Liberals drew flexibly..c ka.S 'I ~. 6/1?eS - /"'-"'J 
upon the remaining two discourses. Consequently the ;A,,,;- ZaA:. 
language of Liberals constituted the most variable talk in 
this study, echoing elements of Nationalist talk (heard 
A )1::)% o/O:;$~S 
through the discourse of biologism in particula:t;') and Left;:- ..v' "caSeS /~ 6070 dr 
wing talk (heard through the discourse of constructivis~ 
within a unique construction of topics and rhetorical 
strategies. 
158 
Liberal participants typically described themselves as 
beset by contradiction. Although the manifestation of 
contradictory themes in modern racial discourse (Billig, 
1988b) is well established, the reflexive commentary of 
speakers themselves upon this feature of their talk seems 
to have received little attention. In this study, sixty 
percent of Liberals apologised during the interview for 
their lack of clarity. Clare, for example, at the end of 
her interview offered the following: 
Clare: Ja, I mean it's ['race'] not a resolved thing for 
me at all. It is a hugely problematic thing that 
I have not come to terms with at all (.) it is that 
ambivalence (.) I'm not sure where my views are at 
Of course, we shall be examining the function of this type 
of statement within the sections that follow. 
Apart from the degree of variability evidenced in Liberal 
talk, it differed in two other respects from the discourse 
of Nationalist and Left-wing speakers. Liberals focused on 
emotion. Speakers in this group spoke about themselves and 
about their feelings, especially feelings of guilt and 
anxiety, a great deal. Even within the context of talking 
about the injustices of Apartheid, Liberals spoke primarily 
about how it concerned them. In other words, their talk 
was preoccupied with the self. By contrast, people on the 
left framed their language within a wider concern for 'all 
South Africans' or 'the oppressed', for example; while 
Nationalists couched their discourse within talk of an 
external reality' or 'the hard facts'. 
The concern of Liberals for themselves was echoed through 
their expressed opinions on a range of topics or issues. 
Liberals voiced reservations about the policy of 
affirmative action, fears of reverse racism, fears of 
material losses following nationalisation and a concern not 
to be seen as 'white' by 'black' people in South Africa -
in other words, to be seen as a non-racist individual and 
not as a member of an oppressive minority group. 
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These central themes of Liberal talk will become more 
apparent in the detailed analysis which follows. 
7.2 The discQUrses of Liberalism: 'I'm always aware not to 
seem like I'm a spoilt white brat' 
The discourse of cognitivism outlined earlier (refer 
chapter 5, section 5.2.2) is founded upon the ideas behind 
Social Cognition and Social Identity Theory. Although 
Nationalist and Left-wing interviewees used this discourse 
in the construction of their accounts of 'race' and racism, 
it was amongst Liberals that it predominated. In essence, 
this discourse served to construct the notion of social 
groups and the processes of social categorisation, social 
identi ty, and social comparison as 'truths', enabling 
Liberals to disclaim a racist identity. 
Indeed, in warranting their claims to non-racism, Liberal 
speakers frequently made explicit reference to particular 
theorists and theories, especially the work of Henri 
Tajfel; for example: 
Alan: You know like the work of Tajfel and his cronies 
(.). All these theories go a certain way to explain 
part of why we make these distinctions and why we 
have this inability to just look at someone as a 
person. 
Here Alan is using Taj felian theory to excuse racial 
categorisation (and stereotyping) through citing the notion 
that such processes are biologically functional and 
unavoidable. As noted earlier, the danger of cognitivist 
approaches (Edwards & Potter, 1992) is precisely that 
prejudice is seen as inevitable (Billig, 1987). Moreover, 
these ideas are adopted not by the diehard racists, but by 
those who define themselves as liberal, progressive and 
non-racist. 
The ideas behind Social Identity Theory form the basis of a 
differentialist racism (Taguieff, 1988) in that they enable 
the speaker to maintain insurmountable differences between 
'races', while refuting a biological basis to 'race' and 
arguing that in reality there are no 'human races'. Thus, 
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nature is replaced with ideas of social categorisation, 
social identity and ethnocentrism which explicate the 
'spontaneous' tendency for human groups to cohere. In 
short, it legitimates a distinction between 'us' and 'them' 
within a framework of "racism without races" (Balibar, 
1991a: 21). 
Despite the arguably more acceptable form of these neo-
racist arguments (Balibar, 1991a), speakers are well aware 
of the normative sanctions against the expression of racist 
sentiments. For this reason we have seen an increase in 
studies investigating 'modern', 'symbolic' or 'subtle' 
racism (eg. Duckitt, 1993; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay 
& Hough, 1976; McConahay, 1986), and in studies such as 
this one which focus upon the discursive practice 
associated with 'race' talk (eg. Cochrane & Billig, 1984; 
Condor, 1988; Wetherell & Potter, 1986, 1992; van Dijk, 
1987, 1992). The Liberals in this study repeatedly 
expressed their concern to be "as liberal as possible" 
(Rose) and to be "completely rid of the stain of racism 
that I bear" (James), demonstrating their appreciation of 
the negative consequences of conservative and racist views. 
However, perhaps the most significant feature of Liberal 
talk was its complex, confused and contradictory nature. 
Here, "the dialectic of prejudice" (Billig et aI, 1988: 
100) was mos t in evidence. In particular, it was 
articulated through a fundamental tension between the 
social and the individual, but was echoed through sub-
dilemmas such as self versus others, and apathy versus 
activism. 
The following, rather lengthy, extract exemplifies the 
nature of this talk. The speaker, Chloe, is addressing the 
causes of racism. Immediately prior to the cited extract, 
she provided an abstract description of some of the ideas 
behind Social Identity Theory to account for the phenomenon 
of racism. At this juncture, the interviewer asked Chloe 
to provide a concrete example of the theoretical ideas she 
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was outlining. 
response: 
The following extract represents her 
ChIoe: sometimes when these big meetings are held [J 
this is an instance of feeling (.) feeling the 
difference urn (.) for this particular one I was 
with this man I was speaking about (.) and just 
somehow within that crowd I felt quite isolated (.) 
I felt very different (.) and I wanted so much to 
feel the same (soft laughter) I wanted so much to 
be able to sing with them (.) and I couldn't (.) 
and I just felt a real gap (.) which was partly my 
fault as well (.) I felt it was their meeting (.) 
although there were other white people there as 
well and it was very much an open to everyone 
meeting (.) I just felt very much (.) I felt at 
that moment 'this is their struggle' (.) and 'why 
am I here?' (.) 'this is their struggle' (.) and 
it's not really like that. I don't see it like 
that (.) but just then I felt it. 
Chloe constructs her answer around a narrative of concern 
for racism in South Africa. The content of the account is 
significant in that it is designed to portray the speaker 
as anti-racist; that is, she describes her participation in 
an anti-apartheid activity, a mass meeting (mass meetings 
such as the one Chloe referred to occurred frequently in 
South Africa at the time, they were usually focused around 
a specific issue or event and were attended by concerned 
'white' people although the majority were usually 'black'). 
However, Chloe' s account is typical of the Liberal 
discourse in this study and as such is by no means 
"undilemmatically straightforward" (Billig et aI, 1988: 
lOO) . One may note that it is formulated predominantly 
within the first person singular (I) and is punctuated by 
references to how 'I feel', and what 'I want'. Chloe is not 
addressing the plight of 'black' people, rather she is 
highlighting how this affects her. As mentioned above, a 
focus upon self, upon 'I', was a striking feature of this, ~ r7D.J'C 
("'~/ .,oa .... ~;?~.~u.!s cooc.~eq .6-'5e".;- a'-:;?V-"T1~~I'<s AJ/i!~,;'" /'k CO....,c~.Kt! tJ/ IJ ?,or I 
group/and at times created difficulties for the speaker in or &, ..... )' ~ /':'i!f!!ri//e~ 
that it seemed to contradict their arguments for the 
salience of social groups. 
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In this extract, Chloe is confronting the following 
contradiction: at other points in the interview she had 
argued that 'race' was of no consequence to her (we shall 
be examining the nature of this argument shortly), yet here 
she wishes to make a case for racial differences. 
Generally, an argument of no differences between people 
accords with a position of non-racism/ anti-racism (refer 
Left-wing discourse in chapter 8), while assertions of 
racial difference are suggestive of an underlying racist 
ideology (refer Nationalist discourse in chapter 6). Chloe 
wishes to account for her 'feeling white' in terms of 'the 
difference' between 'black' and 'white' people; however, 
she has to choose her words carefully so as to construct 
the difference as a feature of an external reality (as did 
the Nationalists) and not a feature of her prejudiced 
personality. Let us examine the text a little more closely 
to ascertain how she accomplishes this objective. 
Chloe attempts to achieve a non-racist account of feeling 
'white' through the use of a number of rhetorical devices. 
First, she defends against a potential criticism that she 
felt different simply because she was on unfamiliar 
territory. In other words, that as a South African 'white' 
she was unused to 'black' company and/or experiencing large 
numbers of 'black' people. Of course, this criticism would 
imply that such a response is unreasonable and indicative 
of prejudice. 
Chloe provides two pieces of information which would rebut 
such a criticism; the first is that she has attended mass 
meetings before (" for this particular one"), and the second 
is that she attended with a 'black' friend ("I was with 
this man I was speaking about"). Notably, although she had 
spoken about 'this man' 
to mention that he is 
at some 
'black' 
length earlier, she omits 
in this context thereby 
reinforcing the notion that his 'race' is of no consequence 
to her. Chloe' s reference to her friend reflects the 
familiar 'some of my best friends are black' argument 
albeit in somewhat more subtle form. The function of these 
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two elements of Chloe's argument therefore is to signal 
that she is not racist: she attends mass meetings against 
apartheid and she has 'black' friends. 
Secondly, Chloe constructs her feeling of isolation within 
the crowd, her experience of 'difference', as an singular 
incident. She begins by asserting that "sometimes when 
these big meetings are held" and then hesitates before 
formulating the example of "this particular one" with it's 
significant characteristics described in the previous 
paragraph. The use of the word 'sometimes' followed by the 
description of the incident conveys that this is an unusual 
feeling for Chloe. Moreover, this idea is reinforced by 
the claim at the end of the account that it was "just then 
I felt it". 
However, not only is this feeling rare, it 'just somehow' 
occurred. The selection of the phrase 'just somehow' is 
significant in that it implies a passivity on Chloe's part. 
This feeling did not originate within Chloe, it 'just 
somehow' overcame her. She had not gone to the meeting 
expecting differences; quite the contrary, she had gone to 
a mass meeting, as she had in the past, with a 'black' 
friend to protest against racism. 
felt isolated and different. Thus 
Yet 'just somehow' she 
Chloe constructs herself 
as passive, neutral and essentially non-racist. 
Thirdly, Chloe asserts that her intention at the meeting 
was the exact opposite of what occurred : "and I wanted so 
much to feel the same (soft laughter) I wanted so much to 
be able to sing with them" (my emphasis). Chloe makes use 
of the rhetorical devices of repetition and extreme case 
formulation ('so much'; Pomerantz, 1986) to maximise the 
genuiness of her desire to 'be at one with black people' . 
However, there are two features of this statement which 
belie other agendas. First, surely one only expresses a 
deep desire to feel the same if one is experiencing a 
feeling of difference? And second, the second sentence in 
this couplet contains an irony: Chloe wants 'so much' to be 
the same as 'them'. While 'so much' serves to highlight the 
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desire for sameness, 'them' functions to expose the 
difference - the contrary themes of modern racial discourse 
are captured within a single sentence. 
In the midst of this statement Chloe laughs softly. The 
laugh seems to be directed towards herself and constructs 
Chloe's belief in 'sameness' as naive. In other words, it 
reinforces the notion that Chloe 'innocently' assumed that 
'race' was irrelevant and happened upon feelings of 
'difference' at this particular meeting. In this respect 
the extract demonstrates certain parallels with the 
Nationalist material. Chloe wants to believe that everyone 
is the same (Nationalists would explicitly define this 
position as one of idealism) and yet she is confronted with 
the· 'reality' of difference (what Nationalists would 
describe as a position of realism). 
In order to warrant her assertions of difference, Chloe 
provides an example. 
(my emphasis) at the 
She argues that she felt a "real gap" 
moment when the formal aspects of the 
meeting gave way to singing. The term 'real' is clearly 
designed to convey that the 'difference' between people who 
are 'black' and those who are 'white' is 'fact' - and not a 
feature of an irrational mind. Indeed, this whole account 
functions to describe how Chloe stumbled upon 'the truth'. 
It constructs Chloe as unwilling to accept 'differences'; 
yet, 'forced' to confront the reality of their existence 
(in this respect, Liberal discourse is not dissimilar to 
Left-wing discourse). 
Chloe's acceptance of the reality of racial 'difference' is 
expressed through statement that she is willing to assume 
partial responsibility for her feelings of isolation 
("which I felt was partly my fault as well"). It is 
probable that the 'part' for which she would accept 
responsibility is learning the words of the song(s} sung at 
the meeting. However, Chloe implies that the rest of the 
responsibility for her feelings of isolation lie elsewhere. 
Although this remains undefined, it resonates with 
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Nationalist talk - Nationalists argue that it is not their 
fault that races are different. 
Finally, Chloe argues her case more strongly with 
references 
(original 
to "their meeting" and "their struggle" 
Chloe shifts her emphasis) . However, 
interactional footing (Goffman, 1981) in order to distance 
herself from these more sensitive statements. By making 
use of reported speech Chloe separates the roles of 
animator and author. The' animator' is the current 
speaker, the 'author' is the person who originally composed 
the words (Clayman, 1989). This rhetorical strategy serves 
to distinguish between Chloe now (animator) and Chloe then 
(author), enabling Chloe to deny that she still experiences 
racial differences and to assert that it was "just then I 
felt it". Although, of course, in the spirit of 
contradiction, less than a page further on in the 
transcript, Chloe affirmed that 'race' was important for 
'black' people in particular in South Africa "especially 
because (.) it is their struggle for freedom, okay?". 
In summary, Chloe employs a number of rhetorical devices 
to construct herself as non-racist, despite her formulation 
of an argument which supports the existence of racial 
'differences' . Essentially, Chloe espouses a 
differentialist racism which postulates insurmountable 
'cultural' differences between people defined as belonging 
to different 'races'. It will be recalled that 'the moment 
of exclusion' for Chloe occurred when the singing began. 
The lines of argument used to strengthen a position of 
differentialist racism are those associated with theories 
of Social Cognition and Social Identity. As noted above, 
this extract follows immediately upon Chloe's accurate 
presentation of some these ideas, in particular those of 
Henri Tajfel, and represents her concrete example of how 
they operate in practice (refer also chapter 5, section 
5.2.2). 
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Ideas of the inevitability of social categorisation, of 
the 'natural' formation of social groups, and of the 
centrality of psychological processes such as social 
identity and social comparison are established as 'fact' 
through reference to the 'science' of psychology. These 
'truths' enable Chloe to construct herself as being non-
racist, even anti-racist, since they provide 'objective' 
and external accounts of prejudice: prejudice is 
inevitable, yet Chloe is attempting to overcome feelings of 
racism in herself. 
While the Liberal discourse of which Chloe' s talk is 
exemplary, is different to both Nationalist and Left-wing 
discourse, it contains elements of both. Although Liberals 
do not warrant their accounts by reference to biology, they 
do develop arguments which seek to establish insuperable 
cultural differences between races. Indeed, it is perhaps 
this notion which reflects the tensions of liberalism most 
clearly. On the one hand, cultural arguments operate like 
biology as Balibar (1991a) has demonstrated. This, 
coupled with assertions of the biologically functional role 
of social categorisation and the inevitability of racism 
result in Liberal talk resonating with that of 
Nationalists. Yet, on the other hand, the argument for 
cultural differences (as opposed to biological ones) is 
used by Liberals to argue for the social construction of 
'race' (as we shall see shortly). In this way, Liberal 
talk approximates Left-wing discourse. This observation 
serves to highlight the dilemma tic nature of Liberal talk, 
and to affirm the fundamental significance of the 'wording 
of meanings' (Kristeva, 1986); that is, meaning does not 
precede wording but is developed within the context and 
content of argumentation. 
Thus far our discussion has concentrated upon group-based 
arguments contained within Liberal discourse on 'race' and 
racism. However, closely intertwined with arguments for 
the salience of social groups and intergroup processes are 
arguments which afford primacy to the individual. Liberal 
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speakers argue that although categorisation and racism are 
inevitable, they believe in 'the individual'. They assert 
that they are 'individualists' and that they pride 
themselves on treating all individuals equally irrespective 
of their group membership. Concurrently, they express a 
desire to be seen as an individual and not as a member of 
the oppressive minority: 'a spoilt white brat'. The 
following series of extracts provides examples of this type 
of argument. They are taken from various discursive 
contexts since the individualist argument permeated most 
topics concerning 'race' and racism: 
Simon: Well for me personally I like to ignore it um I 
suppose most people don't and sometimes you can't 
help seeing that it is there you know you did 
notice differences but urn I do try to ignore race 
(.) it's something I've tried to teach myself to 
do urn throughout my life is to say well it might 
enter your head in the first few minutes of meeting 
someone and then you immediately try and put it 
away and say 'well look, there is no race here 
there is no difference in race here. 
Tom: It seems to me that we just make use of these 
descriptive terms and I personally am not 
particularly interested in doing that and I'm very 
much in favour of of looking at people as 
individuals not as anything else. 
Stacey: I think groups have a polarising effect. I mean if 
you belong to one group then you will always be 
juxtaposed against another group or another two 
groups. You know all that second year theory (.) 
and I don't really understand the point of doing 
that unless you're playing a rugby match where you 
want to win. But if you want everyone to come out 
winners then why group people? [J 
Liberals seemed to account for the individualist argument 
in two ways; they either addressed the apparent 
contradiction between their arguments for the overwhelming 
power of social categorisation and their claims to treating 
people as individuals, or they chose to minimise it. These 
two strategies are reflected in the above quotations. 
Simon adopts the former strategy:/ addressing the {J'o%2 
contradiction and, like many Liberalo/- describing his 
valiant efforts to overcome biology and socialisation and 
achieve his ideal of individualism and non-racism. Tom and 
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Stacey on the other hand, employ the latter strategy,! They r/~r: 
minimise the power of social groups (although they both 
argued vociferously for this at other points in the 
interview) and imply that it is a matter of choice as to 
whether one perceives people as individuals or as members 
of a particular social group. In order to understand 
better the nature and function of these arguments we need 
to examine the text a little more closely. 
Just prior to the first excerpt Simon had been arguing for 
the inevitability of social groups, warranting his 
statements by means of the now familiar notions behind 
Social Cognition and Social Identity Theory. Possibly in 
defence of a potential criticism from the interviewer that 
such a position remains fundamentally racist, simon 
qualifies his earlier stance. He attempts to disclaim a 
racist identity by denying that 'race' is significant 
within his interpersonal relations. However, his 
argumentative strategy is sophisticated in that he 
juxtaposes individualist arguments against cognitivist 
ones. 
For example, Simon initially states: "personally I like to 
ignore it" ('race'). However, this unmitigated denial of 
racism is immediately followed by a three part list 
(Jefferson, 1990) which serves to highlight the uniqueness 
of Simon's position ("I suppose most people don't") ,and 
the difficulty involved in maintaining it ("you can't help 
seeing that it is there", "you do notice differences"). 
Furthermore, his description of how he perceives the 
individual is formulated within the first person singular 
(I), while his accounts of 'noticing differences' are 
formulated within the second person plural (you). This 
rhetorical construction serves to heighten the contrast 
between Simon and other people: while everyone is subject 
to the processes of biology and socia1isation, Simon is 
exceptional in his personal quest to overcome racism. 
Moreover as we have noted previously, the discourse of 
cognitivism constructs ideas of difference as part of an 
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external reality - one which is impossible to overlook 
because it exists visibly 'out there'. 
seeing that 
Hence, even people 
it is there" (my like Simon "can't help 
emphasis) because "you do notice differences". The 
inevitability of social categorisation and prejudice 
'excuses' Simon for his perception of racial differences. 
He is not the irrational bigot who intentionally involves 
himself in racist practice; on the contrary, Simon 
constructs himself as like everyone else (in that he is 
subject to the same reality) but better (in that despite 
this, he attempts to perceive people as individuals and not 
as members of racial groups). We may note here that this 
account has parallels with the arguments of both 
Nationalist and Left-wing speakers. With respect to the 
former group, the similarity lies in the expression of the 
view that biological mechanisms of social cognition 
function to 'pick up' real category differences, such as 
'race'. With respect to the latter group, the similarity 
lies in the distinction between 'good' racists (like Simon) 
and 'bad' racists (other people) . 
In order to warrant his assertions of non-racism and to 
clearly convey the formidable nature of the task he has set 
himself (thereby building a defense against occasions of 
failure), Simon describes the lengths to which he has gone 
in order to overcome his own prejudice. He claims: "I've 
tried to teach myself (.) throughout my life to say 
there in no race here" (my emphasis). Simon' s use of the 
word 'tried' signifies two things; first, he has made an 
effort to overcome racism where "most people don't" and 
second, overcoming racism is not easy - one can try, but 
may not succeed. The rhetorical device of extreme case 
formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) evident in the phrase 
'throughout my life' dramatises and magnifies Simon' s 
efforts to overcome the 'natural' tendency to perceive 
'race' and prejudge people on that basis. 
Finally, simon provides a hypothetical example of how he 
reacts when he meets someone who is not 'white': he tells 
170 
himself "well look there is no race here, there is no 
difference in race here". By shifting his interactional 
footing (Goffman, 1981). Simon manages to "distil 
regularly occurring features of events and bring them 
together in a form which may not strictly represent the 
occasions of their occurrence in 'real life'" (Wooffitt, 
1992:84). This functions to provide the listener with a 
general case and significantly, since the nature of the 
description provided is general. any claims contained 
within the example are not available for scrutiny 
(Wooffitt. 1992). It should be noted that the content of 
this quotation is similar to that of Left-wing speakers. 
They argue that there is no such thing as 'race' and that 
its 'existence' is a social construction. Arguments for 
individualism thus incorporate more progressive ideas 
gleaned from an alternative theoretical base. 
In summary, Simon accomplishes his non-racial position via 
the discourse of cognitivism and to 
of the ideas which are typical 
a small degree via some 
of the discourse of 
constructivism. The discourse of cognitivism establishes 
certain ideas, which demonstrate the inevitability of 
racism, as 'fact'. These 'facts' function to excuse Simon 
of any racist practice in which he may engage. He would 
argue, in the face of potential criticism, that he is not 
really racist. he (like everyone else) is subject to the 
biological mechanisms of social cognition and the powerful 
socialisation of value differentials associated with people 
defined as belonging to different 'races'. 
The discourse of constructivism, heard through the argument 
of no differences between people, provides Simon with an 
ideal to aim for: that he can treat all people as 
individuals because there are no differences between them. 
Simon constructs himself as battling to overcome biology 
and socialisation in an attempt to achieve this ideal. His 
argument is designed to engender a sympathetic response in 
the listener, one which excuses any racist assumptions 
Simon might make in the face of the lengths to which he has 
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gone to treat people as (equal) individuals and to be non-
racist. 
Al though arguments such 
Liberal speakers, many of 
as Simon' s were common among 
c'?,,%) 
this group~aE times downplayed 
the component of the inevitability of racism contained 
within cognitivist discourse. This is illustrated in the 
remaining two quotations; in particular by Tom's statement: 
"we just make use of these descriptive terms", "I 
personally am not particularly interested in doing that" 
(my emphasis) and Stacey's assertion: "I don't really 
understand the point of doing that". 
Tom suggests in this extract that the category of 'race' 
operates simply to describe an external reality. In this 
respect his talk is similar to that of Nationalists who 
argued that the category in itself is innocent. However, 
Tom is constructing a slightly different argument here. He 
is desirous of disclaiming a racist identity and aims to do 
so by constructing racists as people who operate with 
intent. Hence, he asserts that 'people' (ie. racists) 
'just make use' of the category, unthinkingly and because 
they find it expedient to do so. Tom, by contrast, claims 
not to be "particularly interested in doing that" since he 
is "very much in favour of looking at people as individuals 
not as anything else". Arguably, although he does not 
explicitly mention the repercussions of racial labelling, 
Tom's talk remains informed by the idea that mere 
description leads to stereotyping and prejudice. This 
construction serves to portray racial categorisation and 
stereotyping as a matter of choice, a choice made by 
irrational bigots but not made by reasonable people like 
Tom. 
Stacey's account achieves similar rhetorical objectives. 
She also implies that intergroup relations have more to do 
with choice than with processes of social cognition or 
socialisation despite formulating strong arguments to the 
contrary elsewhere in the interview (for example: "I don't 
know (sigh) these things seem cast in iron"). Although 
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Stacey provides an explanation of inter-group behaviour 
broadly along the ideas behind Tajfelian theory ("you know 
all that second year theory"), she claims that she "doesn't 
really understand the point" of social categorisation and 
social comparison since "if you want everyone to come out 
winners then why group people?" . 
This extract functions to construct Stacey as naive, a 
strategy also adopted by Chloe as we saw earlier. Stacey's 
account implies a disbelief that some people are not 
concerned for the betterment of all people. The rhetorical 
strategy of what I shall term 'assuming naivety' (used 
frequently by Liberals in particular) achieves for the 
speaker a position of innocence. More specifically, within 
the context of talk about 'race' and racism, the speaker is 
constructed as 'not guilty' of racism. 'Assuming naivety' 
operates to deny that it is possible to be guilty of 
something of which one is unaware. Thus if Stacey does not 
understand why (other) people categorise and compare social 
groups then she cannot be guilty of that practice herself. 
Ultimately, this strategy serves to distinguish her good, 
moral and non-racist practice from the bad, immoral and 
racist intentions of others. 
In summary, these three accounts highlight the manner in 
which ideas behind psychological theories such as Social 
Cognition and Social Identity may be drawn upon to achieve 
a position of non-racism for the speaker. Although the 
discourse of cognitivism is undoubtedly primary, aspects of 
the discourse of biologism surface in the guise of 
differentialist arguments while features of the discourse 
of constructivism are heard through individualist arguments 
within Liberal talk. 
It is difficult to reduce the complexity of Liberal 
discourse to simple 'rules of thumb', but it is not 
impossible to trace the dominant strategies of Liberal 
discursive practice (although it is important to bear in 
mind that this represents a simplification). Essentially, 
for Liberals the discourse of cognitivism serves to explain 
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the social order, to establish racial differences as 
'real' (refer discourse of biologism), to excuse the 
speaker of racist practice, and to perpetuate a belief in 
'race' and therefore to sustain racism. On the other hand, 
notions of individualism function to reject the dominant 
social order in South Africa, to argue for 'no differences' 
between 'races' (refer discourse of constructivism), and to 
disclaim a racist identity. Yet, concern for the 
individual also serves to sustain racism in that it does 
not address the issue of social structure but locates 
racism as a problem of individual attitudes. 
In the following section we shall examine the rhetorical 
strategies of the denial and admission of racism within 
Liberal discourse. As we have seen, Liberals are concerned 
to impress as non-racist and progressive. In the extracts 
cited above, the speakers may have seemed to be 
predominantly denying that they were racist. However, the 
complex nature of Liberal talk requires that the issue is 
not as straight-forward as it may at first appear. 
7.3 Denial and Admission: 'one word shouldn't cover it 
~ 
Denials of racism have formed a point of focus within 
analyses of racial discourse (Cochrane & Billig, 1984; van 
Dijk, 1987, 1992). However, despite the increasing 
recognition of the dilemmatic nature of prejudice (Billig, 
1988a), the focus upon denial has eclipsed the rhetorical 
strategy of admission. Admissions of racism are defined as 
instances in which the speaker declares that their practice 
(or aspects thereof) is racist. The rhetorical strategy of 
admission was employed by Left-wing and Liberal speakers in 
this study, although there were differences between the two 
groups with respect to frequency of use and rhetorical 
objectives served. 
The absence of admissions of racism in other studies may 
reflect differences in the population sampled. The South 
African context is unique with respect to the manner in 
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which the category of 'race' has been abused (Thompson & 
Prior, 1982; for example, enshrining racial categories in 
law) and clearly this has implications for the 
manifestation of racism. Consequently, the central role of 
admissions of racism within the discourse of Liberal and 
Left-wing speakers in this study may be a particular 
feature of the South African political landscape. 
It is also possible that admissions of racism have not 
assumed a prominent role in work on 'race' and racism to 
da te for conceptual reasons. Arguably, this is a 
consequence of the dominance of what Billig (1987) refers 
to as a one-sided and non-rhetorical psychology; that is, 
one which fails to see thinking "in terms of a wider 
conflict between logoi and anti-logoi" since "the notion of 
conflict is not uppermost in this sort of psychology" (p. 
119). Thus, although many researchers examining the 
discourse of racism tend to assume a discursive paradigm, 
their work may continue to downplay the dilemma tic nature 
of thought. 
In addition, research on racism frequently takes as its 
focus people who obviously are racist, and since denials of 
racism almost represent a defining characteristic of such 
people, it is easy to overlook the perhaps less frequent 
occurrence of admission. Indeed, while denials provide 
the discourse analyst with fertile text to deconstruct, 
admissions of racism at first may seem rather void. 
However, admissions of racism must not be accepted 'at face 
value' . As discourse analysts we are concerned with 
language use; in other words, we need to attend to the way 
in which accounts which incorporate admissions of racism 
are constructed and the functions that they serve. 
The language of Liberals, as we have seen in the previous 
section is characterised by contradiction. It is unique in 
both form and content and yet it is permeated by elements 
of the discourses employed by Nationalist and Left-wing 
speakers. As may be anticipated, Liberal talk embraces 
both admissions and denials of racism providing further 
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testament to the fundamentally contradictory and dilemmatic 
nature thereof. 
There are two features associated with the denial and 
admission of racism within Liberal discourse which 
distinguish it from that of Nationalist and Left-wing 
speakers. 
separated 
First, denial 
within the talk. 
and admission are not clearly 
Rather, they are functionally 
intertwined in order to attain particular rhetorical 
objectives. Second, where there are contextual shifts in 
the patterning of denials and admissions within Liberal 
discourse they are concerned with talk about individual 
'black' people as opposed to groups of 'black' people, the 
latter most often associated with potential violence. Each 
of these features shall examined in turn. 
The following quotation, which is similar to the extract of 
Simon cited earlier, represents a typical example of the 
manner in which Liberal interviewees addressed the topic of 
their own racism: 
Liza: I mean even for myself, you do notice race I don't 
think I'd go beyond that or I t~ not to. When you 
get to know somebody that might dissipate somewhat 
and it might not be an issue for you any longer ... 
Race is a hot topic as far as people see one 
another. It might not have all sorts of judgements 
slapped on it but it will still be there in the way 
that they categorise and see each other. 
This extract is typical in that it incorporates both 
admissions and denials of racism. On the one hand, Liza is 
admi tting that she does notice 'race' and that this 
perception informs her interaction in potential 'mixed 
race' relationships - at least initially (Nationalists 
flatly deny that 'race' affects their perception or 
interaction with people defined as belonging to another 
'race' while Left-wing speakers admit that it does). On 
the other hand, Liza denies that she goes beyond 'mere' 
racial categorisation and that she perceives people in 
terms of stereotypes. However, she does employ the 
, 
rhetorical device of hedging to head off the potential 
criticism that such a position is not possible within the 
176 
South African context. Let us examine the text a little 
more closely in order to ascertain the functions served by 
this convoluted rhetorical construction. 
Liza's admissions of racism are couched within the 
discourse of cognitivism; that is, they are informed by the 
ideas of Social Cognition Theory. She argues "you do 
notice race", "it is a hot topic as far as people see one 
another" . Both these statements convey a sense of 
inevitability, that for people generally and 'even' for 
Liza the social perception of 'race' is unavoidable. She 
backs up this notion with the argument that although the 
category may not necessarily involve stereotyping, "it will 
still be there in the way that they categorise and see each 
other" (my emphasis). We may note that Liza frames this 
statement within the second person ('they') and not the 
first person ('we'). It is somewhat unclear as to why she 
does this, having previously admitted that she too 
categorises people. Possibly it serves to emphasise the 
point that this is a general phenomenon. 
Again, the ideas behind Social Cognition Theory provide a 
warrant for racism; the perception of racial categories is 
constructed as a function of human biology and therefore as 
not being a reflection of a bigoted personality. 
Essentially, what Liza is admitting to is 'innocent' and 
'natural' categorisation; what she is denying is that in 
her case categorisation is linked to racist assumptions and 
stereotypes. 
Liza's denial of racism operates at two levels. First, 
there is the more obvious denial which takes the form that 
Liza does not hold stereotyped beliefs about people who are 
not 'white': "I don't think I go beyond that or I try not 
to". Nevertheless, this denial is carefully constructed. 
The phrases 'I don't think' and 'I try not to' shield Liza 
from the criticism that it is impossible to 'just' see the 
category and blot out the ideas associated with it. Like 
Simon (refer section 7.2), Liza could argue that personally 
she is 'trying' not to see 'race', but that ultimately she 
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is engaged in a struggle against her own biology and 
socialisation. 
The second level of denial is somewhat more subtle and is 
fundamentally linked to the strategy of admission; in fact, 
the denial is embodied within the admission of racism. The 
first step in this complex construction is that Liberals 
produce an account which renders the process of 
categorisation as non-racist; 
established as a 'fact' of 
as we have seen, 
human biology. 
it is 
This 
construction however, represents a denial of racism (Left-
wing speakers would argue that categorisation per se is 
racism and admit that they engage in this racist practice). 
Herein lies the twist: Liberal speakers admi t to 
categorising people in terms of 'race'; however, what they 
are admitting to has previously been denied the status of 
racist practice. 
In one sense then it would be possible to argue that 
'admission' is really a disguised form of denial, and this 
may be an accurate interpretation. However, the crux of 
understanding racist discourse is to tease out the way in 
which accounts are put together and the rhetorical 
objectives they serve. What is apparent from this analysis 
is that the dual strategies of admission and denial 
represent highly flexible devices with which to achieve 
certain rhetorical ends. For those who wish to define 
themselves as Liberal, these ends are first, to portray 
oneself as non-racist, and second, to do so in a manner 
which demonstrates a sensitive understanding of the issues 
at hand. By admitting to 'racism', Liberals construct 
themselves as progressive and reasonable people, as people 
who are willing to reflect upon their practice and change 
it in the quest to achieve the ideal of non-racism. By so 
doing they effectively contrast their practice to that of 
the 'real' racists who flatly deny that they engage in 
racist practice. As Stacey stated: "one word shouldn't 
cover it all"; in other words, although she is admitting to 
178 
racism, she contends that her practice is very different to 
that of 'others'. 
Thus far we have examined the nature of admissions and 
denials within Liberal discourse and we have seen that the 
complex interplay of denial and admission serves the dual 
function of constructing the speaker as non-racist and 
distinguishing him/her from the 'real' racists. Let us 
turn now to examine the second significant feature 
associated with the 'race' talk of Liberals; that is, the 
context of their admissions and denials. 
Billig (1987) has noted that the argumentative context 
within which a piece of discourse is located is essential 
to an understanding of that discourse. In the case of 
Liberal talk, denials of racism tended to predominate 
within the context of talk about individuals, while 
admissions of racism tended to predominate within the 
context of talk about groups. As a consequence of this 
patterning of admissions and denials, Liberal talk 
concerning relations with individuals parallels aspects of 
Nationalist discourse, whereas Liberal talk concerning 
inter-group relations tends to share certain features with 
Left-wing discourse. 
The distinction between responses to individuals and 
responses to groups was raised spontaneously by the 
majority (80%) of Liberal speakers. The remainder of the 
sample were prompted to address the issue by the 
interviewer, but produced accounts which were similar in 
form and content to those accounts which were not directly 
solicited. The following sequence of quotations 
exemplifies talk of this nature: 
Lucy: You know when everything is really peaceful it's 
(.) you can look at people and look at different 
race groups as just: different people but: when 
something like this happens you put them back in 
the big stereotype and you don't look for 
individual qualities and that sort of thing. 
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Clare: I think times when it is relevant for me (.) 
sometimes (.) is when there are groups involved (.) 
like the strikes the other week. 
Nick: 
Emma: 
I do experience that split between individual and 
group (.) I cannot fail to feel a little 
uncomfortable in a huge crowd of people of another 
race. Thanks to George I can now tell you that 
this is a conditioned emotional response and one 
which has been given to me by the media. 
I think there is for white people and I think for 
myself there is qui te a lot of anxiety around 
numbers of black people you know. You kind of (.) 
also again it's the stereotypes you know like these 
'violent groups' you know. Kind of SABe' s ideal you 
know. 'AS soon as you get a group of black people 
together you have a war' you know and I mean that 
definitely would affect me especially at the 
present moment. But and it's not as though it's a 
rational thought because I mean it isn't rational 
at all but it's part of how I feel. 
In each of these extracts the speaker is distinguishing 
between his/her reaction to groups and to individuals. 
While Lucy, Clare and Emma produced their accounts 
spontaneously, Nick's was prompted by a question from the 
interviewer. However, as is evident from a reading of the 
cited extracts, there is little to distinguish Nick's 
account from the accounts of the other three cited 
interviewees. 
Previously (refer section 7.2) we noted that Liberals tend 
to espouse individualism. They argue that although the 
process of social perception necessitates categorisation, 
they prefer to see people as individuals and not as members 
of a pre-defined 'race'. This theme of individualism recurs 
here. The speakers report a "split between individual and 
group" (Nick) with respect to feelings of racism. The gist 
of the argument is that it is easier to be non-racist when 
individuals are involved because one can focus upon that 
individual's qualities. As we have seen in the previously 
cited extracts of Liza (refer above), Simon, Tom and Stacey 
(refer section 7.2), Liberal speakers argue that although 
they may notice an individual's 'race' they do not 
subscribe to the stereotypes associated with his/her 'race-
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group'. In other words, they tend to deny that their 
interaction with individuals is racist. 
Liberals argue that the conditions under which the 
individualist approach fails are when groups are involved 
and/or when there is the threat of violence. Each of the 
above speakers maintains that other 'race' individuals 
invoke in him/her a different response to that invoked by 
other 'race' groups. Moreover, the notion of groups is 
strongly tied to ideas of potential violence. This is 
perhaps best epitomised in Emma's statement that "as soon 
as you get a group of black people together you have a 
war"; although she is critical of this idea, she admits it 
"definitely would affect me". 
How though does this articulate with the strategies of 
admission and denial, and what rhetorical objectives are 
achieved? Each of these speakers is engaged in a complex 
admission of racism. Lucy argues that "when something like 
this happens you put them back in the big stereotype". 
Clare admits that 'race' becomes "relevant [J when there 
are groups involved". Emma asserts tha t for 'white' 
people, including herself, "there is quite a lot of anxiety 
around numbers of black people", and Nick affirms that he 
does "experience a split between individual and group". 
We noted above that admissions of racism frequently embody 
denial, in that what is being admitted to is constructed as 
non-racist. In the context of talk about groups, however, 
the process is somewhat different, although the rhetorical 
aim is similar: to disclaim a racist identity. The key in 
this instance is to establish feelings of racism as 
legitimate and this is achieved by constructing as 'fact' 
the notion that groups of 'black' people are essentially 
violent. In this way, feelings of apprehension, anxiety 
and fear are constructed not as rooted in racial prejudice 
but as 'realistic' under the circumstances. 
For example, both Lucy and Clare make reference to a strike 
by 'black' workers on the University campus ("when 
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something like this happens"; "like the strikes the other 
week"), an event which was punctuated with incidents of 
racial violence. These widely publicised and witnessed 
incidents provide a powerful warrant for the legitimacy of 
the womens' feelings. In effect, this argument maintains 
tha t 'race' only becomes salient when 'black' people 
organise around racial issues (ie. in groups) and when they 
act in accordance with the stereotypes (ie. violently). 
This constructs the speaker as 'blameless' and groups of 
'black' people as guilty: ultimately, it is 'black' people 
who are responsible for racism, not 'white' people. 
Nick and Emma adopt a different strategy in their accounts 
of how they respond to groups of 'black' people, although 
it too successfully locates the source of racism 
externally. Both speakers 'blame' the media. Eroma 
critically comments upon the dominant images of 'black' 
people portrayed by the State controlled television and 
radio, yet declares her susceptibility to them. In other 
words, she is invoking the strategy with which we are now 
familiar - of arguing for the power of socialisation and 
the difficulty of overcoming it in pursuit of non-racism. 
Hence she argues "because I mean it isn't rational but it's 
part of how I feel"; the implication being 'and there is 
nothing I can do about it'. 
Similarly, Nick argues that he "cannot fail to feel a 
little uncomfortable in a huge crowd of people of another 
race" (my emphasis, later he commented "there is always the 
air of a lynch mob associated with crowds"). His use of 
the term 'cannot fail', and the adjective 'huge', represent 
examples of extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) and 
serve to maximise the conditions to which Nick had to 
respond. While 'cannot fail' connotes that Nick had no 
choice, his response of feeling a 'little' uncomfortable in 
the face of a 'huge' crowd is constructed as seeming 
entirely reasonable. 
Furthermore, Nick makes reference to a senior lecturer in 
the Department of Psychology (George) whose course in 
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Behaviourism has provided Nick with an explanation for his 
response - and thereby provided a warrant for it. In fact, 
Nick's response to crowds is not of his own volition but 
"has been given to me by the media" (my emphasis). In 
short Nick's account like that of Emma externalises the 
source of racism, locating it in the media. Both of these 
speakers therefore position themselves as passive 
recipients of a racist ideology which they would wish to 
overcome (in this way the talk has strong parallels with 
Left-wing discourse; refer chapter 8). In essence, they 
are not to blame for the racism to which they admit since 
it is a function of living in a racist society and not of a 
prejudiced personality. 
In summary, the talk of Liberals remains complex and 
contradictory - in general and in respect of the rhetorical 
strategies of denial and admission of racism. While 
Liberal speakers deny and admit racist practice, both 
strategies are oriented to disclaiming a racist identity. 
Frequently, admissions incorporate aspects of denial, but 
they may also operate to locate the source of racism as an 
external reality beyond the control of the speaker. 
Furthermore, the strategy of admission functions to portray 
the speaker as sensitive to racial issues, as progressive 
and above all as reasonable (characteristics not synonymous 
wi th racism). In the following section, we examine a 
little more closely Liberal 'claims' to self-awareness and 
insight with respect to their own racism; that is, to the 
topic of reflexivity. 
7.4 The Role of Reflexivity: 'Its funny, I can't think of 
a time when I've been racist' 
Over the past few years the notion of reflexivity has 
received increasing attention in studies concerned with 
discourse (Ashmore, 1989; Potter, 1988a; Woolgar, 1988a, 
1988b) . Moreover, as noted earlier (refer chapter 4, 
section 4.5), the issue of reflexivity is multi-faceted and 
may pertain not only to an awareness on the part of 
researchers as to the constructedness of their talk or 
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texts, but to a similar awareness on the part of lay-
people. In other words, reflexivity may itself become a 
rhetorical device which serves particular discursive 
objectives. 
In the previous chapter we noted that the discourse of 
Nationalists was characterised by a distinct absence of 
reflexivity, while in the following chapter we shall see 
that Leftwing speakers demonstrate considerable reflexive 
ability with respect to their own and others' talk. In 
this section of the current chapter we examine the notion 
of reflexivity with respect to Liberal discourse and not 
unexpectedly, given the findings of the previous two 
sections, we find that Liberal talk is both reflexive and 
unreflexive in nature. 
Although at first admissions of racism may seem to embrace 
a reflexive component, a close analysis of this rhetorical 
strategy revealed that admissions either embraced a denial 
of racism or externalised racism, thereby absolving the 
speaker of any responsibility for their practice. In this 
way therefore they may be regarded as largely non-reflexive 
in character. Since we dealt with these issues fairly 
comprehensively in the previous section, our aim here is to 
make but a few points specifically relating to the role of 
reflexivity in Liberal discourse. 
As with the strategies of admission and denial, the salient 
feature associated with variation in Liberal reflexive talk 
was the discursive context. In general, considerable 
reflexivity was demonstrated with respect to the racist ) 
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two extracts are exemplary of the former talk: 
Emma: I think they would fear you know of all those many 
stereotypes like this person's not going to have 
proper personal hygiene and they're going to be 
uneducated and they're going to have this bizarre 
huge family 'there are going to be 45 people in 
this family' (smiles) and they're going to want a 
wedding in the middle of nowhere and you know all 
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Nick: 
those kind of things that would never be true about 
an individual. 
Having set them up as bad and yourself up as good 
you immediately fall back into a mode of either 
'they are inherently bad and I must hate them' or 
'they are bad for various reasons and I must save 
them'. So you can set up a whole cul ture around 
hating and saving which makes them the group which 
makes people able to say things like 'I know the 
African' . 
Liberal discourse was replete with talk which sought to 
deconstruct the racist nature of other peoples' practice. 
By contrast self-reflexive talk was minimal. As with those 
on the left (refer chapter 8, section 8.4), Liberals used 
humour and irony to 'send up' the foolishness of others; of 
course, simultaneously distancing themselves from such 
behaviour. This is clearly demonstrated in the two 
extracts above, both of which deploy a number of rhetorical 
strategies to achieve an account which constructs 'others' 
as racist (bad) and the speaker as non-racist (good). 
Ironically, while Nick is able to comment upon the 
splitting of 'good' 'white' people from 'bad' 'black' 
people, he fails to realise that in doing so he is re-
producing exactly such an account: splitting 'good' racists 
from 'bad' racists. 
In a manoeuvre typical of Liberals, both Nick and Emma 
posi tion themselves as the detached social observer, 
commenting upon the vagaries 
shift their interactiona1 
of others. Consequently, both 
footing (Goffman, 1981) at 
various points in their accounts to distinguish their views 
from those of the people whom they are describing. Emma 
also draws upon the strategies of listing (Jefferson, 1990) 
and extreme case formulation 
account. These linguistic 
(Pomerantz, 1986) in her 
devices result in the 
formulation of a caricature of the reactions of 'others' to 
'black' people, and this image successfully achieves a 
contrast between the irrational and racist behaviour of 
others and the rational and non-racist behaviour of the 
speaker. 
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The extracts of Nick and Eroma clearly demonstrate Liberal 
interviewees ability to reflexively consider the practice 
of 'others', and at this point a more detailed textual 
analysis is not warranted. However, in order to highlight 
the contrast between Liberal speakers treatment of others' 
practice and that of their own let us consider one final 
extract. Here, Tom is describing to the interviewer the 
response of his family to his brother's intentions to marry 
a 'coloured' woman: 
Tom: Of course they all colour their prejudice in a 
cloak of concern for the child. You know 'it is 
very unfair on the child' [] and you know 'to get 
married and then to have children it's fine for you 
but you've got to think about the child having to 
grow up in a society like that'. [What was your 
reaction?] My reaction was negative but for a lot 
of reasons which didn't have anything to do with 
race so much as the fact that she's much younger, 
much less educated, he's a universi ty graduate, 
she hasn't even got matric (.) much younger (.) urn 
( .) and I also knew that they hadn't know each 
other for a very long time so that was my concern. 
This extract represents a working model of the manner in 
which reflexivity operates within Liberal discourse. While 
Tom is entirely capable of detecting the racial prejudice 
underpinning the 'concerns' of his family for the child of 
a 'mixed race' couple, he is incapable of recognising that 
he too is "colouring his prejudice" in a "cloak of concern" 
for his brother. 
Tom's description of his family's reaction to the impending 
marriage demonstrates parallels with the previously cited 
accounts of Nick and Emma. He too shifts his interactional 
footing (Goffman, 1981) and directly reports upon the 
nature of the arguments the family would use to debate the 
issues surrounding 'mixed' marriages. Significantly, Tom's 
discourse about his own reaction to the relationship draws 
upon different rhetorical strategies. He lists (Jefferson, 
1990) three problems that he anticipates will create 
problems for the couple in the future: she's much younger, 
less educated and they have known each other for only a 
short time. Moreover, he establishes these reasons as 
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, facts' ( "the fact is") and therefore as completely 
divorced from the issue of 'race'. Once more, we encounter 
an instance in which a Liberal speaker denies racist 
practice with respect to their own interpersonal 
interaction. 
In summary, Liberal discourse was both reflexive and non-
reflexive in nature. Denials of racism were functionally 
related to talk that was essentially non-reflexive in 
nature, and tended to occur within the context of 
discussion about personal relationships with people who 
were not 'white'. Admissions of racism present the analyst 
with a far more complex picture. While one may assume that 
they would be related to discourse that is reflexive in 
nature, we noted in the previous section that Liberal 
admissions either embraced a denial of racism or sought to 
--~- .,." 
locate the source of racism as being outside the speaker. 
Therefore such discourse may be seen as essentially non-
reflexive ~ and as such, contrasts with Left-wing discourse 
in which admissions of racism took a different form and 
were related to reflexivity. 
Ultimately, the talk of Liberals remains extremely complex. 
It is reflexive (unlike Nationalist discourse) when the 
topic of discussion is other peoples' racism, but it is not 
reflexive when Liberals' own racism is under scrutiny 
(unlike Left-wing discourse). However, Liberal discourse 
appears to be reflexive, and therein lies the key to its 
effectiveness with respect to the rhetoric of racism. 
7.5 SummarY 
In summary, the talk of Liberals was constructed primarily 
in terms of the discourse of cognitivism although it 
incorporated the discourse of biologism and the discourse 
of constructivism, more typical of Nationalist and Left-
wing speakers respectively. This variability is what 
characterises Liberal talk and sets it apart from that of 
the other two political groupings interviewed in this 
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study. Liberal discourse is fundamentally dilemmatic, and 
as such is difficult to analyse neatly. 
Essentially, the flexible use Liberals make of the 
discourses of biologism, cognitivism and constructivism 
enable them to negotiate the discursive nightmare of 'race' 
talk. Thus when wishing to argue for the 'reality' of 
difference, they draw upon the ideas of a differentialist 
racism and upon the ideas behind the work of Social 
Cognition and Social Identity Theorists. However, when 
wishing to distinguish themselves from the practice of 
others Liberals invoke social constructionist arguments. 
Despite the intense variability of talk, the fundamental 
rhetorical objective remains consistent: to disclaim a 
racist identity. This aim is realised in part via the 
strategies of denial and admission and via the apparently 
reflexive nature of the talk. Complex discursive web~ cire--' 
woven in which the speaker admits to racist practice and 
yet, does not; demonstrates reflexive and critical 
anaLytical ability and yet, does not. Indeed, as noted at 
the beginning of this chapter, the feeling of confusion and 
of fundamental contradiction is one shared by the speakers 
themselves: the majority apologised for the contradictions 
inherent in their accounts (however, unlike Left-wing 
speakers, they failed to 'analyse' the source of their 
confusion) . The power of these apologies is that they 
served to construct the source of the contradiction outside 
the speaker, and to present the speaker as a 'nice' person 
- if you apologise nicely enough, you can get away with 
anything. For example, Wendy ended her interview by 
saying: 
I'm sorry about all the contradictions, I feel like I 
don't know where my head (.) or heart (laughter) is 
at! 
Liberals may be the 'gentle people of prejudice' (Carnpbell, 
1971; Williams, 1964; in McConahay & Hough, 1976), but they 
remain prejudiced. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
LEFT-WING TALK: 'IT'S COME FROM OUT THERE' 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have examined the talk of 
participants defined as Nationalist and Liberal by virtue 
of their expressed party preference. This final analytic 
chapter examines the talk of participants whom I have 
defined as Left-wing. Members of this group were 
supporters of the African National Congress and declared 
that they would vote for the ANC in an election. The talk 
of Left-wing participants again differed from the talk of 
members of the other two groups in terms of the content of 
the discourse, and the rhetorical strategies used to 
construct accounts. 
The talk of interviewees who defined themselves as Left-
wing was dominated by the discourse of constructivism 
outlined earlier (refer chapter 5, section 5.2.3). The 
content of talk for this group was significantly different 
to that of the Liberals and Nationalists in that it argued 
consistently against any biological factor in 'race': 
nei ther inherent biological differences nor biological 
mechanisms of social cognition were espoused. However, the 
function of 'doing talk' served similar ends: as with the 
Liberals and Nationalists, academic theories (explicitly or 
implicitly) were used to bolster arguments which attempted 
to construct the speaker as anti-racist/non-racist or, at 
the very least, as a 'good' racist. This section examines 
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how Left-wing participants discursively achieved this 
objective. 
8.2 The discQUrse of constructivism: 'race is a social 
construction' 
The accounts of Left-wing interviewees were dominated by 
the disCourse of constructivism which argued against any 
biological factor in 'race' and, significantly, did not 
invoke the kind of 'cultural' explanations that Wetherell 
and Potter (1992) encountered in their data and that 
Balibar (1991a) refers to as 'neo-racism'. Not 
surprisingly, these accounts were punctuated with the terms 
one has come to associate with Left-wing discourse -notions 
of patriarchy, capitalism, oppression,. exploitation,· 
redistribution of resources, nationalisation and the like 
featured prominently. By contrast, they were conspicuously 
absent in the discourse of Liberals and Nationalists, 
despite equal exposure to these academic ideas. 
While in theory the idea of 'race' as a social construct 
was appealing to those on the left, the daily reality of 
'differences' between 'black' and 'white' people in South 
Africa seemed to make this argument difficult to sustain in 
practice. This was primarily due to the association of 
'race' as construct with the idea that there were no 
differences between people of different 'races'. To argue 
for a position of no difference in the present South 
African context would be to deny decades of oppressive 
'white' minority rule and would not be consonant with a 
Left-wing position. 
Left-wing interviewees repeatedly reflected on the 
contradiction between ignoring 'race' (because it is a mere 
construct) and recognising the differential experiences of 
people of different 'races' (because of a history of 
oppression or privilege). This occurred at various stages 
in the interview and was not precipitated by a specific 
question. The following two extracts, taken from the 
interview transcripts of Gill and Ruth respectively, 
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provide some examples of the dilemmatic nature of this 
talk: 
Gill: It was after Max' s inaugural thing and after 
looking at his breakdowns and I said but why can't 
we have no breakdowns in Psychology research and 
she said that you have to acknowledge the 
differences. And I don't know but I still have a 
problem with that kind of thing because if we keep 
on breaking people up then how are we ever going to 
(.) I don't know (.) maybe I'm just trying to 
smooth over differences when I shouldn't but I 
don't see how we can stop thinking about race if it 
keeps coming up in research. . 
Ruth: That's the eternal contradiction (.) I know that I 
started out this interview speaking about the fact 
that to me I have a problem with 'differences' 
[hands marking inverted commas] and I suppose (.) I 
mean I recognise (.) I mean maybe it is stupid to 
use the word experiences. I mean one could say that 
experiences is a euphemism for race but I think 
that (.) I don't think they are inherent. They are 
certainly not inherent differences, they are 
experiences that certain people have because of 
socio-political forces. 
These extracts present arguments that occurred repeatedly _\ 
c.// ..fPf!!a.<~",,f' .... :...... '#"~<f-~ pf'f!q' .?.4f!"'" a~ /~QSC- t:,Y"7CV 
within the discourse of Left-wing interviewee~ The nature 
of 'race' constitutes an "ideological dilemma" (Billig et 
aI, 1988): the 'theory' of no differences, of 'race' as a 
social construct conflicted with the 'practice' of real and 
obvious differences between people of different 'races' in 
South Africa. In this sense, the discourse of Left-wing 
interviewees represents a powerful demonstration of the 
dilemmatic aspects of thinking and arguing (Bil1ig, 1987; 
Billig et aI, 1988). 
In both of the above extracts the speaker has pitched her 
argument at an abstract level; that is, they are reflecting 
upon the implications of acknowledging or ignoring racial 
differences which have resulted from decades of 
differential access to political, economic and social 
power. Gill is speaking about an exchange she had with a 
'black' fellow student regarding the inaugural address of a 
Professor in the Department of Psychology. Earlier in the 
interview, Gill spoke about South Africans being 
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"positioned within a discourse of racism" and here she 
continues this line of argument by questioning how the 
concept of 'race' can ever be challenged, if it continues 
to find expression in research - particularly critical 
research as in the case to which she was referring. 
This dilemma 
highlights 
is echoed in the following extract where Ruth 
what she refers to as the "eternal 
contradiction". On the one hand, the desire to move away 
from racial categorisation and all that goes with it, and 
on the other hand the impossibility of ignoring the 
different experiences of 'black' and 'white' South 
Africans. As another of the Left-wing interviewees noted: 
"You can't speak of South Africa and not speak about 
apartheid and racial issues. 
South Africa". 
They are synonymous with 
By couching the dilemma in abstract terms, both Gill and 
Ruth are able to distance themselves from a potentially 
contentious issue and maintain a position of relative 
neutrality. In other words, they have constructed a 
'political' argument regarding the manner in which racism 
is overcome and have established themselves as 
'deliberator', reflecting on the issues at stake. However, 
this dilemma of 'no difference versus difference' found 
expression not only at the level of the political but also 
at the level of the individual. Indeed, Left-wing 
interviewees argued that the political must translate into 
the personal. The following two extracts are exemplary. 
They constitute responses to a question concerning the 
effect 'race' has upon their thoughts and judgements of 
people who are not regarded as 'white': 
Wendy: OK I mean I know for myself a lot of the time I 
actually (.) it's almost (.) it is a contradiction 
in a way because it's almost like I try to make an 
effort for it not really to matter but even making 
that effort it does ma (.) it obviously does matter 
because if it didn't you wouldn't have to make that 
effort. 
Barn: I'm aware of my history, I'm aware that in me there 
are racist tendencies (.) now there is a 
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contradiction because I try not to be that but I'm 
aware ja that there are (.) they are there. 
In these extracts the speakers express a desire for the 
category of 'race' not "to matter" to them. However, they 
acknowledge that "it obviously does matter" and that racist 
tendencies "are there". Wendy, in an attempt to appear not 
to be contradicting herself, describes the dilemma as "it's 
almost (.) it is a contradiction in a way". She hesitates 
in formulating this statement, possibly because she is 
thinking about how to best formulate her position without 
appearing to contradict herself. 
Sam admits that he experiences a contradiction within 
himself but has constructed his racism as 'racist 
tendencies'; this softens the negative association in that 
to 'be racist' implies that it informs the whole person, 
while having certain tendencies implies that they are not a 
dominant characteristic of that person's being. This seems 
to parallel the political arguments cited above. Those on 
the left assert that there are no real differences between 
'black' and 'white' people hence they do not wish to think 
in racial terms, yet there are differences between 'black' 
and 'white' South Africans and they do think in racial 
terms. 
Thus far we have examined the di1ernrnatic nature of 
arguments constructed by Left-wing interviewees with 
respect to issues of 'race' and racism. The fundamental 
dilemma pertains to a tension between 'the constructed' and 
'the real'. Left-wing interviewees attempt to negotiate 
this dilemma via the discourse of constructivism, thereby 
attempting to identify themselves as non-racist or anti-
racist. It is to the way in which social constructionist 
type theory is used, and the functions it fulfils, that our 
discussion now turns. 
Earlier (refer chapter 5, section 5.2.1) I referred to the 
work of Etienne Ba1ibar (1991a: 18) and his notion that 
"there is in fact no racism without theory (or theories)". 
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Indeed, I hope to demonstrate that the relationship between 
theory and practice is not a straightforward one, quite the 
reverse. For it how that theory is used and to what ends, 
that is significant. As we shall see those theories which 
would claim to be progressive, even critical, may form the 
basis of arguments which excuse racist practice. For Left-
wing interviewees, constructionist approaches to knowledge 
offered two lines of argument which together enabled the 
speaker to escape taking responsibility for their racism. 
First, as we have seen, Left-wing interviewees borrow from 
constructibnist approaches the idea that there is no such 
thing as race, a commonplace within 'white' South African 
Left-wing ideology. Following a constructionist line of 
argument, those on the left unanimously and consistently 
argued that 'race' is a social construct with a particular 
socio-political history; that is, there are no differences 
between 'black' and 'white' people. Accounts of race as 
construction, rather than reality, function to achieve a 
position of non-racialism for the speaker: if one does not 
believe in 'races', one cannot be a racist. 
The second element in Left-wing talk, borrowed broadly from 
the ideas of cultural theory, is the idea of 'discourses' -
in particular, the idea that people are positioned by 
discourses. There was much talk of the "discourse of 
racism" in terms of which 'white~' South Africans were 
(' .l'S % a/ c~~?r""? .rt?~"?tf/O'1f!cZ l!#J/S 
powerfully positionex; although the e were some references 
to the university and organisations involved in the 
National Liberation Struggle which provided new (nqn-
(I$<:>/: ,..~r~ d~ 6/7~ 
racist/anti-racist) "discourses to plug intoX Indeed, 
Gill commented (unaware if the irony of her statement) in a 
detailed discussion with the interviewer on this point: "it 
['race'] is a social construction but I don't know if it's 
a social construction because that's what I've been told at 
university" . 
The force of the first of these two lines of argument (that 
'race' is a social construct) is that it locates racism 
'out there'. It is not something inherent, it is not a 
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category humans beings need biologically in order to 
comprehend their world, it is something other people 
construct "for political gain" (Luke). Ruth describes the 
position exactly: 
Ruth: I think it is 
from ou t there. 
I'm born wi th. 
largely or almost definitely come 
I don't think it is something that 
The second line of argument flows directly from the first. 
People are positioned in terms of these powerful discourses 
which other people have constructed. Political ideologies, 
such as racism, have grasped passive human subjects who do 
not have any hope of resisting. Wendy, for example, 
describes the influence of racial ideology as follows: 
Wendy: very strong (.) I mean I think that it has 
been so inculcated in our system that I think 
people automatically judge or their attitudes are a 
little bit different and it takes a lot more effort 
to actually begin to see through the label and the 
colour and everything. I think it's sort of 
instilled into us. 
Wendy uses the terms "inculcated" and "instilled" to 
explain a process which could 
but which blurs into talk of 
interviewees. Others in 
be described as socialisation 
discourses for all Left-wing 
this group used the words 
"injected" and "inserted". Each of these terms very 
clearly portrays individuals as devoid of human agency, as 
the receptors of a racial ideology which is variously 
drummed into or placed within them. 
For those who describe themselves as Left-wing, 
constructivist and post-structuralist ideas serve to 
establish as fact that 'race' is a social construct, that 
the ideology of racism is located 'out there' (and not 
within the individual), and that individuals are firmly 
positioned in terms of a discourse of racism. The function 
of this discourse is to remove any personal sense of 
responsibility for racism from the speaker. Thus, although 
the discourse of constructivism provides an antithetical 
set of arguments to those of the discourses of biologism 
and cognitivism which dominated the talk of the 
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Nationalists and Liberals respectively, they function to 
the same effect: to locate racism in such a way that it 
defends the speaker against criticism on racial grounds in 
that their arguments establish scientific evidence which 
'proves' that they are neither irrational nor unreasonable. 
This last point is sealed by the repeated accounts that 
Left-wing interviewees gave of their attempts to 'fight' 
racism within themselves. In the extracts of Gill, Wendy 
(extract 1) and Sam cited above, they describe how they 
"try" not to see 'race' and not to be racist, while in both 
of Wendy's extracts she addresses the need to make a 
concerted "effort" to "see through the colour and the label 
and everything". This phrase is constructed as a three-
part list (Jefferson, 1990) which serves to emphasise the 
enormity of the task at hand; that is, that overcoming 
'race' is not easy or straightforward. Furthermore, the 
term 'and everything', is an example of what Pomerantz 
(1986) has called an extreme case formulation. This 
rhetorical device maximises the evaluative dimension 
referred to; for example, if a youngster is accused of 
smoking, they may retort that 'everybody' at school smokes. 
Wooffitt (1992: 81) has noted that extreme case 
formulations are used when speakers "suspect that their 
accounts will receive an unsympathetic hearing". In 
Wendy's case, her arguments may be levelled at the 
potential criticism that she is racist and has not tried 
hard enough to be non-racist. 
In summary, Left-wing interviewees used psychological 
theory to achieve two rhetorical aims: first, to establish 
as fact the 'out-thereness' of racism, and second to claim 
that they were passive human subjects positioned by a 
powerful discourse of racial ideology. In mitigation of 
the latter argument, they asserted that they were engaged 
in a constant battle to overcome their own racism. These 
theories claimed for the speakers a position of 'good 
racist' - while admitting to being racist, they were 
constructing arguments in terms of which they could not be 
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held accountable for their racism. It is to the rhetorical 
strategy of 'admission' that our discussion now turns. 
8.3 The Rhetorical Strategy of A4mission: 'Of course I'm 
racist' 
The majority of studies examining racial discourse have 
highlighted the phenomenon of denial. Indeed, Teun van 
Dijk (1992: 87) in a paper entitled 'Discourse and the 
denial of racism' has highlighted "the prominent role of 
the denial of racism, especially among the elites, in much 
contemporary text and talk about ethnic relations". By 
contrast, denials of racism were not a significant feature 
in the accounts of Left-wing interviewees in this study. 
Instead the material seemed to be permeated by the very 
reverse: admissions of racism. 
'Admissions of racism' refers to instances of discourse in 
which the speaker declares that s/he is racist. In 
contrast to the classic 'I'm not racist, but 
formulation, admissions take the form 'I am racist, but 
... ', although the disclaimer may not be so clearly linked 
to the admission. The following extract exemplifies this 
form of talk. Luke, the speaker, is discussing with the 
interviewer the nature of racism; specifically whether 
racism is something one either is, or is not, or whether 
there is a continuum along which everyone could be placed: 
Luke: Racism isn't something that you are or not (.) and 
I mean there's a lot of people I mean I (.) for 
myself there's times when I've like, for example, 
like I said earlier like seen somebody and rather 
thought of them as a potential criminal because 
they're black rather than thinking that of a 
'white' person and in a sense that is racism and 
you know I think it~. I am racist. So I think it 
is very subtle and I think probably all of us are 
guilty of that (mm). But I think given the 
circumstances in this country it's difficult for 
those sort of things not to be around for us to 
sort of tap into For example, when you're 
watching TV, the only news bulletin is the SABC's 
official government view. So definitely it is 
graded but I think sort of on more extreme levels 
when people start consciously identifying with a 
certain race group and buying into all the other 
ideologies (.) starting to talk about themselves as 
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white people. I mean ordinarily I don't think of 
myself as a white person at all. 
This extract begins with Luke asserting that racism is not 
something that "you are, or not", because "a lot of 
people", including himself, have thoughts which "in a 
sense" are racist. Luke then reformulates this utterance in 
stronger terms "you know I think it is [racistl", followed 
by "I am racist". Wooffitt (1992) notes how repair work 
demonstrates that speakers may analyse their own prior talk 
and reformulate it in accordance with the concerns they 
have regarding the construction of their accounts. Here, 
Luke provides a personal example of racist thoughts and 
describes this as racism "in a sense". By repairing this 
statement, Luke defends himself against the criticism that 
his thoughts are racist and that the phrase "in a sense" is 
an attempt to deny the seriousness of his practice. This 
piece of text reveals that there is no admission without 
denial and vice-versa or in Billig's (1987: 46) terms how 
,,' logoi' are always haunted, if not by the actuality of 
'anti-logoi', at least by their possibility". 
Having admitted that he is racist, Luke sets about 
justifying this position in three ways. First, he uses the 
rhetorical device of extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 
1986): "all of us are guilty" (my emphasis). If all of us 
are guilty of racism, Luke cannot be accused of racist 
practice by the interviewer who is also a young 'white' 
South African, for she too is guilty. Moreover if everyone 
is guilty, the crime is lessened and Luke's racism cannot 
be ascribed to irrational feelings. This rhetorical 
manoeuvre was used by all Left-wing interviewees. 
Second, Luke draws upon the idea that racial ideology 
"seeps into" (his earlier words) people without their being 
aware of it. Cleverly, he uses the example of South 
Africa's state-controlled media to back up his claims, an 
idea which hints at brain-washing. People who have been 
'brain-washed' are not truly responsible for their actions 
as they are seen to have been unaware of what was happening 
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to them. In essence, they had no choice and therefore 
cannot be held accountable. All of the Left-wing 
interviewees described becoming "aware" of being racist in 
tones which suggested an unwanted 'thing' lurking within 
them like a cancer waiting to be discovered. As Ruth said 
: "It's something I've become aware of, you know (.) much 
to my own dismay". This relates to the function of 
psychological theory discussed above in which interviewees 
described the powerful effects of socialisation and ideas 
of being positioned by discourses. 
Finally, Luke redefines racism. Although continuing to 
argue for a graded position (thereby maintaining the stance 
that everyone is racist) he distinguishes between those who 
are extreme and those who are not. In other words, between 
those who choose to be racist (the bad racists) versus 
those who have had racism foisted upon them (the good 
racists). The bad racists identify themselves in terms of 
'race' and "buy into" racial ideology. Luke, by contrast, 
does not think of himself "as a white person at all" and 
needless to say does not "buy into" racist ideology. Again 
the rhetorical device of extreme case formulation ("at 
all") is used to emphasise the point. 
In summary, it is misguided to classify racial discourse 
in terms of 'denial' or 'admission' for within one are the 
seeds of the other. Thus although Left-w~ng inte~·ewees 
~Q// .leA' -4)ln, ~e~c~ CO~cq"-?~a Pt::T,.,.,,,jJ,,,:u,?.S' ~ rt:re".sn-;;. 
admitted to being racis~and did not exhibit the assic 
form of denial reported elsewhere (eg. Billig, 1991; Van 
Dijk, 1987, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), their talk was 
constructed to ward off criticisms of racism and to 
construct themselves as deserving of the title 'non-racist' 
by dint of their self-critical and reflexive abilities. In 
other words, it is not the admission itself that is of 
consequence, but the rhetorical function of the admission 
that is important. 
Liberals, for example, used admissions to 'clear their 
name' of racism but made very little attempt beyond that to 
account for how they were trying to address their own 
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racist practice. Left-wing speakers, on the other hand, 
also employed the rhetorical strategy of admission but 
coupled it with detailed accounts of how they had tried to 
get to grips with their own racist beliefs. For example, 
in the next extract Sam admits to being racist but explains 
that he feel such a title is unfair in the context of his 
efforts both personally and politically to fight racist 
practice. 
Sam: It's actually just (.) ja as a category I think I 
am still racist though I don't judge myself for 
being that. I understand how (.) I give myself the 
same leeway I give somebody else. Okay I 
understand why we came to this point and because 
I'm fighting against it in myself and in my 
community I feel that I deserve the title 'not 
racist' although I know that I am on a clinical 
level racist. 
Before turning to examine the role of reflexivity in the 
discourse of Left-wing interviewees, I wish to consider 
one last possibility with respect to the way in which 
'admissions of racism' function to stave off criticism on 
racial grounds. In my interviews with 'black' South 
Africans (which unfortunately had to be omitted from the 
thesis due to the large corpus of material) discussions 
concerning the nature of 'race' were often long and 
challenging. However, when I admitted to being racist 
because of occasional thoughts or overcompensatory 
behaviour, interviewees responded along the lines of Themba 
(an active ANC member): 
Themba: No, I disagree. I would not consider you racist 
because you are aware of those things and are 
actively engaged in a personal struggle with them, 
as well as being involved in the struggle for 
democracy and non-racialism. 
I am not suggesting that my sample of ten is representative 
of the views of all 'black' South Africans, but there is a 
sense in which admitting to something bad in our society 
leads to a more sympathetic response. The maxim 'knowing 
what the problem is, is half the solution' embodies that 
sentiment. Therefore if one can admit to being racist, not 
only is one demonstrating that one is on the road to 
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recovery but, people will respect you for that. Finally, 
the clear parallels between the arguments advanced by Sam 
in mitigation of his stance and those put forward by Themba 
on behalf of mine demonstrates that speakers are aware of 
the power of this 'common-place', in Billig's (1987) terms, 
to accomplish the last word. 
8.4 The Role of Reflexivity: 'race in inverted commas' 
Reflexivity 
(Garfinkel & 
is a central characteristic of language 
Sacks, 1970 in Wooffitt, 1992). Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) refer to two meanings of 'reflexivity' 
which are significant in discourse analysis. The first 
defines reflexivity as "the fact that talk has the property 
of being both about actions, events and situations, and at 
the same time part of those things" (p. 182; original 
emphasis) . The second refers to the idea that the 
arguments of discourse analysts regarding the constructive 
nature of language equally applies to their own texts. For 
our analytic purposes it is useful to distinguish a third 
meaning since it is not only discourse analysts who 
reflexively consider their own talk or writing. This third 
meaning refers to the notion that lay-people may 
demonstrate an understanding of the constructive nature of 
language by deconstructing the talk of others and 
themselves. It is to this aspect of Left-wing talk that we 
now turn. 
Commentary upon the reflexive character of language was 
confined to interviewees on the left in this study, not 
being a feature of the accounts of interviewees who defined 
themselves as Nationalist or Liberal. This is not entirely 
unexpected since the type of arguments articulated by 
Nationalists and Liberals were grounded in a realist model 
of the operation of discourse, while those of people on the 
left were informed by constructionist approaches to 
knowledge. However, as discourse analysts we need to 
examine the rhetorical objectives of the strategy of 
reflexivity in the talk of those on the left, as well as to 
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consider the function of its absence in the accounts of 
Nationalists and Liberals. 
Left-wing interviewees spent a considerable amount of time 
deconstructing the talk of others. Earlier (refer section 
8.2, extract 1) we encountered Gill, who criticised 
researchers and lay-people alike for their continued use of 
racial categories because it perpetuated their existence. 
Luke spoke about encountering people who make 'they or 
them-type' comments for example "it's them again" and "they 
are doing this" and "look at them rioting in the township" 
(speaker's emphasis). By couching his examples within the 
frame of reported speech, Luke is able to capture the 
essence of the talk that he is criticising, as well as 
clearly disassociate himself from that. 
Natalie, who attended an Afrikaans dominated school because 
it was the only one available in the rural area in which 
she lived, described how her Afrikaans history teacher 
"used to say 'I'm not being propagandist and I'm not 
talking politics'" but actively encouraged support for 
"spotting the communists who were infiltrating the area 
giving a written guideline - obviously they had to be black 
(.) and suspicious-looking and if we ever saw anyone like 
this we were to immediately report them to our headboy 
(laughter) " . 
Like Luke, Natalie is deconstructing the talk of others. 
While he focused attention upon the content of racist 
language ('them'), Natalie is unpicking the ideological 
significance of the classic disclaimer 'I'm not prejudiced 
but She constructs a vivid narrative using the 
rhetorical strategies of 'footing' (Goffman, 1981), to 
directly report her history teacher's words, and extreme 
case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) to maximise the 
effectiveness of her account. With respect to the latter 
strategy, Natalie' s use of 'spotting the communists', 
'obviously', 'if we ever saw' (speaker's emphasis) and 
'immediately' comprise examples. The laughter at the end 
of this tale was spontaneously produced by Natalie and then 
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the interviewer in response to her graphic tale about the 
ludicrous action of her teacher and the appropriateness of 
the description in both our experiences. 
In each of these cases, the speaker describes the talk or 
practice of others as racist and warrants this claim by 
producing a sophisticated analysis of the practice cited. 
This form of talk was typical of Left-wing interviewees -
they did not rely upon mere description, but were at pains 
to demonstrate their critical and reflexive abilities. 
Moreover, it achieved for the speaker at leas t two 
objectives. First, it served to construct both the speaker 
and the hearer as non-racist, even anti-racist. Indeed, 
quite often in my interviews with Left-wing participants I 
felt as if they were wanting me to collude with them in 
maligning what one participant termed 'the enemy'. 
Second, the rhetorical strategy of 
construct the speaker as left-wing. 
reflexivity served to 
Critical thought and 
acute analysis of the status quo represent characteristics 
'expected' within left-wing circles. The rhetorical 
strategy of reflexivity serves to affirm claims to non-
racism, even anti-racism, since the speaker demonstrates 
their ability to 'see through' racist practice. However, in 
order to avoid the potential criticism of denying one's own 
racism, the speaker needs to focus the lens of reflexivity 
upon him or herself as well. 
The following extract displays the self-reterential quality d«Y~ 
(a.// ~e/t.-IfJ;':'l /~t!e/'YI"e4/ee.s rif/~cCe.d' CQ."-' Z' 
of talk which is characteristic of peop'1.e on the left!. It 0/'0" ~<'~) ~ "w.n /,~c.~ 
forms part of an account given by Gill at the very end of 
the interview in response to a question which asked whether 
there was anything she felt she still wanted to talk about: 
Gill: I feel that there are such diverse issues that I 
almost feel that there is no definite answer for 
anything (.) that there are so many contradictions 
and there are so many things tha t I'm no t sure 
about. You know I'm not sure about why I think the 
way I do and I think sometimes like especially with 
this idea of race it almost seems silly for me to 
say that there is no race because this concept gets 
replaced with something else. I almost feel 
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hypocritical to talk about say culture if I'm not 
talking about race because I almost seem to be 
paying lip-service to the whole thing and I feel 
that I have been socially constructed into not 
using the word race so I don't feel (.) I don't 
know how it ties up with my real feelings 
The most striking feature of Gill's account is its 
dilemmatic quality, it demonstrates clearly what Billig et 
al {l988} meant by a 'dialectic of prejudice'. Gill 
produces a vivid account of the contradictory issues 
surrounding the concept of 'race': on the one hand, Gill 
wishes to argue that there is no such thing as 'race'; yet 
on the other hand, she is aware that while she may not be 
talking about 'race' per se, she is still talking about a 
'difference' by using other terms such as culture. 
It could be argued that Gill offered this account at the 
end of the interview in an attempt to explain what she 
described as "my distinct lack of clarity". Possibly Gill 
felt it necessary to clarify why she was expressing 
inconsistent views because in South Africa it would be 
expected that people on the left would hold clear and 
strong views about issues such as racism; quite simply, 
they should be opposed to it. For this reason Gill needs 
to locate the confusion within South African society, and 
not within herself. She accomplishes this by externalising 
the contradictions and constructing them as 'facts'. For 
example, at the beginning of the extract, Gill uses the 
rhetorical strategy of a list: "there are such diverse 
issues", "there is no definite answer", "there are so many 
contradictions", "there are so many things that I'm not 
sure about". The repetition of 'there are/is', in 
particular, serves to create the issues as 'things' 
existing 'out there' . 
Thus, Gill constructs her contradictory views as a 
consequence of the external 'reality' of South Africa,and 
not of her own personal inadequacies and inabilities. She 
claims, for example, "I feel that I have been socially 
constructed into not using the word race", and "I don't 
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know how it ties up wi th my real feelings". These 
statements construct Gill as passive and not responsible 
for the contradictions and inconsistencies she has 
expressed. 
herself as 
By externalising the problem, Gill constructs 
an individual confronted with a contradictory 
and confusing reality within which she must formulate an 
opinion. Hence, she is "not sure of why I think the way I 
do" but this is not because she is a indecisive or 
incompetent individual, but because she lives in a society 
characterised by ideological dilemmas. 
Gill's account demonstrates how constructionist arguments 
may be mobilised to excuse the residues of racism Left-wing 
speakers 'find' in themselves, and explain away 
inconsistency in their accounts. At various points in 
their interviews Left-wing participants made similar 
comments. For example: 
Gail: You see its difficult to escape. You're positioned 
in a racial discourse and at the same time you're 
not supposed to talk about 'race'! 
Trevor: I try to avoid using racial terminology at all cost 
as I've explained (.) but (mm) sometimes it slips 
out and I think 'Oh shit' (.) no matter how hard I 
try. I suppose its because we're positioned by 
competing ideologies, to get fancy. 
In this way Left-wing speakers manage to achieve a position 
in which all flanks are covered: any traces of racism are 
acknowledged but are no fault of their own since they are 
positioned by powerful racial discourses. Furthermore, 
using other terms to refer to 'race' is not an unthinking 
use of euphemism but is the result of the impact of new and 
competing discourses (or ideologies in Trevor's words) of 
non-racism/ anti-racism. So dominant are these discourses, 
Gill argues, that she has lost touch with her "real 
feelings". In other words, she is a hapless victim caught 
in a web of discourses which inform who and what she is and 
how she feels. Her 'real' self cannot be held responsible 
or accountable for her practice, since her discursive self 
has taken over. In this way, reflexivity is seen to be 
far more than a characteristic of language, it is a major 
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device which can be used flexibly to achieve a variety of 
rhetorical objectives. 
8.5 Summary 
In summary, the discourse of Left-wing interviewees 
differed in content and form from that of the Liberals and 
Nationalists. With respect to content it was informed 
almost exclusively by what I have termed 'the discourse of 
constructivism' . However, this does not mean that the 
nature of the talk was consistent and undilemmatic. 
Tensions relating to what is 'real' and what is 
'constructed' permeated the fabric of every account and 
served to secure for the speaker the position of 'concerned 
and thoughtful individual'. Furthermore, the ideas of 
constructionist approaches to knowledge provided the 
speaker with powerful arguments which located the source of 
racism 'out there' and excused him/her from taking personal 
responsibility for the racism to which they admitted. 
'Admissions of racism' played a significant role in the 
talk of this group of interviewees acting to construct for 
the speaker the identity of 'good' racist. This strategy 
was closely associated with talk which was explicitly 
reflexive in nature; reflexive thought functioned to 
deconstruct the racism implicit in the practice of others 
and the speakers themselves. Such analyses of racist 
practice coupled with the repeated descriptions of how the 
speaker was endeavouring to purge themselves of the racism 
with which they had been afflicted 'proved' that s/he was 
deserving of the title anti-racist or at the very least 
'non-racist' . 
In conclusion, the previous four chapters have presented an 
analysis of the discourse of twenty-five young, 'white', 
South Africans. Most significantly, despite the fact that 
participants in this study were ostensibly very similar 
(young, 'white', middle-class, university students reading 
psychology), their discourse was highly variable and did 
not present as a coherent whole. Instead the central 
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pattern identified in the analytic material related to the 
declared political affiliation of the speaker. Differences 
in the content and form of accounts were observed between 
speakers who defined themselves as Nationalist, Liberal or 
Leftwing, while the accounts of speakers within each of 
these three groupings shared common features. 
Although it is difficult to summarise the central findings 
of a discourse analytic study in the sense that so much of 
the important detail is omitted, it is important to do so 
in the interests of clarity. The findings of this study 
may be summarised in four points. 
1. Talk about issues of 'race' and racism was characterised 
( ~ 
by a high degree of' variability) Racism represented an 
'ideological dilemma' and racist views were contradictory 
and inconsistent. 
2. Three broad discourses were identified which accounted 
for the variation in talk between participants who 
categorised themselves as Nationalist, Liberal or Left-
wing. These were labelled the 'discourse of biologism', 
the 'discourse of cogni tivism', and the 'discourse of 
constructivism' . The talk of Nationalists was constructed 
in terms of the discourses of biologism and cognitivism, 
the talk of Left-wing participants was constructed almost 
exclusively in terms of the discourse of constructivism, 
and the talk of Liberals represented an eclectic mix but 
was cons~tructed principally in terms of the discourse of 
cognitivism. 
3. These discourses were expressed and articulated through 
many different linguistic devices and rhetorical strategies 
(such as three-part lists, extreme case formulations, and 
footing) however, two rhetorical strategies were 
particularly salient in functioning to construct the source 
of the speaker's racism as an external 'reality' and 
therefore to construct the speaker as undeserving of the 
title 'racist'. These were the rhetorical strategies of 
'admission of racism' and of 'doing reflexivity'. Just as 
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speakers of different political affiliation employed 
different discourses in the construction of accounts, they 
also employed the strategies of denial versus admission, 
and reflexive versus unreflexive commentary in different 
ways. Nationalist discourse incorporated denials of racism 
and was characteristically unreflexive in nature. As such 
it most closely approximated the racial discourse of 
'white' people reported in other studies (eg. van. Dijk, 
1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Left wing talk employed 
admissions of racism and was explicitly reflexive in 
respect of others and of self; while the discourse of 
Liberal participants embraced both admissions and denials 
of racism, and reflexive as well as unreflexive commentary. 
4. Overall, the discourse associated with each of the three 
political groupings was distinct in terms of the discourses 
and rhetorical strategies used to construct the account. 
However, all accounts shared a common function: to disclaim 
a racist identity -albeit that they attempted to achieve 
this objective in very different ways. 
In several ways the findings of this study do not accord 
with the findings of other discourse analytic studies of 
racism, and it is this topic that forms the basis for 
discussion in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
DISCUSSION 
The previous four chapters have presented an analysis of 
the discourse of twenty-five young 'white' South Africans. 
This final chapter has two main objectives. The first of 
these is to highlight the main features of contemporary 
discourse studies on 'race' and racism, and to review the 
findings of this study in the light of this research. The 
second objective is to raise and discuss a couple of 
theoretical issues which have tended to recur in the 
writing of this thesis, and which have implications for 
discourse analysis as a theoretical and methodological 
framework. 
9.1 Discourse and the Nature of Racism 
9.1.1 Contemporary findings: a brief review 
The 'language of racism' (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) has 
proved to be a popular topic among discourse analysts. 
Studies have examined the talk of people ranging across 
different nationalities and different class backgrounds 
(Bi11ig, 1991). The findings of this small, but solid, 
body of research have consistently provided evidence for 
three trends in contemporary racial discourse. These are: 
that talk about 'race' is highly variable and dilemmatic, 
that modern discourse has become 'deracia1ised' (Reeves, 
1983), and that discourse is characterised by denials of 
racism. Although these trends have been discussed 
elsewhere (refer chapters 6, 7 and 8), it may be useful to 
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reiterate the central thrust of these findings in view of 
the findings of this study. 
Traditionally, social psychology has viewed racism as a 
type of 'attitude'; that is, a fixed and consistent 
response which situates an 'object of thought' on a 
'dimension of judgement' (McGuire, 1985: 239). Discursiv~ 
or rhetorical psychology (cf. Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Billig, 1991), by contrast, has 
demonstrated that peoples' opinions are variable and 
characterised by dilemma and contradiction. Moreover, this 
is the case even if the speaker holds 'strong views' about 
the topic of conversation (Cochrane & Billig, 1984; Billig, 
1989, 1991). 'Views', therefore, are not fixed, even when 
strong, but vary as a consequence of the action-orientation 
of talk (which functions to achieve particular consequences 
through a variety of constructions) and the dilemmatic 
nature of common sense. 
The second finding in contemporary racial discourse is that 
it has become 'deracialised' (Reeves, 1983). More 
recently, Etienne Balibar has described this discursive 
phenomenon as "racism without races" (1991a: 21) or "neo-
racism" (1991a: 17). The notion that people elect to speak 
about racial issues without reference to racial terminology 
accords with North American research on 'modern' or 
'symbolic' racism which stresses shifts in public 
'attitudes' toward minority groups, from overt and direct 
expression to more covert and subtle forms (cf. Kinder & 
Sears, 1981; McHonahay & Hough, 1976) although 
researchers in this area continue to conceptualise these 
shifts in terms of relatively stable and consistent 
'attitudes' . 
The 'deracialisation' of modern discourse has been 
attributed to a 'general cultural norm' against expressing 
prejudiced views (Billig, 1991) which are widely associated 
with notions of irrationality and unreasonableness (Billig 
et aI, 1988). Modern-day speakers, wishing to avoid being 
tarnished by the label 'racist', avoid racial nomenclature. 
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However, this does not mean that racism is a thing of the 
past, as speakers continue to espouse racist ideas through 
the use of alternative nomenclature instead. 
The 'new' language of racism employs the concepts of 
'culture' or 'nation' (cf. Balibar, 1991a, 1991b; Barker, 
1981; Donald & Rattansi, 1992; Wallerstein, 1991) to argue 
for enduring differences between groups of people. These 
ostensibly more neutral terms provide the speaker with a 
reasonable and socially acceptable way. of expressing 
prejudiced views and have been a noted feature of racial 
discourse in Britain (Reeves, 1983; Cochrane & Billig, 
1984), France (Balibar, 1991a, 1991b), the Netherlands 
(Essed, 1988, van Dijk, 1984, 1987, 1992), New Zealand 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992), and the United States of 
America (Goldberg, 1993). 
The third widely reported feature of modern racial 
discourse is the 'denial of racism' (cf. Cochrane & Billig, 
1984; Billig et aI, 1988; Billig, 1991; Essed, 1988; van 
Dijk, 1992, Wetherell & Potter, 1992) Denial is oriented 
to the rhetorical strategy of 'credentialling' (Hewitt & 
Stokes, 1975) in which the speaker wishes to disclaim a 
racist identity. Denials of racism work by ascribing the 
speaker's opinions to external 'facts', rather than 
irrational feelings. This is achieved by constructing a 
'real-seeming version' (Edwards & Potter, 1992) of the 
world which justifies and legitimates the speaker's 
evaluative comments (Potter & Wetherell, 1988). For this 
reason denial usually assumes the linguistic form: 'I'm not 
prejudiced, but ... ' where the speaker refutes a racist 
identity and ascribes their racist comments to external 
'truths' over which they have no power. The rhetorical 
strategy of denial has even been found in the talk of 
National Front supporters (Cochrane and Billig; 1984) 
suggesting that the cultural norm against prejudice is more 
widespread than may at first be supposed. 
In summary, the past fifteen years or so have witnessed 
something of a transformation in the expression of racist 
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sentiments. The moral rejection of racism as 'bad' has 
resulted in the development of new and covert means of 
expressing prejudice, means which avoid racial terminology 
and deny racist inferences. However, as mentioned above, 
it .would be wrong to assume that 'race' talk is uniformly 
subtle (as do 'modern' racist theorists) for racism 
constitutes an ideological dilemma (Billig et aI, 1988). 
To reiterate, racial discourse is not 'undilemmatically 
straightforwa~d' (Billig et aI, 1988). It is characterised 
by variability (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), a consequence of 
the speaker's need for rhetorical dexterity as s/he 
marshals logoi against anti-Iogoi in the complex context of 
racial argumentation (Billig, 1987). 
9,1.2 Discourse and Context: the present findings 
considered 
This study set out to investigate 'white' racism in South 
Africa using a discursive or rhetorical approach. The 
findings confirm that in some respects the racial discourse 
of 'white' people in South Africa is similar to that of 
'white' people elsewhere in the world. However, in other 
respects, the discourse of the present participants was 
different. While the racial discourse of young 'white' 
South Africans was highly variable, it was neither 
uniformly 
denials of 
'deracialised', nor characterised by clear 
racism. The discourse in this study presented 
an altogether more complex picture. 
Discourse analysts argue trat people use language to 
achieve particular objectives. For this reason, talk is 
variably constructed in order to fulfil specific functions 
(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & wetherell, 1987). 
Furthermore, rhetorical theorists claim that talk will vary 
because it is founded upon the contradictory themes of 
ideological common-sense (Billig et aI, 1988). As we have 
seen, studies of racial discourse have supported the notion 
that there is a "dialectic of prejudice" (Billig et aI, 
1988) . 
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In this study too, the discourse of young 'white' South 
Africans was characterised by(;ariability.' However, this 
analysis revealed two sources of variability. First, 
accounts varied in relation to the local argumentative 
context within which discourse was framed; and second, 
accounts varied in relation to the speaker's declared 
political affiliation. The first of these sources of 
variation is anticipated within a discursive approach, and 
confirms the findings of other analyses of racial 
discourse. Talk about race is not 'undilemmatically 
straightforward' (Billig et aI, 1988), but is pervaded by 
contradiction. In this study, this characteristic of 
racial discourse was something which speakers themselves 
reflexively commented upon. For example, Liberal 
participants in particular frequently apologised for their 
'failure' to present clear and uniform views (refer chapter 
7) • 
The second source of discursive variation observed in this 
study occurred in relation to the speaker's professed 
political position. Participants were asked at the end of 
each interview: "What political party or movement do you 
support, or most closely approximates your own views?" 
Quite fortuitously, this question 'divided' the 
participants into three groups of almost equal numbers: 
Nationalist, Liberal and Left-wing. As we have seen (refer 
chapters 6, 7 and 8), members of each of these groups 
constructed their talk about 'race' differently in terms of 
the discourses they drew upon and the rhetorical devices 
they employed. Indeed, it would seem with respect to this 
study that talk was variably constructed in relation to its 
political function, since participant's ways of talking 
about the world were related to their self-categorisation 
in terms of political group, and needed to be understood 
within that discursive framework. 
The relationship between socially shared 'common-places' 
and social groups is most directly addressed by Moscovici 
(1981, 1982, 1984) in his theory of social representations. 
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Moscovici argues that social representations are 
coterminous with social groups (cf Moscovici, 1981; 
Moscovici & Hewstone, 1982); in other words, that social 
groups are constituted by their shared social 
representations, and that social representations are 
consensually adopted by the group (cf. Moscovici, 1973, 
1981). This theory would appear to offer a parsimonious 
explanation for the findings of this study: Nationalist, 
Liberal or Left-wing speakers would be expected to hold 
different social representations since by definition, 
social representations provide the very fabric of social 
groups. 
However, Moscovici's theory has not escaped criticism -
generally, or in respect of the relationship between 
representations and social groups. The latter is 
particularly problematic, as Potter and Wetherell (1988: 
143) correctly point out, for: 
"there is no way of talking about the groups concerned 
independent of social representations, yet Moscovici 
wants to argue that group membership determines those 
social representations". 
The problem stems partly from an inherent contradiction in 
social representations theory. On the one hand, this 
theory stresses the constructed nature of social 'reality'; 
for example, Moscovici (1973: xiii) states that social 
representations "determine both the object and the related 
judgements" . However, on the other hand, it fails to 
theorise the socially constructed nature of categories or 
groups themselves (cf. Potter & Edwards, 1~92; Potter & 
Litton, 1985), viewing social groups as pre-defined and 
pre-existing realities instead. For example, Moscovici 
(1982: 135; my emphasis) states that social representations 
"can only be discovered by studying their relations w·ith 
social groups". 
A second problem associated with this relationship between 
groups and social representations is Moscovici's notion of 
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consensus (Potter & Litton, 1985). As we have seen, 
discourse is variable. Thus, while the talk of Nationalist 
and Left-wing speakers in this study could be said to be 
consensual in terms of the broad discourses (or social 
representations) used to construct accounts, the talk of 
Liberal speakers could not be described in the same way. 
As was evident in chapter 7, Liberal talk was extremely 
discordant, combining aspects of both Nationalist and Left-
wing talk. Moscovici's theory is unable to account for 
this discrepancy between social group and social 
representations. 
In short, while the theory of social representations may 
appear to explain the group-bounded nature of the findings 
of this study, it is unable to do so because the inherent 
vagueness of the theory blurs the notion that groups 
themselves as socially constructed. Moreover, social 
representations theory is unable to account for the high 
degree of linguistic diversity displayed within social 
groups. By contrast, discourse analysts view participants' 
categorical descriptions as a social practice oriented to 
serve particular interactiona1 functions (Potter, 1988b; 
Edwards, 1991). Analysis involves developing an 
understanding of these functions through an examination of 
textual construction and variation in relation to both the 
local and broader socio-po1itica1 context. In this study 
three 'levels' of context must be taken into account in 
interpreting the findings: the micro context of 
conversational detail, the specific context of each 
interview, and the macro context of the socio-politica1 
environment. 
As we have seen, analysis of the nuances of interactiona1 
detail of the interview transcripts revealed a high degree 
of variability in racial discourse, as well as certain 
similarities in account construction (in terms of 
discourses and rhetorical devices used) within each of the 
political groups (refer chapters 6, 7 & 8). However, to 
account for the differences between these self-defined 
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groups it is necessary to examine more closely the two 
broader 'levels' of context. 
The socio-political context of South Africa in the years of 
1991/1992 was characterised by the realisation on the part 
of 'white' people that the country was firmly set upon a 
course which would result in the relinquishing of 'white' 
power and a trans fer to 'black' power. On the left, 
preliminary preparations were under way for the first 
democratic election in south African history. Citizens were 
anxious to determine which political group would offer them 
a peaceful and prosperous future and to advocate on behalf 
of that group. In short, aligning oneself with a political 
group, and espousing the political rhetoric associated with 
that group, was an extremely salient activity at the time. 
Thus it is perhaps not surprising that the discourse of the 
participants in this study functioned to achieve certain 
political ends. 
While the broader socio-political context of discourse is 
important, the "interview context itself may elicit 
different ways of talking. Discourse analysts anticipate 
that in different discursive contexts, different linguistic 
repertoires may be deployed. For example, Gilbert & Mulkay 
(1984) found that scientists predominantly used what they 
termed an 'empiricist repertoire' in the context of formal 
research papers, and a 'contingent repertoire' in the 
context of informal interviews. In this study, therefore, 
the manner in which participants constructed accounts needs 
to be understood within the context of the interview 
itself. It is possible that in a different time and space, 
participants may have constructed an entirely different 
account - as was the case with Lucy. 
Lucy was interviewed twice, 
failed to record the first 
because the tape-recorder 
time round! The initial 
interview took place in the midst of a strike by the 
workers on the university campus. The day before the 
interview, Lucy's car had been struck by a bottle hurled by 
an angry worker at students driving onto the campus. During 
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the course of the interview, the workers had marched around 
the campus singing and chanting. Lucy was very upset by 
the events of the strike and became visibly agitated as the 
march got closer and closer to my office. She categorised 
herself as Nationalist, and expressed overtly racist 
sentiments in angry tones; these increased as the marchers 
got closer and waned as they retreated. 
The second interview was held some weeks after the strike, 
the campus was calm and student life had returned to 
'normal'. During this interview Lucy categorised herself 
as Liberal (she would vote for the Democratic Party) and 
did not express overtly racist views. Her discourse was 
typical of Liberal speakers and was characterised by 
contradiction and dilemma (refer chapter 7). Lucy' s 
presentation of two very different accounts in each of 
these interviews is not a function of an indecisive 
individual, but of the functional orientation of talk 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Lucy's 'metamorphosis' from 
Nationalist to Liberal, within the space of a few weeks, is 
evidence that Edwards (1991) is correct when he contends 
that· "categories are for talking"·. categories are not 
predetermined 'truths' (cf. MacNaughten, Brown and Reicher 
on the category of 'nature'), but are employed to serve 
particular rhetorical ends within the micro and macro 
context within which that discourse is framed. 
Thus far this discussion has addressed the issue of 
variability in some detail, partly because it is represents 
a cornerstone of discourse analytic theory and partly 
because the discourse of the participants in this study was 
so variable. However, to recap, while the racial discourse 
of young 'white' South Africans shares with previous 
studies a high degree of variability, it was neither 
uniformly 'deracialised', nor characterised by clear 
denials of racism. It is to these two aspects that this 
discussion now turns. 
Recent research has documented shifts in the expression of 
racist views (cf. Balibar, 1991a, 1991b; Cochrane & Billig, 
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1984; Go1dberg, 1993; Rattansi, 1992; Wallerstein, 1991; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992). It is argued that modern racial 
discourse has become 'deracialised' (Reeves, 1983), for: 
whereas once race seemed to be the most effective and 
prevalent legitimating tool, the ideological baton has 
now been handed to culture and nation. 
(Wethere11 & Potter, 1992: 119) 
While this trend has been documented in a number of 
countries, as mentioned earlier, the evidence from the 
present study is not so straightforward. A 'cultural 
discourse' was used by Nationalists and Liberals, but not 
by Left-wing participants; and it did not eclipse all other 
conceptions of 'race' as, for example, David Goldberg 
(1993) attests. Moreover, a 'discourse of nation' was 
entirely absent from the accounts of these young 'white' 
South Africans. 
In other parts of the world the general cultural norm 
against prejudice has resulted in speakers adopting new 
"masks of race" (Goldberg, 1993: 61) in order to disclaim a 
racist _identity. However, the South African context 
produces, and is reproduced by, slightly different 
ideological commonplaces. The talk of left-wing speakers, 
for example, eschews notions of 'culture'. Indeed, these 
participants deconstructed 'cultural' accounts as racist. 
The rhetorical device of reflexivity, whereby left-wing 
speakers displayed this political acumen, functioned to 
present members of this group as non-racist or, at the very 
least, as 'good' racists. 
By contrast, Nationalist and Liberal participants did 
deploy cultural arguments in their accounts of 'race' - but 
not in quite the same way as has been reported elsewhere. 
was firmly located Nationalist discourse, 
within the language of 
for example, 
biologism, overt racism was not 
avoided. However, Nationalists used a 'cultural discourse' 
to reinforce biological arguments: to provide further 
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evidence that racial differences (and 'white' superiority) 
were 'facts', startlingly obvious to anyone who cared to 
observe them. Thus, rather than forming the mainstay of 
racist arguments, cultural arguments supplemented 
biological ones. 
In the discourse of Liberal speakers 'cultural' arguments 
formed part of extremely complex accounts. Arguments about 
the insurmountable cultural differences between 'black' and 
'white' people were expressed via selected notions of 
Social Categorisation and Social Identity Theory. However, 
like Left-wing participants, Liberals made use of the 
rhetorical strategy of reflexivity in order to deconstruct 
as racist the cultural arguments of others. This is what 
made Liberal talk so dilemmatic: on the one hand, a 
discourse of culture was scathingly attacked in the 
accounts of other people, yet ironically, Liberals employed 
a cultural discourse to disclaim a racist identity for 
themselves. 
In short, while the discourse of culture did surface in 
some of the accounts of participants in this study, it did 
not do so with the same force as has been described 
elsewhere. The language of culture has not superseded the 
language of 'race' in South African discourse. Moreover, 
the discourse of 'nation' does not appear at all. 
The absence of a discourse of 'nation' is perhaps not 
surprising given the term's history in the South African 
context: the 'apartheid vision' originally propounded by 
Verwoerd, and refined in the 'reform' period of the 1980s, 
saw each 'race group' developing its own inherent potential 
within a specifically demarcated territory or set of 
territories, and ultimately becoming a sovereign 'nation' 
(Sharp, 1988b). 'Nationhood' constituted the ideological 
backbone of the National party's misguided attempt to 
'divide and rule', and as such has a long association with 
excessive racism in South Africa. For many South Africans, 
'nation' represents an old mask of racism and not a new 
one; therefore it is unlikely that modern-day speakers, 
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aware of the sanctions against the expression of prejudice, 
would employ this term. 
The third and final feature of contemporary racial 
discourse is that of denial. Typically, speakers deny that 
they are expressing racist views in order to disclaim a 
racist identity. In this study such denials of racism were 
a feature of Nationalist talk but did not feature 
significantly in either the talk of Liberal or Left-wing 
participants. Rather, the talk of these latter two groups 
was punctuated by admissions of racism. As discussed 
earlier (refer chapter 7, section 7.3), this finding may be 
related to the specifics of the South African context. 
However, it is possible that admissions of racism may have 
been overlooked in previous research as a consequence of 
the typically one-sided approach to human thinking adopted 
by psychologists (Billig, 1987). 
Rhetorical theorists, such as Billig (1987, 1991) have 
highlighted the two-sided nature of human thinking, and 
drawn attention to the need for a psychology which takes 
this into account. The findings of this study suggest that 
, 
identifying-denials of racism is an important but one-sided 
move on the part of discourse theorists - for as logos 
matches antilogos in the cut and thrust of thinking and 
arguing, denials of racism match admissions. As we have 
seen in Liberal discourse (refer chapter 7, section 7.3), 
these two rhetorical strategies are difficult to separate 
for admissions embrace denials in order to fulfil 
particular rhetorical aims. For Liberals, admitting to 
being racist functions to construct the speaker as a 'good' 
racist, and implicitly incorporates a denial of being a 
'bad' racist - in Liberals' terms, someone who fails to 
acknowledge their racism and to strive to rid themselves of 
it. Left-wing participants tended to construct 'cleaner' 
admissions of racism (refer chapter 8, section 8.3), but 
here too denials could be heard since admissions served to 
ward off criticisms of racism and to construct Left-wing 
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speakers as 'non-racist' or 'anti-racist' by dint of their 
modest reflections. 
In summary, the findings of this study are in line with 
current research on modern racial discourse in the 
following two respects: racial discourse is characterised 
bY a high degree of variability, and is oriented'ultimately 
to avoiding a racist identity. However, these findings 
diverge from others in respect of the discourse used to 
construct accounts of 'race' and racism, and the rhetorical 
strategies used to fulfil the function of eschewing a 
racist identity. In order to account for these differences 
it has been necessary to consider the dialectical 
relationship between discourse and society. 
hand, society constructs discourse since: 
On the one 
The way in which orders of discourse are structured, 
and the ideologies which they embody, are determined 
by relationships of power in particular social 
institutions, and in the society as a whole. 
(Fairc1ough, 1989: 31) 
On the other hand, discourse constructs 'society - it is 
both reflective and constitutive of external 'reality' 
since: 
the discursive act creates groups, interests, 
emotions, similarities and differences, a social 
landscape, an anthropology, a psychology of identity 
and even a geography. 
(Wethere11 & Potter, 1992: 146) 
In the following section the relationship between discourse 
and society is examined more closely, with reference to the 
degree to which discourse analysis has satisfactorily 
accomplished an integration of the two. 
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9.2 The Future of Discourse Analysis; Theoretical and 
pragmatic Issues. 
The relationship between text and context, or discourse and 
society, has been comprehensively reviewed in chapter 2 
(sections 2.3 & 2.4). Here, in the light of the analysis 
of South African racial discourse, I wish merely to raise 
again a few central points in relation to the current 
status of discourse analytic theory. Specifically, ! wish 
to address the importance of the concepts of ideology and 
power for an analysis of discourse, for as we have seen in 
the preceding section, the findings of this study have to 
be understood within the global, social or political 
context of South Africa in the early 1990s. 
To recap, I argued earlier that the two principal 
approaches to discourse analysis within psychology are 
unsatisfactory as they stand (refer chapter 2, section 
2.4). Broadly, Parker and Burman's approach is 
insufficiently grounded in the text itself although it is 
useful in respect of issues of ideology and power, while 
--Potter and Wetherell' s approach is excellent in terms of 
textual analysis but is poorly theorised (even recently) 
when it comes to power and ideology. 
As Parker has noted (1992), one of the negative effects of 
the rise of discourse analysis has been that the notion of 
ideology has almost disappeared from social psychological 
analyses. Yet, the concept of ideology is central to 
overcoming the individual-social dualism which continues to 
plague psychology (Henriques et aI, 1984). Moreover, in 
South Africa in particular (characterised by l~rge-scale 
intergroup conflict and a long history of domination and 
oppression) the processes of ideology are obviously central 
to understanding social psychological issues (Foster, 
1991d). Finally, a concern with ideology also reflects the 
desire of certain social psychologists to produce research 
which is socially relevant for as Kurt Lewin argued, nearly 
50 years -ago, psychology should be involved in the 
investigation of serious topics and committed to the idea 
222 
that "research that produces nothing but books will not 
suffice" (1948: 203; in Billig, 1977: 401). The 
development of a serious critical paradigm which explicitly 
addresses social and political issues must be premised upon 
notions of ideology and power (Burman, 1992; Lather, 1988; 
Bhavnani, 1988) because it is these concepts which provide 
the theoretical links between "the structures or strategies 
of discourse and the local and the global, social or 
political context" (van Dijk, 1990: 14). 
As yet, discourse analysis has not been very successful in 
connecting the detail of linguistic structure with wider 
analyses of the constitution of meaning; indeed, van Dijk 
maintains that "societal, political and cultural dimensions 
have received short shrift in the study of language use and 
discourse (1990: 7). The way forward seems to be through a 
conceptualisation of ideology as practical, lived and 
embodied within the everyday language of common-sense 
(Billig et aI, 1988). From this perspective, ideology 
operates through language and involves the ways in which 
meaning serves to sustain relations of power. Language 
represents the key to understanding the way in which 
particular practices are constituted and reproduced 
(Parker, 1992). Consequently, analyses of discourse should 
enable researchers to reveal the way in which power 
relations in society are maintained and changed, to 
examine: 
the nature of the social practice of which the 
discourse practice is a part, which is the basis for 
explaining why the discourse practice is as it is; and 
the effects of the discourse practice upon the social 
practice. 
(Fairclough, 1992: 237) 
The social practice of South Africa involves a history of 
colonialism and capitalism, one shared with many other 
countries. However, South Africa's political landscape is 
unique in two respects. First, in no other political 
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system in a sovereign state has overriding power been 
exercised by a minority racial group; and second, in no 
other political system has the central axis of policy-
making been the maintenance of racial stratification 
(Thompson & Prior, 1982). The nature of this social 
practice provides the basis for explaining the differences 
between the discursive practice of 'white' South Africans 
and those of other 'white' people in New Zealand, Britain 
and the Netherlands for example. 
While discourse theorists have tended to neglect notions of 
ideology and power, they have also tended to avoid the 
rather difficult area of social transformation or social 
change - perhaps with the exception of Norman Fairclough 
(1992). Fairclough's treatment of social change, however, 
is typical of his approach generally: it is fuelled by the 
right convictions, but somehow fails to produce an inspired 
account. with respect to social change, Fairclough (1992) 
reduces this vital area to three processes: 
'democratization', 'commodification', and 
'technologization'. He has an unfortunate penchant for 
neologism. Ultimately, while appearing to offer an exciting 
theory of discourse and social change, Fairclough's work 
becomes bogged down in figures of various dimensions and 
more terms than exist in the rest of discourse analysis put 
together. In short, it fails in its objectives (Takahara, 
1993) . 
This study was undertaken during a period of momentous 
social change and therefore some commentary (albeit 
cautious and preliminary) on the relationship between 
discourse and transformation is essential. Given that the 
interviews were conducted in a time of political upheaval, 
and that discourse "express (es), describe (es), enact(s), 
legi tima te (s) and reproduce (s) more global levels of 
societal structure and culture" (van Dijk, 1990: 9), it may 
be anticipated that participant's discursive practice 
should reflect something of the social practice of which it 
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is part. Again van Dijk (1990: 9) has described clearly 
why this should be the case - discourse participants: 
bring to bear their membership or position in societal 
groups or institutions within the local context, 
thereby at the same time contributing to the 
reproduction of such groups and institutions at the 
macrolevel. 
The most striking feature of the analysis of 'white' South 
African discourse was its relationship to 'political 
groups'. Indeed, until I examined the material in this 
context after months of fruitlessly searching for patterns, 
the discourse made very little sense at all. The turmoil 
associated with this juncture in South African political 
history seems to have caused speakers to mobilise their 
talk on issues of political relevance in terms of their 
declared political 'position'. In one sense, the analysis 
of discourse in this study may be seen as a mapping the 
languages of racism, because "at any given moment, 
languages of various epochs and periods of socio-
ideological life cohabit with one another" (Bakhtin, 1981: 
291). Thus, the language of biological racism (frequently 
assumed to be a language of the past), the language of 
differentialist racism (generally acknowledged as the 
language of the present), and the language of 'race' as 
social construction (arguably a language of the future) co-
exist, because although each discourse tended to be 
associated predominantly with a particular political 
position, this was not exclusively the case - as was 
evident in Liberal talk for example. 
It is possible to begin to see how each of these discursive 
practices 'positions' (Davies & Harre, 1990) the social and 
political subject in South Africa in 1991. At that time, 
the Nationalist Party continued to cling precariously to 
political power: the racist arguments of the past served to 
legitimate their continued exploitation of the 'black' 
majority. By contrast, for ANC supporters, political 
transformation was close to hand: the language of non-
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1. The talk of participants in this study was related to 
their definition of themselves in terms of political identity. 
Thus, identity was multiple and shifting within the micro 
context of talk and relatively consistent with respect to the 
interview as a whole. This finding raises questions about the 
ontology of identity and highlights the need for discursive 
psychology to address this issue in the near future. 
2. Discursive psychology needs to place more emphasis upon 
reflexivity; in particular, with respect to the 
researcher/respondent relationship and the way in which that 
relationship affects the discourses produced in research 
relationships. In this study, the respondents had all studied 
psychology, something which may raise questions regarding the 
generalisability of the research findings: would members of 
the general public use similar forms of talk in their accounts 
of 'race' and racism? Although it is not possible to produce 
a clear answer to this question without gathering further 
material (such as texts surrounding a particular issue or 
incident), I would suggest that similar discourses would be 
found in lay talk. The participants in this study drew in the 
main upon lay understandings of 'race' (e.g. biological 
arguments, arguments pertaining to the inevitability of social 
groups). In this study these were simply backed up by certain 
ideas gleaned from undergraduate psychological theory. 
3. The analysis of findings presented here is typical of the 
sort espoused by Wetherell and Potter (1987). However, if 
discourse analysis is to engage seriously with issues of 
ideology and power it would seem necessary to explore the 
development of an approach which tackles functionality not 
only at the level of individual talk, but at an institutional 
level as well. 
4. This research, because of both the topic studied and the 
way in which it has been approached, also has implications for 
the nature of a political psychology. 
It is only through confronting such issues that social 
psychology may move beyond reformist tinkering and toward a 
truly liberatory social science. 
racism and democracy heralded the imminent birth of a new 
era. For Liberals, acutely aware of supporting a political 
party with a minimum of support, the issue of the future 
presented a dilemma. On the one hand they supported 
change, but on the other hand, they were extremely wary of 
too much change: the complex and contradictory nature of 
their discourse echoed aspects of both Nationalist and 
Left-wing talk reflecting the ambivalence associated with 
being poised between the language of the 'old' South Africa 
and that of the 'new'. 
In summary, the findings of this study have pointedly 
demonstrated the importance of locating discourse within a 
broader social and political context as well as a local 
textual one: issues of ideology, power and social change need 
to be incorporated more fully into discursive theory and 
method. Additionally, this thesis has raised four other, 
related, issues which need mention here although a thorough 
exposition lies beyond the scope of this chapter: 
9.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I wish to make just two points. The first 
is best expressed in the words of Norman Fairclough (1989: 
234) . 
Even while we focus upon language and discourse, let 
us remind ourselves that social emancipation is 
primarily about tangible matters such as unemployment, 
housing, equality of access to education, the 
distribution of wealth, and removing the economic 
system from the ravages and whims of private interest 
and profit 
Fairclough's statement, however, seems to imply that the 
tangible matters he raises are outside the ambit of 
discourse studies. I would argue that they are not. While 
discourses support 
relations (Parker, 
institutions 
1992) , they 
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and reproduce power 
may also challenge 
institutions and undermine power relations - as we have 
seen in the South African context. Analyses of discourse 
should be aimed at empowerment, and ultimately social 
action (Bhavnani, 1988; Lather, 1988). As Potter and 
Wetherell (1987: 175) argued in their seminal text: 
The main point is that application is very much on the 
agenda and should not be relegated to an optional 
extra. 
My second, and final, point flows directly from the 
importance of application. On the 10th of May this year, 
Nelson Mandela -political prisoner for nearly three decades 
- was sworn in as South Africa's first 'black' State 
President. Apartheid was dead. However, while this moment 
may have signalled the end of centuries of 'white' rule, it 
did not signal the end of racism. Such an accomplishment 
remains a long way off. One of the Left-wing participants 
in this study (single quotation marks represent the speaker 
making curved gestures with her hands in the air) put it 
this way: 
But how do we get rid of 'race', once and for all, 
when we don't seem to be able not to see the 
differences (.) whether we call it 'race', 'culture', 
'ethnicity', or any other name we care to invent, 
those words still 'make' the difference. Even when I 
argued that it was a social construction, that still 
made it something. It feels like trying to conceive 
the end of the world when you're a child ... it won't 
end, it can't? can it? ... how will it end? 
A great deal of work remains to be done. 
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APPENDIX 1 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO BIOGRAPHICAL 
INFORMATION 
1. How old are you? 
2. Is Cape Town your home town? (if not, where did you 
grow up, when did you move to Cape Town?) 
3. How far did your mother go in school? 
4. Did she obtain any post-school qualifications? (if so, 
what were they?) 
5. Is your mother employed now? 
6. What work does she do, and how much does she earn 
approximately? 
7. How far did your father go in school? 
8. Did he obtain any post-school qualifications? (if so, 
what were they?) 
9. Is your father employed now? 
10. What work does he do, and how much does he earn 
approximately? 
11. Are your parents still married? (if not, explore 
background superficially) 
12. Have you any brothers and/or sisters? 
13. Do you still live at home? (if not, where do you live, 
with whom?) 
14. Where did you go to school? 
15. Did you come straight to university after you had 
finished school? (if not, what did you do between 
school and university?) 
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16. What degree are you registered for? 
17. What year of study are you in now? 
18. What were/are your majors? 
19. What are hoping to do with your degree? 
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APPENDIX 2 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
1. Understandings about 'Race' 
1.1 How would you define 'race'? 
1.2 What makes people different? (characteristics -
internal? external?) 
1.3 How would you define culture? (if arises here, 
otherwise after next question) 
1.4 Why are these different 'races'? How do you account 
for the development of different 'races'? (evolve, 
religious explanation etc, hierarchy?, different 
'levels of development' in different parts of the 
world?) 
2. Salience of 'Race' 
2.1 Do you think that 'race' influences most peoples' 
judgements (attributions) of one another in South 
Africa? How? Why? 
2.2 Do you think 'race' influences your assessments of 
people? How? Why? 
2.3 How important do you think 'race' is in terms of the 
everyday lives of most South Africans? 
2.4 How impor·tant do you think 'race' is in terms of your 
own daily life? 
3. 'Race' Relations and Attitudes 
3.1 Do you have any acquaintances who are not 'white'? 
3.2 Do you have any friends who are not 'white'? 
3.3 How did these relationships form? 
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3.4 Why is it difficult to have relations with people of 
other 'race-groups'? 
3.5 What would happen if your brother/sister/close 
relative wished to marry a 'black' person? How would 
your parents feel about it? (tape superficial 
reaction, real feelings) 
3.6 How would wider family and friends react? 
(superficially/really) 
3.7 How would you react/feel? 
3.8 Could you imagine having an intimate relationship with 
a 'black' person? Or have you had such a 
relationship, are you currently involved in such a 
relationship at present? (elaborate, explore, any 
difficulties, explore colour continuuml colour bar) 
3.9 Do you think there are any problems associated with 
being a child of a 'mixed' marriage? (will the 
increased number of children of 'mixed' marriages 
result in 'race' becoming less salient) 
3.10 How do you think you'd feel if 80% of UCT was 'black' 
and 20% 'white'? How would this distribution affect 
what happens at UCT? 
3.11 If 80:20 in your suburb (all immediate neighbours 
'black') 
your childrens' school 
shops 
social life 
What difference would this make? (standards/bending 
over 'blackwards' type issues) 
3.12 How would you feel if at some time in the future the 
religious festivals or holidays or traditions that you 
celebrate were no longer recognised? 
4. Racism 
4.1 How would you define racism? (explore continuum of 
racism vs either racist or not; affirmative action 
type issues often raised here, 'black' backlash) 
4.2 What sorts of things constitutes racism for you? 
(describe, probe) 
4.3 What do you think causes racism? 
4.4 Can you think of an incident when you've felt 
particularly 'white'? (explore in-group/out-group 
perceptions) 
4.5 Can you think of an incident when you've been racist? 
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4.6 Is there a racial incident which you have witnessed 
which you were not necessarily involved in that stands 
out in your mind? 
Describe it. 
4.7 How do we get rid of racism? (strategies, suggestions) 
5. Self 
5.1 Who or what do you think has been most influential in 
shaping you views as you've expressed them today? 
5.2 Have your views changed in any way in recent years? 
Why? How have they changed? 
5.3 How different are your views from those of 
your partner? 
your family? 
your friends? 
5.4 How would you define yourself? (identify with, explore 
groups) 
5.5 In the South African context, what groups do you see 
as the most important/salient at the moment? 
6. Politics 
6.1 Where do you locate yourself on the political 
spectrum? (membership?, vote for?) 
6.2 How do you feel about the protection of minority 
rights? (one person one vote? (Bill of Individual 
Rights?) 
6.3 will racial tension resole itself in a new South 
Africa? How? 
6.4 Separated/ integrated? What will happen in a new 
South Africa? 
6.5 Do you feel optimistic/pessimistic about the future of 
this country? Explain. 
6.6 Do you have a future vision of South Africa? What is 
it? And where do you fit in it? 
6.7 Is there a point at which you would leave the country? 
7. General 
7.1 Is there anything that we haven't discussed that you'd 
like to, anything I haven't covered that you feel is 
important, anything I've said that you want to pick up 
on? 
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APPENDIX 3 
TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS 
Example 1 
Lea: So, (.) then it is something that affects you on a 
daily basis (.) is that what II you're saying? 
Sarah: I I Ja (.) I don't (.) if you're busy and you're 
going through your day it doesn't affect you, but 
if you've got time to sit back and wonder about 
life (.) then it does affect you start 
wondering about this whole issue. 
Example 2 
Lea: 
Sam: 
Bu t presumably its no t (.) I mean in the fu ture it 
would be perfectly conceivable for you to have an 
intimate relationship wi th someone who wasn't 
white? 
Absolutely! No, that's not (.) I wouldn't do it as 
a kind of badge of honour (mm) to say look I'm 
really trendy you know. It would have to be the 
person and as I'm saying I'm finding black [hands 
in air for inverted commas} people more and more 
attractive you know. Maybe it's because I'm on the 
rebound from Johan you know (.) it might be. 
The system of transcription illustrated in these two 
examples is based loosely upon that of Jefferson (cf. 
Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1985), and follows 
conventions used by Wetherell and Potter (1992) in their 
recent study of 'white' New Zealanders. 
As noted earlier (refer chapter 4, section 4.4), this 
system maximises readability; consequently, commas, full 
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stops, question marks and exclamation marks have been 
added. The main conventions which appear in the extracts 
above are explained below: 
(.) - pause in speech flow 
II - starts of overlap in talk 
- omitted material 
~ - words said with emphasis 
(mm)- interjections 
[xxl- clarificatory material usually relating to non-verbal 
gestures 
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